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ON-THE-JOB
TRAINING

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In 1964, Gary Becker noted the important role of on-the-job training 
in Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education by observing that:
Theories of firm behavior, no matter how they differ in other 
respects, almost invariably ignore the effect of the productive pro 
cess itself on worker productivity. This is not to say that no one 
recognizes that productivity is affected by the job itself; but the 
recognition has not been formalized, incorporated into economic 
analysis, and its implications worked out.... Many workers 
increase their productivity by learning new skills and perfecting 
old ones while on the job. Presumably, future productivity can be 
improved only at a cost, for otherwise there would be an unlimited 
demand for training (1964, p. 8).
In the decades following Decker©s classic text, researchers have 
made substantial progress in achieving Becker©s goal of fully incorpo 
rating the role of on-the-job training into economic analysis.
Researchers now widely accept that there are two key aspects of 
training. First, there is the recognition that on-the-job training is an 
important example of an "investment" in human capital. 1 Like any 
investment, there are initial costs. For on-the-job training, these costs 
include the time devoted by the worker and co-workers to learning 
skills that increase productivity plus the costs of any equipment and 
material required to teach these skills. Like any investment, the returns 
to these expenditures occur in future periods. For on-the-job training, 
these future returns are measured by the increased productivity of the 
worker during subsequent periods of employment.
The second key aspect of on-the-job training is the distinction 
between "general" and "specific" on-the-job training, a distinction 
emphasized by Becker in his early works. While all training increases
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the productivity of the worker at the firm providing the training, gen 
eral training also increases the productivity of the worker at firms other 
than the one providing the training. For example, a secretary who 
learns the use of a standard word-processing program or a doctor who 
interns at a specific hospital both receive general training, as these 
skills are transferable to other workplaces. On the other hand, specific 
on-the-job training increases the productivity of the worker at the firm 
providing the training, but not at other firms. Resources spent orienting 
new employees to the practices of their new employer, or teaching 
employees how to contribute to a unique assembly process or work 
team, are examples of specific training.
Chapter 2 presents the standard theoretical framework for assessing 
the impact of on-the-job training on productivity, wages, and turnover. 
This sets the stage for our investigation in subsequent chapters of the 
magnitude and effects of on-the-job training, an investigation that 
focuses on three employer-based surveys of the training received by 
newly hired workers. We start by considering two questions: Exactly 
how much training do employers provide their workers? Who receives 
this training? Chapters 3 and 4 address these two issues: the extent of 
training and the characteristics of the recipients of on-the-job training. 
Our focus is on the extent of training provided to new workers during 
their first three months of employment. We find that a substantial 
amount of on-the-job training takes place at the beginning of a job, that 
most of this training is informal training, and that participation in this 
training depends on such variables as an individual©s level of education 
and experience.
The findings reported in chapters 3 and 4 rely solely on employer- 
based surveys. This raises the issue of whether the patterns of on-the- 
job training reported by employers are similar to workers© perception 
of the extent of training. One way to examine this is to identify a par 
ticular position and compare the employer©s response concerning the 
training involved with the responses of the worker who is the recipient 
of this training. An analysis of such a "matched" survey is the subject 
of chapter 5. We find substantial measurement error in the training 
variables, and also that firms tend to report more training than workers. 
But there appears to be no systematic variation in reporting errors 
based on firm or worker characteristics, and aggregate reported mea 
sures of the incidence of training are similar.
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The theory of on-the-job training developed in chapter 2 involves 
several key predictions concerning the effect of training on the starting 
wage and on wage and productivity growth. Chapter 6 investigates the 
evidence supporting such predictions. We find that training does 
increase wage and productivity growth as anticipated, but there appears 
little evidence that training substantially reduces the starting wage as 
predicted.
Chapter 7 investigates evidence consistent with the possibility that 
there is a matching of positions with more training to more "able" indi 
viduals. To do so, we examine employer recruiting activities. Here, we 
find evidence of a systematic attempt by employers through their hiring 
activities to link high training positions to higher-ability workers. In 
short, employers do spend substantially more time searching for a new 
employee if the position to be filled involves greater training. These 
findings provide a rationale for our failure in chapter 6 to detect a 
strong, inverse relationship between the level of training and the start 
ing wage. Chapter 8 summarizes all of our findings and offers some 
policy recommendations.
NOTE
1. Human capital investments have been classified as ". . . activities that influence the future 
money and psychic income by increasing the resources in people" (Becker 1964, p. 1). Human 
capital investments include not only schooling but also on-the-job training, migration, medical 
care, and searching for information about wages and prices. All these activities are engaged in at 
some cost and yield future returns, often in the form of higher wages.

CHAPTER
On-the-Job Training
as an Investment in Human Capital
A 1992 survey by the Small Business Administration indicates that 
workers© starting wages in 1992 increased by 10 cents for each addi 
tional month of formal education. This finding is consistent with an 
extensive literature documenting the fact that firms pay higher wages 
to workers with greater formal education, consistent with the assump 
tion that such workers are more productive. It is not clear, however, to 
what extent formal education can be viewed as an investment in human 
capital that directly increases a worker©s productivity. An alternative 
view is that formal education acts as a signal that more productive 
workers, because they can acquire additional formal education at a 
lower cost, do so to signal their higher productivity to employers. In 
this view, increased formal education does not increase the inherent 
productivity of workers, but it does reveal those workers who are more 
able.
It is not our intent to discern the relative importance of formal edu 
cation as a human capital investment versus formal education as a sig 
nal of ability. Rather, we seek to focus on a different, less-studied type 
of human capital investment on-the-job training. The potential 
impact of on-the-job training on worker productivity can be substan 
tial. For instance, the SBA survey of employers that we later analyze 
extensively indicates that if an employer spends an additional month 
providing on-the-job training to a particular worker, that worker©s 
hourly wage will rise by 6.5 cents. This 6.5 cent figure likely underesti 
mates the actual increase in worker productivity that can be attributed 
to on-the-job training. The reason for this is that part of the return to 
on-the-job training is reaped by the employer as higher profits, as pro 
ductivity increases by more than the wage paid.
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The extent of on-the-job training varies widely across different 
occupations and industries. What patterns in terms of differences in 
wage and productivity growth, as well as hiring activity and turnover, 
should we expect to see across positions? To answer this question, we 
introduce the standard theory of the effects of on-the-job training, fol 
lowing our presentation of a simple training model. In doing so, we 
introduce the important distinction between "general" and "specific" 
on-the-job training. We also explore the implications of training for 
turnover.
On-the-job training is but one approach to explaining why wages 
grow with job tenure. This chapter reviews other theories that provide 
alternative explanations. The job-matching/learning approaches sug 
gest that wage growth reflects the revelation of information concerning 
the productivity of particular workers assigned to particular tasks, not 
on-the-job training that increases productivity. The incentive-based 
thesis suggests that the higher wages paid to long-term employees indi 
cates a long-term contract that incorporates appropriate incentives to 
minimize shirking by newly hired workers. The final section of this 
chapter provides an overview of the available evidence concerning the 
major predictions of on-the-job training theory.
A Simple Model of On-the-job Training
When a worker is hired, there is a match between a particular posi 
tion and a particular worker. Firms© positions differ with respect to a 
variety of factors including the extent of on-the-job training required, 
formal educational requirements, the capability of the employer to 
monitor workers© effort, and the safety or attractiveness of the work 
place. Workers also vary widely with respect to such factors as innate 
ability, formal education attainment, and the propensity for future turn 
over.
To focus on the role played by on-the-job training, let us consider a 
simple situation in which a worker is hired by a firm for two periods. 
The worker comes to the firm with a level of general human capital 
acquired through formal education E and a level of ability denoted by 
the Greek letter a. A worker with no training but with education E and
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ability a has productivity in the first, or beginning, period of work 
denoted by the term p(E, a, 0), where the zero in this expression indi 
cates that the worker has received no training by the current employer 
in prior periods. Naturally, increases in formal education or ability 
make the worker more productive. In terms of first derivatives of the 
productivity function, this means that dpIdE > 0 and dpi da > 0.
During the first period, the employer provides the total training to 
the worker denoted by the vector T. The training provided take two 
forms. General training, denoted by Tg, is training that increases the 
worker©s productivity not only at the firm providing the training, but 
also at other firms. Specific training, denoted by 7^, is training that 
increases the worker©s productivity only at the firm providing the train 
ing. Thus, the training vector T = (Tg, Ts). Training increases the pro 
ductivity of the worker at that firm in the future. In our simple example, 
the future is the second period. Thus, a worker with ability a and edu 
cation level E who has received general training Tg and specific train 
ing Ts at the firm will have a productivity in the period "after" training 
given by:
(2.1) fa = p(E,cc,T)
where dp/dT > 0. We assume that increased ability a not only increases 
worker productivity, but also affects the return to training. In particular, 
it is assumed that cPpldTda > 0. In words, the return to increased train 
ing is greater for more able workers (workers with a higher a).
Training increases future productivity, but it comes at a cost. Other 
wise, as Becker notes, "there would be an unlimited demand for train 
ing." (1964, p. 9) One way of introducing costs of training is to view 
part of the output of a worker being consumed by the training activity. 
That is, output produced for sale is reduced as the worker takes time 
out to learn how to increase productivity by observing others. Training 
costs also include the lost output of co-workers and managers who take 
the time to show the new worker techniques for improving productiv 
ity. 1 Let c(E, a, T) denote the total training costs in terms of lost output 
that the employer incurs during the first period to provide training T to 
an individual with formal education E and ability a.2 Naturally, dc/dT 
is greater than zero, such that there are greater costs to increased train-
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ing. The net productivity of a beginning worker during the training 
period is thus given by:
(2.2) fb =p(E,a,0,0)-c(E,a,T).
If there were no training provided (T - (Tg, Ts) - (0, 0)), then train 
ing costs are zero i.e., c(E, a, 0, 0) = 0.
As expressions (2.1) and (2.2) indicate, with no training the net pro 
ductivity of the worker during the first and second periods of employ 
ment would be identical. If the worker receives some training (i.e., Tg > 
0 or Ts > 0), then the productivity of this worker after training (fa) is 
higher than his or her net productivity during the first period (fb) for 
two reasons. First, there is the productivity enhancement of training in 
that p(E, a,T)> p(E, a, 0, 0) if Tg > 0 and/or Ts > 0. Second, there is 
the cost of training c(E, a, T) in terms of the reduced contribution to 
output of the worker during training along with reduced output by co- 
workers.
Let wb denote the "beginning" wage paid the worker during the first 
period and wa denote the wage paid a worker during the second period 
of employment, "after" training. Let q denote the probability a worker 
quits the employer at the end of the first period of employment. With 
probability 1 - q, the worker remains at the employer for a second 
period of employment. Then the employer©s expected net present value 
to hiring a worker and providing training levels Tg and Ts during the 
first period of employment, NPV, is given by:
(2.3) NPV =fb - Wb + $(\-q)(fa - Wa)
where ft is the discount factor (1 > ft > 0). The second term in expres 
sion (2.3) indicates that with probability 1 -q, the worker does not quit, 
and the firm reaps the net return/  - wa from the trained worker during 
the second period of employment.
We start by comparing the wages paid beginning and trained work 
ers. Competition across employers in the form of the creation or 
destruction of various positions means that, in equilibrium, all three 
types of positions will have zero net present value to employers. Set-
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ting NPV, as defined by expression (2.3), equal to zero, wages satisfy 
the following zero profit condition:
(2.4) wb + p(l-q)wa =fb + $(l-q)fa .
Substituting (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.4), and noting that total training, 
r, is equal to the vector of general and specific training, (Tg, Ts), the 
zero profit condition implies the following two-period wage function 
for newly hired workers:
(2.5) wb + p (\-q) wa =p(E, a, 0, 0)- c(E, a, Tg, Ts) 
+ P(\-q)p(E> a,Tg,Ts).
The next two conditions place restrictions on the wage paid to 
trained workers. The first condition, a result of competition among 
employers for trained workers, requires that employers pay an after- 
training wage wa at least as great as the trained worker©s potential con 
tribution to output at other firms. 3 Otherwise, such workers will be bid 
away. As the potential contribution of workers at alternative employers 
depends on the extent of general, but not specific, training, we thus 
have the following expression for the wage paid to workers after the 
training period:
(2.6) wa >p(E, a,Tg,Q).
Condition (2.6) indicates that competitive forces provide a lower 
bound to the wage an employer pays a trained worker.
There are other forces that impose an upper bound on the after-train 
ing wage wa . Specifically, the employer will have an incentive to unilat- 
erally dismiss a trained worker if the wage paid the trained worker in 
the second period exceeds his or her productivity. Such moral hazard 
considerations on the part employers imply that an incentive-compati 
ble wage agreement will require a second period wage that does not 
exceed the worker productivity. That is, we have the following condi 
tions concerning the wage paid a trained worker:
(2.7) wa <p(E,a,TK,Ts).
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The danger of an employer paying a wage in the second period below 
that previously agreed upon is not considered. It is assumed that the 
potential for the worker to sabotage production in retaliation against 
such actions is a sufficient deterrent.
By invoking conditions (2.5) - (2.7), we can identify reasons for dif 
ferences in wages across various positions that differ solely in the 
extent and type of training. For instance, let w0 denote the per-period 
wage for a worker in a position that offers no training and wag denote 
the wage paid a worker after receiving general training Tg but no spe 
cific training. Conditions (2.6) and (2.7) imply that w0 will exactly 
equal the worker©s productivity in the position, pa(E, a, 0, 0), while wag 
will exactly equal pa( E, a, Tg , 0). Thus, the difference in the second- 
period wage paid to workers of identical ability a and education E 
across these two positions is:
(2.8) wag -w0 = p(E, a, Tg, 0) - p(E, a, 0, 0) = r(E, a, T8) > 0
where r(E, a, Tg) is the gross return in terms of increased productivity 
from an investment in general training Tg by a worker with ability a 
and formal education E.
If the worker reaps the entire return to general training, then from 
the zero profit condition (2.5) it follows that the worker must bear the 
entire cost of general training. In other words, the first period wage of 
workers who receive general training, wbg , is reduced by the cost of 
providing the training. That is,
(2.9) w0 -wbg = c(E, a,Tg)>0
where c(E, a, Tg) is the total cost in terms of lost output from an invest 
ment in general training Tg by a worker of ability a with education E.
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) illustrate the well-known prediction that 
workers reap all the returns to general training and bear all the costs of 
such training. What is not indicated is whether the return to general 
training, fully captured by workers through higher wages after training, 
more than compensates workers for the costs in terms of the reduced 
wages received during the training period. That is, we have not yet 
placed any restrictions on the net gain to an individual investing in the
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level of general training Tg . For an individual of ability a with formal 
education level E, the net value to such an investment is:
(2.10) Vg(E, a, Tg) = p r(E, a, Tg) - c(E, a, Tg).
Clearly there are differences across workers in terms of ability a and 
differences across positions in terms of training requirements. Assum 
ing that Vg is increasing in ability, it follows that workers will be sorted 
across positions according to ability, with the higher ability workers 
assigned to positions with increased training.4 An equilibrium in which 
some positions offer general training while others do not then requires 
that there exist a marginal worker with level of ability amg and formal 
education Emg who will be just indifferent between the two positions. 
For such a worker:
(2.11) Vg(Emg, amg, Ts) = p r(Emg, amg, Tg) - c(Emg, amg, Tg) = 0.
For this worker, the fact that the present value of the return to general 
training exactly matches the cost of such training implies that the two- 
period return to accepting a position with general training Tg is identi 
cal to a position that offers no training.
With regard to specific training, the restrictions on the wage paid to 
trained workers as represented by conditions (2.6) and (2.7) do not, by 
themselves, determine who bears the costs of, or reaps the return to, 
specific training. For the moment, let us assume that workers reap a 
constant fraction 8 (1 > 8> 0) of the total return to specific training in 
the form a higher wage after training. If the worker receives the frac 
tion S of the return to specific training, then the difference between the 
wage was paid to a worker after receiving only specific training Ts and 
the wage w0 paid a worker with no training is:
(2.12) was -w0 = 6 \p(E, a,0, Ts)-p(E, a, 0,0)] = 8 r(E, a; Ts) > 0 .
As with general training, the zero profit condition across positions 
that vary in training implies that if a worker reaps some of the return to 
specific training, the worker must bear some of the costs in terms of a 
reduction in the beginning wage. From equation (2.12) and the zero 
profit condition (2.5), for workers who receive the fraction 8 of the
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return to specific training, the cost of training in terms of a lower wage 
equals:
(2.13) w0 - wbs = c(E, a. Ts) - (1-6) p (\-q) r(E, a, Ts).
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) illustrate the well-known point that if 
workers receive a greater fraction of the return to specific training (a 
higher 8), they will bear a greater cost in terms of a reduction in the 
starting wage. Naturally, for a given 8 < 1, both a lower quit rate q or 
greater return to specific training r(E, a, Ts) will reduce the training 
costs borne by the worker as each change increases a firm©s reward to 
providing the training. This reflects the fact that the overall net return 
to specific training, given by:
(2.14) VS(E, a,Ts,q)l = (\-q) r(a, E, Ts) - c(a, E, Ts) 
depends inversely on the quit rate.
Traditional Predicted Effects of Training on Wages, 
Productivity, and Turnover
Below we summarize the above discussion of on-the-job general 
and specific training with respect to the commonly cited implications 
for wages and productivity. We then turn to the implications of specific 
training for turnover. With respect to the effect of general and specific 
training on the pattern of wages, we have the following two proposi 
tions. 
Proposition 1: Comparing a position that offers general on-the-job
training with one that offers no training, if workers of similar ability
and level of formal education were to be employed in both positions,
then the following predictions hold:
  The wage paid after training to a worker in the position offering the 
general training would be higher to reflect the increased productiv 
ity of the trained worker at the employer offering the training as 
well as at other employers (see condition (2.8)).
  The starting wage for a worker at the position that offers the train-
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ing would be lower to reflect the cost of training (see condition 
(2.9)).
  The growth in wages and productivity for a worker at the position 
offering general training would exceed that of a worker at the posi 
tion not offering such training (see conditions (2.8) and (2.9)).
  The growth in wages and productivity for a worker who starts in a 
position offering general training would be identical whether the 
worker quits after training to work for another employer or 
remains with the employer (see conditions (2.6) and (2.7)). Thus, 
controlling for the effect of work experience on wage and produc 
tivity growth, there would be no additional effect on wages and 
productivity growth for workers who have a longer tenure at a par 
ticular firm.
Proposition 2: Comparing a position that offers specific on-the-job 
training with one that offers no training, if workers of similar ability, 
level of formal education, and quit propensity were to be employed 
in both positions, then the following predictions hold:
  The wage paid to workers after training would be higher to reflect 
the increased productivity of the trained worker at the employer 
offering the training (see condition (2.12)). The extent of the 
increase will depend directly on the sharing rule for total returns 
(8) and total return to the investment (see condition (2.12)).
  The starting wage for a worker at the position that offers specific 
training would be reduced if the worker (a) reaps a greater share 6 
of the return to such training, or (b) has a higher quit propensity q 
(see condition (2.13)).
  The growth in wages and productivity for a worker who starts in a 
position offering specific training would be lower if the worker 
quits after training to work for another employer. The lower growth 
occurs because the worker forfeits his or her share of the return to 
the investment in specific capital. Thus, controlling for the effect of 
work experience on wage and productivity growth, specific train 
ing suggests an additional effect on wages and productivity growth 
for workers with a longer tenure at a particular firm. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the potential wage profiles for individuals with 
no training, with a given amount of training that is all general, and with 
the identical level of training that is specific. For specific training, it is 
assumed that the worker and firm share both the cost to and return from
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the training. This explains the less steep wage profile for the specific 
training compared to an identical level of general training. Either type 
of training, however, provides a rationale for an upward sloping wage 
profile.
Figure 2.1 Effect of Training on Wage Profiles
Wages General Training
Specific Training 
No Training
Tenure at Firm
Wage Equations Implied by the On-the Job Training Model
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest the estimation of the following wage 
equations for beginning and trained workers: 5
(2.15) In (wb) = b0 -bl In Tg -b2 In Ts + b3 In a + b4 In E-b5 q + e 
and
(2.16) In (vvf) = eQ + e\ In Tg + e2 In Ts + e3 In a + e4 In E - e5 q + e
where b, , et > 0, i = 0, ... , 5. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that, control 
ling for individuals© levels of ability (a), formal education (£), and quit 
propensities (q), a cross section of beginning workers© wages should 
reveal the pattern of lower starting wages at positions with more train-
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ing, with a greater negative impact on the starting wage for general 
training, as workers bear the entire cost of such training (i.e., b l > b2). 6 
Conversely, a cross section of trained workers© wages should reveal the 
pattern of higher wages at positions that offer more training, again with 
general training having a greater impact (i.e., e l > e^).
Often measures of differences in training across positions are not 
directly available. One alternative approach to test the theory of on-the- 
job training, an approach that circumvents this lack of data, uses data 
on the lengths of time a worker has been in the labor market and with a 
particular employer as proxies for the extent of general and specific 
training. The argument is that, as training takes place over time, the 
extent of general training should be directly correlated with the length 
of time an individual has been in the labor force, or what is generally 
referred to as his or her length of work "experience." Similarly, with 
regard to specific training, a greater length of time a worker has 
remained at a particular employer, or what is generally referred to as 
his or her "tenure" at an employer, is interpreted as indicative of a 
worker who has acquired greater specific training. As we discuss later 
in this chapter, these proxies have been used to test for the predicted 
returns to training.
The Implications of Specific Training for Turnover
A unique aspect of specific training as an investment in human cap 
ital is that, for such an investment to pay off, an employer and 
employee must continue in their employment relationship. Equation 
(2.14) illustrates this by noting that the net return to specific training, 
Vs, increases with a reduction in the quit propensity. In a more general 
model, not only the propensity of workers to quit but also the propen 
sity of employers to terminate the employment relationship through a 
unilateral discharge influences the net return to specific training. Such 
turnover, whether initiated by employer or employee, imposes costs on 
the other party when the costs and returns to specific training are 
shared (1 > 6 > 0). There are at least two ways to minimize the 
adverse effects of turnover decisions on the joint return to specific 
training: contract choice and the sorting of workers across positions 
based on their quit propensities. We consider contract choice first.
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To minimize the adverse effects of turnover decisions, an optimal 
employment contract will seek an arrangement in which the individu 
als workers or employer who make turnover decisions after train 
ing quit or discharge consider the entire lost return to specific 
training arising from a termination of the employment relationship. For 
instance, let©s say that the sole source of turnover is quit decisions by 
workers who discover new, more attractive alternatives. If one were to 
restrict the analysis to the appropriate sharing rule (i.e., optimal choice 
of §), then the optimal sharing rule would be to set 8 equal to one. In 
this case, the worker contemplating whether or not to quit would bear 
all the costs, in terms of the forgone return to specific training, if the 
decision were to quit. 7
If one were to consider more flexible contractual forms, then the 
optimal contract would specify that a worker who quits must compen 
sate the employer for any lost return to specific training. Similarly, an 
employer who discharges a worker must compensate the worker for 
any lost return to specific training. Such payments are not uncommon. 
For instance, the practice of granting severance pay to a dismissed 
worker can be interpreted as a contingent terminal payment that forces 
employers to compensate workers for lost returns to specific training. 
Similarly, the fact that, if workers quit shortly after receiving training, 
they give up future pension payments or paid vacations, illustrates ter 
minal payment by workers to employers that compensates the 
employer for the lost returns to specific training.
The above discussion leads to the following proposition concerning 
the nature of contracts that arise at positions with specific on-the-job 
training. 
Proposition 3: Comparing a position that offers specific on-the-job
training with one that offers no training, if workers of similar ability
and level of education were to be employed in both positions, then
the following predictions hold:
  If workers are to receive new information on the value of alterna 
tives to continued employment, it is optimal for workers to bear at 
least part of the cost and reap at least part of return to specific 
training as higher posttraining wages. The outcome is a wage for 
the experienced worker that exceeds that available from other 
employers. As a consequence, the worker will be less likely to quit. 
This result is strengthened if optimal contingent terminal payments
On-the-Job Training 17
(e.g., vested pension plans, paid vacation days based on seniority) 
are considered.
  If employers are to receive new information on the value of alter 
natives to continued employment, it is optimal for employers to 
bear at least part of the cost and thus reap at least part of the return 
to specific training as posttraining wages below the productivity of 
the worker. As a consequence, the employer will be less likely to 
discharge the worker. This result of a "quasi-fixed" labor input is 
strengthened if one considers optimal contingent terminal pay 
ments (e.g., severance pay). 8
A second way to minimize the adverse effects of turnover decisions 
on the joint return to specific training involves the sorting of workers 
across positions based on their quit propensities. For instance, let©s pre 
sume that the labor market is populated with two types of individuals. 
Stayers (51) have a low-quit propensity, qs, while movers (M) have a 
high-quit propensity, qM, with qM > qs. For positions that differ in the 
extent of general training alone, this difference in quit propensities 
would be irrelevant, as quit propensities do not affect the return to such 
an investment.9 As the expression for the net return to specific training 
indicates (expression (2.14)), however, individuals with a lower-quit 
propensity will find such positions more attractive. To the extent that 
the employer shares in the costs of and return to specific training, 
employers as well will place a greater value on individuals with the 
lower-quit propensity.
The fact that the joint gains to specific training are greater for work 
ers with the lower-quit propensity implies a sorting of workers. To see 
why, let©s assume that there are two types of positions, those that 
require no specific training and those that require substantial specific 
training. Further, let us assume that employment contracts are initially 
allocated randomly across the two types of workers (those with high- 
quit propensity qM and those with low-quit propensity qs). Given such 
an allocation, the wage profiles of the two types of positions are such 
that expected wages and profits are identical across the two positions 
for the mean quit propensity, with qM > q > qs. In this case, the stayers 
would prefer to be located in positions with specific training, as they 
would be more likely to reap a return to the training in the second 
period that takes the form of a higher wage. Conversely, the movers
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would prefer the positions with no specific training. Similarly, employ 
ers filling the positions that require specific training would prefer the 
stayers, as they would then be more likely to reap their portion of the 
return to specific training. Search and screening activities by both 
workers and employers to induce such a sorting of workers provide us 
with the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Comparing a position that offers specific on-the-job 
training with one that offers no training, the sorting of workers of 
similar ability and level of formal education but differing quit pro 
pensities provides the following predictions:
 Positions with specific on-the-job training would be populated 
with individuals who have a lower inherent propensity to quit. As a 
consequence, we would observe less turnover (quits) in positions 
that require more specific training.
  Workers with low-quit propensities would on average be more pro 
ductive in the labor force (e.g., they would be equally productive in 
positions requiring no specific training but more productive in 
positions with specific training). As a consequence, their compen 
sation should be greater than that of high-quit propensity individu 
als.
The importance of the above propositions is suggested by Lazear 
and Rosen (1988), Kuhn (1993), and Barron, Black, and Loewenstein 
(1993). These papers, among others, consider the sorting of women 
into jobs with low turnover costs (e.g., positions with low specific 
training) that can arise if turnover rates are inherently higher for 
females than males. If women have a weaker attachment to the labor 
force, then as proposition 4 indicates, efficiency, and hence labor mar 
ket equilibrium, requires that women be assigned to jobs in which turn 
over is less costly. Becker (1985) suggests that this sorting of women 
into such jobs that offer less training may reflect explicit decisions by 
women to take such positions because of their specialization in home 
production and weaker labor force attachment. Along similar lines, 
O©Neill (1985) argues that part of the gender wage gap is created by 
women©s preferences for part-time work and flexible work schedules.
Thus, the traditional model of on-the-job training provides 
predictions concerning the starting wage, wage growth, turnover, and 
even gender differences in the labor markets. At this point, however, it 
is worth noting the informational assumptions necessary for this
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model. First, both firms and workers must be able to agree on before- 
training productivity (fb ) and after-training productivity (fa ). 
Obviously, firms have an incentive to understate the productivity of a 
worker before the receipt of training so as to lower the starting wage. 
In addition, both firms and workers must agree on what are the costs of 
training (our <;( ) function). Unfortunately for the parties, there is no 
market that will efficiently provide a price quote for the training 
services. Again, firms would appear to have an incentive to overstate 
the cost of training to lower the starting wage.
Perhaps more important, workers and firms must agree on what 
training is general and hence should be funded by workers, and what 
training is specific, for which the firms and workers should share the 
investment. Clearly, firms would like to describe all the training as gen 
eral training, and workers would like to specify all the training as spe 
cific. The division of training between specific and general may not be 
as obvious as it first seems. Much training may be specific to an indus 
try, and if that industry©s employment is declining, should we count it 
as general training? When the market for trained workers is thin, it 
becomes difficult to determine what fraction of the training is truly 
general. In addition, because the gains to specific training are a func 
tion of the likelihood of job turnover, workers and firms must agree to 
the probability of job turnover. Finally, because labor contracts seldom 
explicitly determine the wage profile, workers and firms generally 
agree to an "implicit contract." Such implicit contracts inherently can 
not rely on third-party enforcement mechanisms to insure that both 
parties honor their commitments and hence are often difficult to 
enforce.
Other Models of Compensation, Productivity, and Turnover
On-the-job training models provide important insights into patterns 
of wages, productivity, and turnover. An investment in training today 
raises a worker©s future productivity and consequently his or her future 
compensation. As we have seen, since the initial contributions of 
Becker (1962) and Oi (1962), economists have drawn a key distinction 
between general training, which has value at alternative firms, and spe-
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cific training, which has value only at the firm offering the training. 
There are, however, alternative interpretations of the observed wage 
patterns that are predicted by on-the-job training. This section briefly 
considers two such alternatives: learning/job matching models and 
incentive-based compensation models. As we examine the extent and 
impact of on-the-job training, we must keep in mind the role these the 
ories could play. Otherwise, we may incorrectly attribute wage growth 
or productivity growth to on-the-job training when such growth actu 
ally reflects these other phenomena.
Learning/Job Matching Models
The human capital literature stresses the productivity-enhancing 
effects of on-the-job training. As this training is acquired during the 
first period of employment, it is predicted that productivity and wages 
will be directly correlated with experience. It has been suggested that 
other activities unrelated to traditional human capital investment also 
occur during the first period of employment and imply similar out 
comes. Specifically, employers gather information concerning a new 
workers© ability during the initial period of employment. Similarly, 
workers gather information concerning the nonpecuniary benefits of an 
employer. As discussed below, the acquisition of information can affect 
wage growth and task assignment. The key assumption of these learn 
ing/job matching models is that information on the value of a match 
between an employer and new hire increased over time rather than pro 
ductivity growth due to training. Below we consider three types of 
information that can be acquired over time.
The first type of information acquisition is known as the "learning 
model." In such models, the employer acquires information on the true 
ability of the worker. Those who are identified as high ability are 
rewarded by an increase in wage, for the employer seeks to reduce the 
likelihood of turnover by such individuals. Thus, the wages of some 
workers will rise over time as these workers are identified as the higher 
ability workers. Others will experience a decline in wages. This predic 
tion is distinct from human capital theory. For human capital theory, 
wages do not fall with tenure; zero training implies identical wages 
across time, while positive training implies rising wages. In contrast, if 
information revelation on ability occurs during the first period of a 
worker©s employment, then wages can fall for those workers revealed
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to be below average. In fact, Farber and Gibbons (1991) find that real 
wage declines do occur. They estimate that as many as 20 percent of 
workers experience a real wage decline with experience on the job.
The "job matching" literature focuses on a second type of informa 
tion acquisition. Unlike the learning model, the information acquired 
does not reveal the productivity of the worker at other firms. Rather, 
each employer regards all prospective employees as identical ex ante. 
In other words, the realized value of a match between any given worker 
with any given employer can be viewed as a random variable drawn 
from a common distribution. In some of the models (e.g., Johnson 
(1978), Viscusi (1979^, Lippman and McCall (1981), and Holmlund 
and Lang (1985)), the realized value depends on information the 
worker gathers during the first period of employment about working 
conditions and other non-pecuniary aspects of the employment rela 
tionship. In other models, e.g., Jovanovic (1979b), the realized value of 
a match between a firm and a worker is the discovered productivity of 
the worker. If the additional information suggests that the joint value to 
the match is a good one, the worker remains at the firm. If the realized 
joint value includes in part a good draw in terms of productivity, the 
worker who remains with the firm will receive a higher wage, for only 
the more productive matches continue.
A third type of information acquisition by employers during the ini 
tial period of employment concerns the tasks for which the new 
employee has a comparative advantage (that is, the tasks for which the 
new employee is the low-cost producer). As discussed by Barron and 
Loewenstein (1985), such information will allow the employer to effi 
ciently assign workers across tasks. The ability to assign workers effi 
ciently is valued by employers as it reduces production costs. Thus, 
employers will pay workers whose abilities they have identified higher 
wages to discourage turnover. Here it is possible that all identified 
workers will receive higher wages, as each could be equally capable at 
the task for which they have a now-identified comparative advantage.
Incentive-based Compensation Models
There are numerous examples of incentive-based compensation 
models. A key feature of such models is that employers cannot readily 
identify an employee©s work effort. For example, there might not be a
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clear link between observable current output and the worker©s effort, 
which is not directly observable. If it takes time to discover the extent 
of shirking by a worker, then an optimal compensation scheme would 
delay payment until it is revealed that the worker provided appropriate 
effort. If it turned out that the worker had shirked, termination of the 
employment agreement would deny the worker these anticipated large 
payments toward the end of his or her tenure at the firm. This could 
create a powerful incentive for workers to provide substantial work 
effort during the early periods of employment. Lazear (1979) describes 
this incentive-based compensation scheme as follows:
By deferring payment a firm may induce a worker to perform at a 
higher level of effort. Both firm and worker may prefer this high 
wage/high effort combination to a lower wage/lower effort path 
that results from a payment scheme that creates incentives to 
shirk. Thus, it may pay the firm and worker to set up a scheme 
such that the worker is paid less than his marginal product when 
he is young and more than his marginal product when he is old to 
compensation (p. 1264).
There are several pieces of evidence that suggest that incentive- 
based compensation models can complement training models in pro 
viding an explanation for wages rising with tenure at a particular 
employer. First, as Lazear notes, they are consistent with the institution 
of mandatory retirement, as older workers lack incentives to provide 
work effort and are paid a wage above their marginal product as a 
reward for providing substantial work effort in their youth. Second, as 
noted by Lazear and Moore (1984), the age-earning profile is less steep 
for self-employed workers, and these are the workers for whom the 
problems in inducing the appropriate level of effort do not exist.
Evidence Concerning the Standard Predictions 
of On-the-job Training
Tests of the predictions of the theory underlying on-the-job training 
have typically taken one of two approaches, depending on the avail 
ability of data. The first, and more common, approach is adopted when 
direct measures of on-the-job training are not available. As discussed
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above, by making the assumption that the extent of general on-the-job 
training varies directly with the time in the labor force (labor market 
experience) and that the extent of specific on-the-job training varies 
directly with time on the job (job tenure), economists have relied on 
measures of labor market experience and job tenure to proxy for on- 
the-job training. The second approach to testing the theory of on-the- 
job training relies on explicit measures of training.
Inferring Training from Wage Data
In his path-breaking research, Mincer (1974) established the stan 
dard specification for the effect of on-the-job training earnings over the 
life-cycle. Mincer assumed that on-the-job training investment was 
directly related to work experience, and suggested that individual (log) 
earnings appeared to be a quadratic function of experience. 10 This rea 
soning leads to the following specification for the typical wage equa 
tion that includes both a worker©s labor market experience and job 
tenure:
(2.17) In (w) = (3 x + <|), (exp) + <j>2 (exp)2 + YI (ten) + y2 (ten)2 + e
where x is a vector of control variables that includes measures of 
worker demographics and formal education, exp is the worker©s total 
labor market experience, ten is the worker©s tenure at the firm, £ is the 
error term, and j3, <j)©s, and /s are parameters to be estimated. 11
We may estimate equation (2.17) using standard regression analysis 
and claim that the <j)©s provide a measure of the returns to general 
human capital while the y©s provide some evidence about the returns to 
specific training. To see why, consider the experiment of two workers 
who have just completed their first year in the labor market: John and 
Carol. John has just left his previous employer, so while his experience 
is one year (exp = 1), his tenure at his current employer is zero (ten = 
0). Thus, John©s expected log wage is:
(2.18) £(ln(w)) = pjc + (|) 1 + (|)2
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because John now has one year of labor market experience, but his ten 
ure at his current employer is zero. In contrast, Carol©s expected wage is:
(2.19) £(ln(w)) = p;t + (|> 1 + (|>2 + y.+Y2
because she has both one year of experience (exp =1) and one year of 
tenure (ten =1).
If jobs offer general on-the-job training, both John and Carol will 
earn more after they have spent one year in the labor market (that is, 0, 
+ 02 > 0)- In addition, if jobs offer firm-specific training and if workers 
reap at least a portion of the returns to that specific training, Carol will 
earn an additional premium for her tenure at the firm (y, + y2 > 0). 
Because John has left his previous employer, any firm-specific skills 
that he may have picked up no longer increase his productivity and 
hence no longer have any impact on his wage. By examining the differ 
ence in the returns to Carol©s labor market experience and John©s labor 
market experience, we can identify the increase in wages due to firm- 
specific training. By examining the difference in John©s wage to a 
worker without any previous experience (or if available, comparing 
John©s wage a year ago to his wage today), we can identify the increase 
in wages from general human capital. 12
The above approach to estimating the impact of on-the-job training 
has a long history. Although the approach is simplistic, the data seem 
to support many of its implications. First, literally hundreds of studies 
find that wages increase with labor market experience, as one would 
expect if on-the-job training increases worker productivity and the 
extent of on-the-job training is directly related to the span of time in 
the labor force. Second, the literature also finds substantial increases in 
earnings when job tenure increases, suggesting that the increase in 
worker productivity from specific training is also, at least partly, 
reflected in the wages paid. Moreover, as the theory suggests, dimin 
ishing returns to experience and tenure with respect to their impact on 
wages is typically found.
Holzer (1990a, 1990b), however, cites recent evidence of mixed 
support for OJT theory©s claim that increased worker experience and 
tenure raises wages by increasing worker productivity. 13 One may 
question whether the finding that wages are significantly correlated 
with experience and tenure measures of on-the-job training is a true
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test of on-the-job training theory. There is, we believe, a sample selec 
tion problem. This notion, which dates back in economics to Roy 
(1951), emphasizes the non-experimental nature of most economic 
data. 14 Consider the experiment with John and Carol that we described 
above. Our interpretation is valid if John©s decision to leave his 
employer were a random event. In economics, however, it is often 
thought that agents© decisions are not random; they instead are the out 
come of rational agents attempting to maximize their utilities subject to 
the appropriate constraints. John may be unmotivated and may find it 
difficult to hold a job while Carol may be a highly motivated, loyal 
employee. Unfortunately, most data sets do not provide researchers 
with the necessary data to measure such differences. One way to model 
such unobservable characteristics is to assume they are a part of the 
error term, or
(2.20) ejt = T|J + «jt
where £jt is the error term for the jth worker (in our example, John or 
Carol) and t is the time period. The term rjj represents the individual©s 
"fixed effect," because it does not change over time while Ujt is the 
standard error term that varies each period. If we replace the error term 
in equation (2.17) with this more detailed error term, we can easily see 
some of the statistical problems that this selection problem generates. 
If the worker©s 77 is correlated with his or her tenure and labor market 
experience, OLS provides biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters (j)©s and y©s. For instance, suppose that r\ measures the 
worker©s motivation and suppose that more motivated workers are 
more productive (hence earn higher wages), more likely to stay at the 
current employer, and more likely to remain in the labor market. In this 
case, the (|)©s and y©s will be upwardly biased; we will be mistakenly 
ascribing the returns of the worker©s motivation to training.
We can avoid this problem if we have panel data that provide 
repeated observations on the wage of individual workers. For instance, 
one strategy would be to focus on the difference in wages between two 
years, or from equation (2.17):
(2.21) A(ln (w)) = (3 AJC + <j), A(exp) + <j>2 A(exp)2 + y, A(ten) 
+ y2 A(ten)2 + Au
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where the A refers to the difference of the variable between time t and 
(f-1). Equation (2.21) is independent of the 7]©s because we have 
removed them by "differencing" the data. If a variable does not change 
over time, we cannot identify the corresponding parameter.
Estimation of such fixed-effect models does eliminate the potential 
bias previously identified, but such estimation is clearly impossible in 
cross-sectional data. Fortunately for the human capital model, panel 
data sets have confirmed the presence of large experience and tenure 
affects on wages. As our discussion of the matching literature in the 
previous section suggests, however, fixed-effect models may not be 
sufficient to assure a clean test of on-the-job theory. To see why, con 
sider a slight generalization of equation (2.20):
(2.22) Ej^rij + cpjj + Mjt
where (p^ is a match-specific error term between thejth worker and the 
ith firm. 15
As the matching literature suggests, workers can differ in their pro 
ductivities because of idiosyncratic differences in the matches among 
workers and the firms. For instance, a worker may complement the 
unique skills of existing workers, or, conversely, a worker may not get 
along with current employees. The presence of this added match-spe 
cific effect, however, creates a major problem in the estimation of the 
returns to tenure. If a worker is well matched (has a large 77,,), he or she 
is more likely to remain at the firm. Thus, OLS estimation of equation 
(2.21) will result in biased estimates of the /s because workers who 
have remained with their current matches have higher <p©s than workers 
who leave. Moreover, as Jovanovic emphasizes, we might expect the 
value of <p to be learned over time, which further complicates the esti 
mation. While there have been numerous studies that attempt to control 
for these matching considerations, their results remain controversial. 
See Garen (1988) for a review of that literature. 16
While the job-matching argument does provide a challenge to the 
on-the-job training model in the interpretation of the returns to tenure, 
the job matching model does not challenge the interpretation of the 
returns to experience. The large return to labor market experience 
would appear to be good evidence of the returns to on-the-job training, 
but the relative importance of firm-specific training would appear very
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much in doubt. Moreover, we are unable to test the prediction that on- 
the-job training lowers the starting wage from this indirect measure of 
training. Clearly, a direct measure of training would be useful.
Evidence from Direct Measures of Training
Until recently, one of the key difficulties in testing on-the-job train 
ing theory has been the lack of explicit information on training activi 
ties. As Brown (1990) observes, "obtaining information on the extent 
of training of the workforce is complicated both by conceptual prob 
lems and by difficulty in actually measuring those aspects of training 
that seem relatively well-defined" (p. 98). There now exist data sets 
that offer a variety of direct measures of various types of on-the-job 
training.
Lynch (1992), Levine (1993), and Brown (1989) consider whether 
the observed positive correlation between wages and tenure can be 
interpreted as the return to on-the-job training. With regard to this 
issue, the results are mixed. If measures of training are included in 
wage equations, such measures (a) have no effect on the estimated 
returns to tenure according to Lynch, (b) have some effect on the 
returns attributable to tenure according to Levine, or (c) account for 
almost all the returns to tenure according to Brown. With regard to the 
predicted negative effect of training on turnover, Mincer (1988) reports 
that training and turnover are indeed inversely related. In contrast, 
however, Levine (1993) finds no evidence that establishments with 
high levels of training have low levels of turnover.
There appears to be more agreement concerning the impact of train 
ing on productivity and wage growth. For instance, Mincer (1989b) 
reports that the "range of estimates (on the rate of return to training) 
based on several data sets generally exceeds the magnitude of rates of 
return usually observed for schooling investments." (p. 20) Holzer 
(1990b) and Bartel (1992) find that training increases performance as 
well as wage growth. Booth (1993) also establishes that some types of 
employer- provided training affect earnings, although training is gener 
ally found to be greater and more portable across jobs for men than 
women.
Differences that do exist in the above analysis of the effects of on- 
the-job training can be attributed to at least two factors. One is that the
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various studies cited differ substantially in the measures of on-the-job 
training. Some training measures derive from worker surveys, other 
from surveys of firms. Some studies represent a national survey, while 
others focus on a single large firm. Some studies focus on formal train 
ing measures, while others include informal training activity as well. A 
second factor that can explain differences in results across studies is 
the importance of confounding hypotheses. For instance, Kaestner and 
Solnick (1992) suggest that the upward-sloping wage/tenure profiles 
attributed to on-the-job training-induced productivity differences may 
instead reflect the deferred payment scheme suggested by Lazear 
(1979, 1981). Simon and Warner (1992) view their analysis of the rela 
tionship among wages, experience, and job tenure as support for 
Jovanovic©s job-matching model, not the on-the-job training model. 
Finally, Barren, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) suggest that the 
matching of high ability workers to positions with high training can 
bias the estimated impact of training on wages.
In light of the above discussion, a key contribution of the chapters to 
follow will be to provide thorough analyses of the various effects of 
on-the-job training that (a) rely on a common set of on-the-job training 
measures across data sets, and (b) attempt to control for other hypothe 
ses that can confound estimations of the predicted effects of on-the-job 
training.
NOTES
1. Training costs can be broadly defined to include the "hiring costs" associated with resources 
devoted to interviewing and screening potential new employees, as well as losses due to the posi 
tion being vacant during this hiring process.
2. The training cost function includes the worker©s formal education and ability, as either 
could influence the cost of additional training.
3. Our discussion ignores any "search" costs associated with workers locating alternative 
employers. In addition, our analysis also assumes that other employers know at zero cost the 
extent of general training received by a worker.
4. The increase in the return to training for more able individuals reflects our prior assumption 
1hatd 2p/dTgda>Q.
5. The term "In" stands for the natural logarithm of the variable.
6. As we discuss in more detail below, estimation of these two wage equations is not as clear- 
cut as it may first appear. Difficulties arise from the assumption that ability affects the return to 
training. For instance, this assumption suggests that higher ability individuals will be matched to 
positions with greater training, such that differences in measured training be closely related to dif 
ferences in worker ability. The estimated coefficient on training may then capture not only the 
return to training but also compensation for increased ability. If for some reason workers of differ-
On-the-Job Training 29
ent ability are assigned to positions with the same amount of training, so that training and ability 
are not perfectly correlated, other issues arise. For instance, the assumption that the return to train 
ing depends on ability then suggests the inclusion of an ability/training interaction to capture the 
effect of ability on marginal return to training.
7. Hashimoto (1981) considers this problems.
8. The view that specific training can result in labor being a "quasi-fixed" factor of production 
was first emphasized by Oi (1962), who coined this term.
9. This statement assumes that a difference in the quit propensity of two workers simply 
reflects a difference in the likelihood a worker changes employers. However, the outcome of some 
quits is that the worker exits the labor market. If a higher-quit propensity reflects a reduced likeli 
hood of continued participation in the labor force, then the return to general training, which is 
reaped only by those who remain in the labor force, would be lower for those with a higher-quit 
propensity.
10. The quadratic form allows for decreasing returns to experience, indicated by a negative 
coefficient on the squared term. Recently, Murphy and Welch (1992) show that a quadratic speci 
fication tends to understate wage growth early in workers© careers. While they recommend the use 
of quadratic specifications, we will for convenience of exposition continue to use the quadratic 
specification.
11. In cross-sectional studies, Mincer suggested that researchers use age minus years of 
schooling minus six as a proxy for experience, with the six subtracted to account for the first six 
years of life when the individual is not in school and with schooling subtracted to reflect that the 
individual is (presumably) and working full time when enrolled in school.
12. Our informal presentation of this material belies the considerable theoretical underpin 
nings of the wage equations that labor economists estimate. See Mincer (1974) for a rigorous jus 
tification of the standard wage equations.
13. For instance, Hanushek and Quigley (1985), in probing the relationship between wage 
growth and investments in on-the-job training, find that the restrictions imposed on wage growth 
by OJT are not supported for substantial portions of the labor force.
14. Roy was concerned with worker©s nonrandom selections of jobs and the implications for 
the distributing of wages.
15. As in Willis and Rosen (1979), this also could be a match-specific parameter between the 
jth worker and the ith job.
16. Lazear (1979, 1981) also notes that presence of hours restrictions and mandatory retire 
ment provisions seems inconsistent with the basic human capital model. He argues that upwardly 
sloped wage profiles result, at least in part, from incentive contracts that firms design to avoid hav 
ing workers shirk.

CHAPTER
Measures of On-the-Job Training
For many years, economists seeking to test the theory of on-the-job 
training presented in chapter 2 have relied on proxy variables such as 
job tenure and labor force experience to measure the extent of on-the- 
job-specific and general training. In the past fifteen years, however, 
data sets with direct measures of training from both employees and 
employers have become available. In this chapter, we focus on 
employer-provided data. The first section introduces two employer 
training surveys. We then compare the employer-provided data of the 
1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) and 1992 Small 
Business Administration (SBA) surveys with employee-provided data 
from other surveys.
Employer Survey Questions on Training
This section analyzes two of the three data sources used in this 
book: the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey and the
1992 Small Business Administration survey. The third data set, the
1993 Upjohn Institute Survey, is considered separately in chapter 5, as 
this data set asked both employers and employees about the training 
activities of newly hired workers. We start with a brief description of 
the training questions contained in the 1982 EOPP and 1992 SBA sur 
veys.
The 1982 EOPP Survey
In 1980, the Department of Labor funded an extensive survey of 
employers to study the labor market effects of the Employment Oppor 
tunity Pilot Projects. This 1980 EOPP survey interviewed employers at
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23 sites across the country; approximately 5,700 employers were 
involved in the survey. In 1982, the National Institute of Education and 
the National Center for Research in Vocational Education funded a fol 
low-up survey of the employers who participated in the original 1980 
EOPP survey. For the second wave, 70 percent of the original respon 
dents completed surveys. The 1982 EOPP data set improved on the 
1980 EOPP survey by obtaining more detailed information on the 
training activities of the most recently hired employee.
Researchers have used the 1982 EOPP data set extensively (e.g., 
Barren, Black, and Loewenstein 1987; Bishop 1990; Holzer 1990a, 
1990b; and Holzer, Katz, and Krueger 1991). One key advantage of the 
survey is that it asked establishments detailed questions about the on- 
the-job training provided to the last worker hired at the establishment. 
In particular, the survey asked employers the following sequence of 
three questions:
During the first three months of work, what was the total number 
of hours spent on formal training, such as self-paced learning pro 
grams or training done by specially trained personnel?
During the first three months of work, what was the total number 
of hours management and line supervisors spent away from other 
activities giving informal individualized training or extra supervi 
sion?
During the first three months of work, what was the total number 
of hours co-workers who are not supervisors spent away from 
their normal work giving informal individualized training or extra 
supervision?
In a different section of the questionnaire, the employer was asked:
During the first three months of work, how many total hours does 
the average new employee spend in training activity in which he 
or she is watching other people rather than doing it himself or her 
self?
Answers to the above four questions provide information concerning 
four types of training. Answers to the first three questions provide the 
employer©s measure of the number of hours of formal training, of 
informal training that management provided, and of informal training 
that nonmanagerial co-workers provided to the newly hired worker in 
the first three months of employment. The fourth question sought to
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measure the number of hours during the first three months that the 
worker spent watching others in order to learn how to do the job. A 
final training question asked by the survey, similar to the worker-based 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics measure of training, was:
How many weeks does it take a new employee hired for (name©s) 
type of position to become fully trained and qualified if he or she 
has no previous experience in this job, but has the necessary 
school-provided training?
Because it asks respondents to calibrate their responses to workers 
without any previous experience, this question provides an indication 
of the total human capital that the job requires from nonschooling 
sources. As such, it is a distinct concept from the actual training 
received on the job. For example, workers with considerable previous 
experience may become fully trained and qualified much more quickly 
than this response indicates. Because of this distinction, we refer to the 
answer to this question as the total human capital required for the job 
that the worker holds. This question allows us to control for differences 
in the requirements or complexity of jobs across workers in the EOPP 
and SBA surveys. 1
The 1992 SBA Survey
In 1992, the Small Business Administration funded a survey to 
examine training at large and small firms. Survey Sampling, Inc. of 
Fairfield, Connecticut constructed the sample of businesses for this 
survey. Survey Sampling drew a stratified random sample of 3,600 
businesses from the Comprehensive Business Database, oversampling 
large establishments to ensure statistically meaningful comparisons 
between large and small firms. 2 The authors designed the survey and 
the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Kentucky con 
ducted the survey in the summer of 1992. 3
While based on the survey methodology of the EOPP data, the SBA- 
funded survey had several innovations. First, unlike the EOPP data set, 
the SBA data set did not oversample low-income workers, nor was it 
targeted only at sites where new government programs were planned. 
The survey also differed from the EOPP data in that the questions con 
cerning the total hours of training over the first three months of 
employment were divided into separate questions concerning the aver-
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age number of hours of training per week and the number of weeks of 
training. This approach allowed us to discover to what extent training 
was complete by the end of the first three months of employment. 
Finally, in addition to the EOPP©s four measures of training (formal 
training programs offered by the firm on site, informal training by the 
worker©s supervisor, informal training by co-workers, and time that the 
worker spent watching others perform tasks during the first three 
months), the SBA survey added a fifth measure, the number of hours 
spent at off-site formal training programs during the first three months 
of employment.
To check how the set of completed SBA surveys compares to the ini 
tial stratified national sample, we estimated a probit equation with the 
dependent variable equal to one if the establishment was in the sample, 
and zero otherwise. For independent variables, we used a set of one- 
digit industry dummies, Census region, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the establishment was located in a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, and a vector of establishment-size variables. 4 Establishments 
from SIC code 7 (a portion of the service industry [10.2 percent in 
sample versus 16.6 percent universe]) and SIC code 5 (retail trade 
[30.8 percent versus 33.0 percent]) are somewhat underrepresented in 
our sample. Similarly, there are too few establishments from the North 
east Census region (13.7 percent versus 17.4 percent), and there are too 
few urban establishments (77.6 percent versus 85.1 percent). In addi 
tion, the probability of inclusion in our sample monotonically increases 
with the size of the establishment. However, the differences are not 
large, and one can conclude that the sample of firms that completed the 
survey is generally representative of the underlying national population 
of firms.
Employer Measures of On-the-job Training
Table 3.1 reports the magnitude and incidence of training for the 
two surveys. Figure 3.1 illustrates the differences in the means of the 
various measures of training between the EOPP and SBA data sets. 
Note that the overall means are quite similar. For the EOPP data, newly 
hired workers receive about 142 hours of training in the first three
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months, with about 95 percent of all workers receiving some form of 
training; for the SBA data, newly hired workers receive about 150 
hours of training with 98 percent of all workers receiving some train 
ing.5 For the individual training measures, the off-site formal training 
(which is unique to the SBA) is a relatively minor form of training; 
average newly hired workers receive about three hours of this training 
while only about 7 percent of all workers receive this form of training. 
Thus, if we subtract the three hours of off-site formal training from the 
SBA mean, the two data sets indicate a remarkable degree of similarity.
Table 3.1 Means and Incidence Rates of Training Measures, 1992 SBA 
Data and 1982 EOPP Data
Total hours of training
Incidence rate
Hours of off-site formal training
Incidence rate
Hours of on-site formal training
Incidence rate
Hours of informal management training
Incidence rate
Hours of informal co-worker training
Incidence rate
Hours of watching others
Incidence rate
N
SBA
149.9
0.978
3.4
0.069
13.6
0.205
59.4
0.906
32.8
0.605
40.7
0.645
1,123
EOPP
141.9
0.948
 
 
11.9
0.151
49.3
0.872
26.3
0.628
54.5
0.803
1,916
Within specific categories of training, table 3.1 reveals some differ 
ences in the average level and incidence of training. For instance, inci 
dence of formal training is higher in the SBA data than in the EOPP 
data. In contrast, the EOPP reports more training by watching others 
than does the SBA data. For the EOPP, the newly hired worker has an 
average of about 54 hours with an incidence rate of 80 percent, but for
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the SB A data, the average number of hours is only about 41 hours with 
an incidence rate of 65 percent.
Figure 3.1 EOPP and SBA Measures of Average Hours Spent in 
On-the-job Training During First Three Months
150
120
90
X 60
30
SBA EOPP
Total hours Hours of Hours of Hours of Hours of
of training on-site formal informal informal watching
training management co-worker others
training training
A comparison of means and incidence rates, however, can be some 
what deceiving. The length of training in the first three months can be a 
very skewed variable, and the mean is somewhat sensitive to large 
observations in the right tail of the distribution. Therefore, in table 3.2, 
we provide the mean, and the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th 
percentiles for each training measure conditional on the measure being 
positive. In each case, the mean of the distribution is considerably 
larger than the median of the distribution, indicating that the distribu 
tions are skewed to the right.
A weakness of both the EOPP and SBA data is their reliance on 
training received in the first three months of employment. We have just 
seen the importance of the right-hand tails of the data in generating dif 
ferences in unconditional means in training between the SBA and 
EOPP data. To understand the significance of the three-month trunca 
tion of training, table 3.3 lists, for each type of training, the probability 
that a training spell lasts at least 12 weeks (both the unconditional
Table 3.2 Comparison of 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Training Measures
Formal Training
Percentile
5th
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th
95th
Mean
N
SBA
Off-site
4
4
16
30
40
120
240
48.1
110
SBA
On- site
4
6
16
35
80
180
240
66.9
318
EOPP
On-site
4
6
16
40
100
200
240
78.6
252
SBA
Management
1
4
12
30
65
160
240
65.5
1,012
EOPP
Management
2
4
10
30
70
120
200
56.6
1,645
Informal Training
SBA
Co-worker
2
3
10
21
60
120
240
54.2
766
EOPP
Co-worker
2
4
8
20
48
100
145
41.8
1,157
SBA
Watching 
others
2
4
8
24
65
160
360
63.1
765
EOPP
Watching 
others
3
5
10
32
80
160
240
67.9
1,512
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probabilities and the more revealing probabilities conditional on 
receiving the type of training) for only the SBA data. We cannot con 
struct a similar table for the EOPP data because that set only contains 
information on the total number of hours, not length, of training. We 
choose 12 weeks because both 12 and 13 weeks are mass points. While 
a three-month period contains 13 weeks, we thought many respondents 
believed that period to contain 12 weeks. We refer to an incidence of 
training that lasts at least 12 weeks as a truncated incidence, although it 
is possible that the incidence would end exactly on the 12th week. 
From table 3.3, we see that 29 percent of training spells are truncated at 
three months. Conditional on receiving each type of training, the trun 
cation rates are very high, with each measure having more than one in 
five cases truncated. Thus, the three-month frame of reference used by 
both the SBA and EOPP data appears to understate the training that 
newly trained workers received.
Table 3.3 Rates of Training Spells Lasting at Least 12 Weeks, 
1992 SBA Data
Training measure
Total training
Off-site training
On-site training
Informal management training
Informal co- worker training
Watching others
Overall rate
0.291
0.016
0.042
0.217
0.157
0.146
Conditional rate
0.298
0.230
0.204
0.239
0.259
0.226
Finally, in table 3.4 we compare the reported time it takes to become 
fully trained and qualified. For the EOPP data, this measure of total 
human capital has a mean of 20.2 weeks, but the median is only 6.75 
weeks. The SBA data set reveals a similar mean for total human capital 
of 22.2 weeks but a median of just 6 weeks. Again, both measures are 
highly skewed to the right. In sum, the two distributions of total human 
capital look very similar despite the ten-year difference in the time 
periods.
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Another issue that could cloud comparisons between the 1982 
EOPP data and the 1992 SBA data is the effect of the business cycle on 
training. The EOPP survey was conducted in the first half of 1982 just 
prior to the trough of the cycle in November 1982. The SBA survey 
was conducted in the summer of 1992, just over a year past the trough 
of the cycle in March 1991. The training data for the last worker hired 
precedes the date of the survey by at least 3 months by construction. 
Thus, much of the EOPP training data precedes the 1982 trough of the 
cycle by several months, and much of the SBA data is very close to the 
1991 trough. It could be that training decisions of firms are different at 
the trough of the cycle from those before or after it. If so, comparisons 
made between the SBA and EOPP data could be affected. Unfortu 
nately, the EOPP and SBA cannot be used to provide evidence on this 
question. However, tabulations by James Spletzer using the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) provide evidence on the inci 
dence of formal training over the cycle that had its trough in 1991. 
Spletzer finds that the incidence of training is the lowest in 1991 at the 
trough of the cycle. Using a probit model, the probability of receiving 
training in 1990, one year before the trough, is only slightly higher. 6 
This suggests that any contamination from business cycle effects is 
likely to be small when comparing the EOPP and SBA data.
Table 3.4 Length of Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified, 
1992 SBA Data and 1982 EOPP Data
Percentile
5th
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th
95th
Unconditional mean
Fraction nonzero
N
SBA
.55
1
2.25
6
24
52
104
22.2
.991
1,193
EOPP
1
1
2.8
6.75
22.1
52
94
20.2
0.969
1,921
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In other words, the EOPP and SBA were both conducted close 
enough to the trough of a business cycle to avoid any contamination 
from business cycle effects. However, comparisons between the EOPP, 
SBA and surveys conducted further into an expansion or at the peak of 
the cycle may be affected. The Spletzer results run counter to the argu 
ment that as firms stockpile their most capable workers during a down 
turn, they increase their training activities. Of course, Spletzer©s results 
are for the incidence of training and suggest that firms do not train 
more extensively during economic downturns, but they may train some 
workers more intensively. However, if his results hold for the provision 
of training in general, then the EOPP and SBA surveys would under- 
predict the incidence of training at other points in the business cycle.
Overall, the 1982 EOPP data and the 1992 SBA data give very simi 
lar answers on the provision of training. In some respects, these simi 
larities of the data sets surprised us. The 1980s was a decade of 
fundamental change in the distribution of wages in the U. S. economy. 7 
During that time, the distribution of wages became much more dis 
persed, and little overall growth in real wages occurred. For some 
groups in particular, those below the median earnings of the econ 
omy there was a decline in real wages. For others, especially workers 
in the upper quintile of the earnings distribution, there was a substan 
tial increase in real wages for high-wage workers. Given the apparent 
importance of on-the-job training in wage determination, one may 
have anticipated a similar increase in the dispersion of on-the-job train 
ing. Comparing these two data sources, however, we find only limited 
evidence of such an increase in the dispersion of on-the-job training. 
The SBA data appear to have a somewhat greater dispersion for man 
agement training and co-worker training, and have a somewhat greater 
incidence of formal training than the EOPP data, although the differ 
ences are not substantial. One must bear in mind, however, that both 
data sets are truncated at the first three months of employment and may 
hide some important changes in the distribution of on-the-job training. 
Further, the sample for the EOPP data is not nationally representative.
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Worker Measures of On-the-job Training
Another approach to measuring on-the-job training asks employees 
about their training experiences. Obviously, most data will not have a 
collection of newly hired workers, so worker surveys will include a 
considerable number of workers with a significant amount of tenure. If 
these workers receive less training than newly hired workers, and if 
workers are asked about their training activities over a relatively short 
period of time, very low incidence rates for training are likely to occur. 
As a result, surveys of workers tend to ask very general training ques 
tions; however, one still finds very low incidence rates of training from 
worker surveys.
The first commonly used data on training was the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which in 1976 asked a question similar to 
the EOPP and SBA question about the time to become fully trained 
and qualified. The PSID asked:
On a job like yours, how long would it take the average new per 
son to become fully trained and qualified?
Duncan and Hoffman (1978, 1979) were the first to analyze these data; 
they note that the instrument used the phrase "the average new person" 
rather than "you" in order to "minimize reported training differences 
due to skills or experience unique to the respondent" (1979, p. 596).
This wording, however, creates a potential difference between the 
frames of reference of the PSID data and the EOPP and SBA data. 
Namely, the PSID does not explicitly tell the respondent to assume that 
the new person has no previous experience, while both the EOPP and 
SBA do explicitly ask the respondent to make this assumption. 8 Keep 
ing this potential difference in mind, Duncan and Hoffman report that 
the mean response to this question was 1.66 years, or about 86.32 
weeks. The PSID sample, however, contains many individuals with a 
great deal of tenure at their employers. Black, Garen, and Loewenstein 
(1988) report that there is a very strong concave relationship between 
tenure at the firm and the length of time to become fully trained and 
qualified; therefore, we should not be surprised that the PSID mean is 
so much larger than the EOPP and SBA means.
The National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 
(NLSHS72) provides a more detailed set of questions concerning train-
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ing. Altonji and Spletzer (1991) provide an excellent description and 
analysis of these data. In 1986, the survey asked for the number of 
weeks and the number of hours per week of four different forms of 
training in the worker©s current job or last job held by the worker. 
These forms of training included employer-provided formal training 
(which Altonji and Spletzer suggest corresponds to the SBA on-site 
formal training), informal training, off-site training, and any tuition or 
financial aid that the employer offered to employees attending an edu 
cational institution. The sample of workers is limited to individuals 
who graduated from high school. The training questions ask about any 
training received at any time on the last job, and some workers may 
have considerable tenure at the job.
Altonji and Spletzer report that 45.7 percent of workers receive 
some employer provided training that is, some formal, informal, or 
off-site training. For the individual training measures, 27.8 percent of 
all workers report that they received formal on-site training. This figure 
is somewhat higher than the 20.4 percent reported in the SBA data and 
the 15.1 percent reported by the EOPP data. The mean hours of formal 
training is 52.7 hours, but unlike the SBA and EOPP data, the 
NLSHS72 data is truncated at 93 weeks of training, so the means are 
not directly comparable. The mean duration of formal training, condi 
tional on receiving this type of training, is 10.9 weeks, and more than a 
quarter of the sample has a duration lasting 12 weeks or longer, which 
is somewhat higher than the SBA figure of 20.4 percent. Given that 
these workers are more educated than workers in the two other data 
sets and given also that many of them have considerable tenure on the 
job, these differences do not appear to be overly large.
The informal training, however, has a much lower incidence (19.7 
percent) than the other two data sets. In contrast, the incidence rates of 
informal training by management in both the EOPP and the SBA data 
are more than 85 percent. Thus, it would appear that the incidence of 
informal training is underreported in the NLSHS72 data. In our view, 
this finding is not particularly surprising. Formal training is probably 
much easier to remember than informal training, especially after sev 
eral years have elapsed. Moreover, the worker may not recognize as 
"real" training much of the informal training that occurs. A newly hired 
worker may not consider asking a co-worker for assistance or some 
advice to be training, but the employer may count this as training,
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especially if it detracts from the performance of the co-workers. The 
mean number of hours of this type of training is 45.8 hours. The mean 
conditional on receiving informal training, however, is 233 hours, and 
half the sample reports the training lasting at least 20 weeks. To us, this 
seems to indicate that workers are more likely to remember the very 
long spells of informal training. As SBA data indicates that most spells 
of informal training last less than 12 weeks, this may account for the 
relatively low incidence rate of informal training in the NLSHS72 data.
Another large difference between the NLSHS72 and the SBA data 
lies in the incidence rate of off-site training. For the NLSHS72, Altonji 
and Spletzer report an incidence rate of 20.0 percent, whereas the SBA 
data indicates only a 6.9 percent incidence rate. While some of this dif 
ference may be explained by variances in the education levels of the 
two samples, the disagreement is still too large. Off-site training often 
involves a considerable expense because it may involve substantial 
direct costs in fees or tuition, and because it may be necessary to send 
the worker to a different location for training, incurring transportation, 
food, and lodging expenses. Firms and workers may wish to ensure a 
beneficial employment match before incurring such costs. Thus, we 
might anticipate that the off-site training incidence is somewhat higher 
for more senior workers because the likelihood of a separation declines 
with the worker©s tenure. The mean hours of training, conditional on 
receiving this type of training, is 101.3 hours, which is considerably 
larger than the SBA©s conditional mean of 48 hours.
Finally, Altonji and Spletzer note that the incidence of a worker tak 
ing advantage of tuition plans is 9.4 percent, with a mean of 18.2 
hours. The mean conditional on an incidence of this type of training is 
193 hours with a mean duration of 27 weeks. This suggests that formal 
schooling continues to be a rather important part of the training pro 
grams of many firms. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993) report a similar 
rate for the CPS data (13.6 percent).
A comparison of the incidence rates and hours of training measures 
from the NLSHS72, EOPP, and SBA data provides four interesting 
observations. First, there is somewhat more formal training among 
workers as a whole than among a sample of newly hired workers. Sec 
ond, this difference for off-site formal training is even more pro 
nounced than for on-site formal training. These two observations 
suggest that formal training is more prevalent for workers with some
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tenure than for newly hired workers. Third, there are many incidences 
of on-site formal training and informal training that last longer than 12 
weeks, which suggests that the EOPP and the SBA three-month frame 
may understate the training that newly hired workers received. Fourth, 
employees seem to understate the incidence of informal training, with 
workers more likely to remember particularly long spells of informal 
training. Given the prevalence of informal training that we find in the 
EOPP and SBA data, this suggests that relying on surveys of workers 
will lead to an understatement of the importance of informal on-the-job 
training.
To examine further the differences in formal training programs, we 
consider the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which is a survey 
of over 12,500 youths ranging in age from 14 to 22 years in 1979. 
Lynch (1992), Veum (1993), and Bartel and Sicherman (1993) provide 
analysis of this data set for different time periods. Concentrating on 
data from 1979 to 1985, Lynch focuses on a sample of workers who 
did not complete college and who received formal on-the-job training 
lasting at least four weeks. These limitations result in a sample of 
3,064 workers. The four-week length of a training spell is a sampling 
feature of the early NLSY training measures. Lynch reports that only 
4.2 percent of the workers in her sample had this type of on-the-job 
training, but that the average length of this type of training was 31 
weeks. In contrast, in the SBA data 38 percent of all training inci 
dences lasted at least four weeks so the incidence rate of formal train 
ing programs lasting at least four weeks is about 7.8 percent (20.5 
percent of all workers receive any on-site formal training and 38.0 per 
cent of these incidences last at least four weeks). Given that Lynch 
excludes college graduates from her sample and that, as we shall later 
see, college graduates are more likely to receive formal training pro 
grams, these two incidence rates appear very similar. This suggests that 
her conditional mean for formal training spells is a reasonable estimate 
of the conditional mean, although it is a bit low because it excludes 
college graduates. Lynch©s results suggest that the distribution of time 
in formal on-the-job training spells has extremely thin but very long 
tails. By focusing on the training received in the first three months, sur 
veys such as the SBA survey and the EOPP survey cut off that long tail, 
which may cause researchers to underestimate the training that newly 
hired workers receive.
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As to the importance of the three-month truncation, we may use 
Lynch©s estimate of the conditional mean to infer what the SBA mea 
sure of training would have been without the truncation. For the SBA 
data, our unweighted mean weeks of training, conditional on receiving 
formal training, is 4.1 weeks. We may separate this mean by
(.3.1) E(x) = Pr(x < 3 weeks) E(x I x < 3 weeks) + Pr(x > 3 weeks) 
E(x \x>3 weeks).
The mean number of weeks of on-site training conditional on the num 
ber of weeks being less than or equal to 3 weeks is 1.51 weeks with 
0.6541 of the spells being less than 4 weeks. Using Lynch©s conditional 
mean estimate of 31 weeks, the estimated untruncated mean number of 
weeks of on-site formal training is about 11.7 weeks, suggesting that 
both the NLSY and the SBA and EOPP truncations lead to a very 
biased estimate of the sample mean. The NLSHS72 data has a mean 
weeks of formal training of 10.9 weeks, but this measure is truncated at 
93 weeks.9
Veum (1993) uses data for the period between the 1986 and 1990 
surveys of the NLSY. For these years, the data no longer require that 
the training spell last four weeks, and it is interesting that Veum reports 
that about 18.4 percent of all workers reported some company-pro 
vided training, which we interpret to be formal on-site training. This 
estimate is reasonably consistent with the estimates of other data, espe 
cially when the differences in samples are considered (the other inci 
dence estimates were 20.4 percent from the SBA, 15.1 percent from 
the EOPP, and 27.8 percent from the NLSHS72). Given Veum©s means, 
we may calculate that the mean number of hours, conditional on 
receiving some company training, is approximately 135 hours, which 
is considerably larger than the truncated EOPP (78 hours) and the SBA 
(67 hours) data, but is smaller than the corresponding estimate from the 
NLSHS72 (190 hours). Veum©s measure is for all incidences of formal 
training that occurred between 1986 and 1990.
Using data from 1988 to 1990, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) report 
that the incidence of formal training was 12.1 percent with a condi 
tional mean of 260 hours, which is considerably larger than the mean 
reported by Veum and larger than the mean from the NLSHS72 data 
(190 hours). Bartel and Sicherman report on annual data, which partly
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explains their lower incidence rates for the total training received over 
a four-year period. We are still unclear why Veum©s estimates of the 
hours trained are so much smaller than Bartel and Sicherman©s esti 
mates.
The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides cross-sectional esti 
mates of the incidence of training that workers received before or on 
their current job both in 1983 and 1991. Lillard and Tan (1992) and 
Pergamit and Shack-Marquez (1987) analyze the 1983 data. The CPS 
on-the-job training data may be divided into formal and informal train 
ing programs. Lillard and Tan report that 11.7 percent of men needed 
formal (what they call "company") training on their previous job to 
obtain their current job, and 11.6 percent of men needed formal train 
ing while on their current job. If we combine those two estimates, we 
obtain an incidence rate of approximately 23 percent, although clearly 
we may have some double counting. Pergamit and Shack-Marquez 
(1987) report that 30 percent of their sample, which differs from Lil 
lard and Tan©s sample, received training both before and during their 
current jobs. Thus, a back-of-the-envelope calculation to correct for the 
double counting suggests an incidence rate of about 20 percent. For 
women, the sum of the two training measures was 20.6 percent and fell 
to 18 percent when we corrected for double counting.
If one takes the more conservative estimates of training on the cur 
rent job 13.1 percent for women and 11.6 percent for men we do 
see a lower incidence rate than data from the other samples. It is impor 
tant to keep in mind, however, that the CPS sample is representative of 
all workers in the economy. Previous data sets discussed thus far have 
not sampled all workers, and this variation may account for some of 
the differences in the data sets. Most important, unlike the EOPP and 
SBA data, the CPS is not a sample of newly hired workers, who receive 
most of the training among all workers. Using a different CPS sample, 
Pergamit and Shack-Marquez report that the incidence rate of formal 
training on the current job is 14.2 percent.
For informal on-the-job training, Lillard and Tan report that 15.1 
percent of men and women received informal training on their current 
job, and 30.8 percent of the men and 26.0 percent of the women said 
they received training on their previous job that was necessary to 
obtain their current job. Thus, the incidence rates from the CPS are 
well below the incidence rates of the SBA and EOPP data. This again
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may reflect the fact that workers are less likely to remember incidences 
of informal training.
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993), using the 1991 CPS data, also 
report an extremely low incidence rate of informal training 16.3 per 
cent. While this figure is somewhat higher than the 1983 CPS esti 
mates, it is much lower than the employer-reported estimates from the 
SBA and the EOPP data. Indeed, the estimate is quite similar to the 
19.7 percent figure Altonji and Spletzer (1991) obtained from the 
NLSHS72. Therefore, the CPS data also seem to suggest that workers 
may underreport the incidence rate of informal training.
In contrast, Loewenstein and Spletzer report an incidence of 17.2 
percent for formal training, which is reasonably similar to the 
employer-reported incidence rates in the EOPP and SBA data (15.1 
percent and 20.5 percent, respectively), and the employee-reported 
incidence rates from the NLSY and NLSHS72 (12.1 percent to 18.4 
percent and 27.8 percent, respectively). While the 1983 CPS data gives 
somewhat lower incidence rates, and the NLSHS72 shows slightly 
higher incidence rates, employee- and employer-reported incidence 
rates appear reasonably similar for formal training. Moreover, compar 
ing the 1982 EOPP survey and 1992 SBA survey of employers, and 
comparing the 1983 CPS and the 1991 CPS of employees, there is 
some modest evidence of an increase in formal training. For the 
employer surveys, training increased from 15 to 20 percent, and for the 
employee surveys, training increased from 12 to 17 percent. 10
The 1991 CPS data also reported the duration of the training that the 
worker received. Loewenstein and Spletzer report that the mean dura 
tion of formal training, conditional on receiving formal training, is 9.6 
weeks. This estimate approximates the NLSHS72 estimate of 10.9 
weeks and the SBA estimate (adjusted for the truncation using Lynch©s 
conditional mean) of 11.7 weeks. Thus, measures of the duration and 
the incidence rates of formal training appear similar.
Finally, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in 
1984 provides another data source to measure training. But because the 
incidence rates are extremely small, we are suspicious of the data. 
Flynn (1993) and Haber (1988) report that the SIPP survey asked in 
1984, "did [you] receive training designed to help [you] find a job, 
improve job skills or learn a new job?" Although this appears to be a 
very broad question encompassing formal and informal job training as
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well as vocational and technical schooling, Haber estimates that only 
23 percent of workers in his sample had ever received any training, and 
only 9.4 percent of all workers had ever received on-the-job training. In 
our view, these estimates are much too low and indicate that the SIPP 
data missed a great deal of training.
Conclusions
We conclude with the following five observations concerning 
employee- and employer-reported measures of training.
1. Employee- and employer-based data sets appear to provide simi 
lar estimates of the incidence of on-site formal training, and there 
is at least some evidence that the measures of the duration of 
training estimates are not dissimilar.
2. The EOPP and SBA data, which measure training only for the 
first three months of employment, appear to understate training 
substantially. Evidence from the SBA and NLSHS72 studies sug 
gests that the difference matters for both formal and informal 
training. Similarly, the early NLSY estimate that only measures 
formal training programs of at least four weeks in length also 
appears to miss a great deal of the formal training.
3. A comparison of the SBA and NLSHS72 data suggests that the 
incidence of off-site training may increase with the worker©s ten 
ure.
4. Comparing the EOPP and SBA data with the PSID data, there is 
some evidence that employees may understate (relative to 
employers) the length of time to become fully trained and quali 
fied.
5. The incidence rates for informal training reported by employees 
are dramatically below the incidence rates for informal training 
reported by employers.
There is one caveat: Our examination of the means of various train 
ing measures from different surveys may not provide a good indication
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of how precisely we are measuring training. Even if employees and 
employers provide estimates of training that have identical means, 
there may be considerable measurement error in the reports of both 
employers and employees. If the measurement error is completely ran 
dom, the means may be quite similar, but the training measures them 
selves are very inaccurate.
NOTES
1. Part of these differences may also reflect the fact that the skills required of more complex 
jobs are more complementary with physical capital such as computers or with high-performance 
workplace transformations.
2. The sample was stratified by establishment size in the following manner: 1,250 establish 
ments with 0-19 employees, 1,250 establishments with 20-99 employees, 550 establishments with 
100-499 employees, and 550 establishments with 500 or more employees. We excluded Agricul 
ture, Forestry, and Fisheries (SIC 0-99) and Public Administration (SIC 900 and above). Except 
for these exclusions, we sampled establishments randomly within each size stratum, providing a 
representative distribution by industry and region.
3. We first sent a letter to each establishment describing the survey. SRC attempted to track 
down establishments with undeliverable letters using directory assistance and attempted to contact 
each of the 3,600 establishments for a telephone interview. Of the original sample of 3,600 estab 
lishments, 2,561 were eligible to complete an interview. The 1,039 ineligible establishments were 
out of business, had disconnected phones, did not answer in any of 15 attempts, could not be 
reached because of Hurricane Andrew, had other miscellaneous problems, or had no employees. 
We had 1,288 establishments complete the survey. The 1,273 noncompletions consisted of refus 
als, those who reported that answering surveys was against company policy, those who stated that 
the appropriate person was repeatedly unavailable, and those who rescheduled the interview six or 
more times.
4. The breakdowns for firm size were 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-49 
employees, 50-99 employees, 100-199 employees, 200-499 employees, and 500 or more employ 
ees.
5. To enhance comparability of the samples, EOPP and SBA sample weights are used in the 
training computations reported in this chapter. The SBA weights account for the stratification by 
establishment size and the oversampling of large firms. The EOPP weights account for the over- 
sampling of smaller, single establishments firms within each target metropolitan area.
6. Relative to the reference year of 1993, the 1991 coefficient is -.0303 (t = 4.53) and the 1990 
coefficient is -.0306 (t = 4.44). We thank James Spletzer for kindly providing these estimates.
7. See Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) or the special issues of the Quarterly Journal of Eco 
nomics (February 1992) for references.
8. See Sicherman (1990) for a discussion of this point and related issues concerning the PSID 
training measure.
9. The reader should keep in mind, of course, that combining these two estimates makes 
heroic distributional assumptions, but we believe that it does indicate a very important limitation 
of both data sets. The NLSY misses a majority of the spells of formal training, and the SBA and 
EOPP data truncate the very long spells of training that are an important determinant of total 
training.
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10. In a remarkably thorough study of all forms of training, Lillard and Tan (1992) also report 
incidence rates from the National Longitudinal Surveys of young men and mature men, which 
were conducted in various years ranging from 1967 to 1982. They report that the incidence of for 
mal training in a two-year period for young men is 10.4 percent and for mature men, 5.6 percent. 
It is difficult, however, to directly compare these data with either the CPS or employer-provided 
data.
CHAPTER
Who Receives On-the-Job Training?
With the development of data sets containing explicit measures of 
on-the-job training, economists have been able to identify the recipi 
ents of on-the-job training. Because of the importance of on-the-job 
training in determining wages, this question is of considerable interest. 
According to traditional on-the-job training models developed in chap 
ter 2, workers with jobs that offer little or no training should not antici 
pate large increases in wages, since work experience does little to 
increase their stock of human capital. If workers with different per 
sonal characteristics differ in their access to on-the-job training, wage 
differences across workers may be attributed, in part, to these differ 
ences in access.
This chapter examines the recipients of on-the-job training from the 
perspective of two employer-reported data sets: the 1982 Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) survey and the 1992 Small Business 
Administration (SBA) survey. Both data sets contain two types of 
training measures. The first measure is the actual number of hours of 
training that newly hired workers received in the first three months of 
employment. The second measure, one that indicates the total human 
capital of a particular job, is the length of time it would take the worker 
to become fully trained and qualified if that worker had no previous 
experience on the job. While these data are limited to newly hired 
workers, evidence presented in chapter 3 suggests that many current 
data sets that rely on employee reports of training appear to exclude 
significant amounts of on-the-job training. In contrast, the SBA and 
EOPP surveys offer us a reasonably detailed account of the training 
that newly hired workers received at two points in time that are ten 
years apart.
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Variations in the Level of Training
In approaching the issue of which employees have access to on-the- 
job training, we proceed in stages. In the first part of this section, we 
consider the simple gross differences in various levels of training by 
workers who differ in their level of education, work experience, size of 
employer, and gender. The second part of this section provides a more 
comprehensive examination of who has access to training. The results 
presented there establish the statistically significant links between vari 
ous characteristics of individuals and their level of training, with other 
factors being equal. The next section examines the incidence of five 
types of training: off- site formal training, on-site formal training, 
informal management training, informal co-worker training, and train 
ing by watching others. To understand the importance of the truncation 
of our training measure at the first three months of employment, the 
final section of this chapter examines the likelihood that each type of 
training may continue after the first three months.
Differences by Education, Experience, Gender, and Employer Size
Not surprisingly, we find that those characteristics that are highly 
correlated with wages are also correlated with access to on-the-job 
training. For instance, in both the 1982 EOPP and the 1992 SB A data 
sets, we find that highly educated workers receive more on-the-job 
training. In figure 4.1, we depict the mean level of training for college 
and high school graduates from the SBA data. College graduates 
receive over one hundred more hours of on-the-job training in the first 
three months of employment than do high school graduates, or nearly 
68 percent more training. Thus, employers of more educated workers 
provide them with more on-the-job training.
Figure 4.1 Hours of Training in the First Three Months of Employment, 
1992 SBA Data
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The difference between college and high school graduates is even 
more dramatic when we look at the time required to become fully 
trained and qualified. In figure 4.2, we depict the means for the time to 
become fully trained for college and high school graduates. On the 
average, college graduates occupy jobs that required about 95 percent 
more time to become fully trained, with college graduates taking 
nearly 37 weeks to become fully trained and high school graduates 
only 19 weeks.
Figure 4.2 Number of Weeks to Become Fully Trained and Qualified, 
1992 SBA Data
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Thus, college graduates obtain jobs that are more complex and pro 
vide more on-the-job training than do those with only a high school 
education.
Another important determinant of wages is a worker©s labor market 
experience. In figure 4.3, we depict the average training received by 
workers with three levels of experience: those with no previous experi 
ence, those with less than a year of experience, and those with more 
than a year of experience. Workers with no previous experience 
received the lowest level of training, only about 164 hours. In contrast, 
workers with less than a year of experience received nearly 198 hours 
of training. Workers with more than a year of experience received only 
about 178 hours of training. These figures suggest that workers with 
significant experience may require less training because some of the 
skills that these workers learn at one employer can be transferred to 
their new jobs.
The relationship between labor market experience and the time to 
become fully trained and qualified seems to confirm the suggestion that 
skills are transferable across jobs. In figure 4.4, we depict the means of 
time to become fully trained by level of experience. Unlike hours of 
training, the total human capital required for a job increases as the
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worker develops more experience. In other words, workers with more 
experience are hired into more complex jobs that require more total 
human capital. For workers without any experience, it takes just over 
16 weeks to become fully trained, but for a worker with less than a year 
of experience, the training takes just over 23 weeks. Workers with 
more than a year of experience occupy jobs that require nearly 29 
weeks to become fully trained. Thus, firms tend to hire workers with 
more experience to fill complex jobs. But as a result of their experience 
in previous jobs, these workers may require less training than workers 
filling jobs that require less total human capital.
Figure 4.3 Hours of Training in the First Three Months of Employment 
by Experience Level, 1992 SBA Data
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Figure 4.4 Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified by Experience 
Level, 1992 SBA Data
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Labor economists have also found that workers employed in large 
establishments tend to receive higher wages than similar workers in 
small establishments (e.g., Barron, Black, and Loewenstein 1987; 
Holtmann and Idson 1991). Similarly, both the EOPP and SBA data 
indicate that workers in large establishments receive more training than 
workers in small establishments. In figure 4.5, for the SBA data we
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depict the mean hours of training by four categories for the size of 
establishment: those establishments with less than 25 employees, those 
with 25 to 99 employees, those with 100 to 249 employees, and those 
with 250 or more employees. Workers in establishments with fewer 
than 25 employees received about 154 hours of training in the first 
three months of employment, while workers in establishments with 
250 or more employees received over 220 hours of training. Thus, 
workers in the largest category of establishments received 42 percent 
more training than workers in the smallest category. Interestingly, nei 
ther the EOPP nor the SBA data reveal any significant difference in the 
time to become fully trained by size of establishment. Of course, larger 
establishments are training their workforces more intensively in the 
first three months than smaller establishments, so these large employ 
ers presumably are providing their workforces a greater stock of 
human capital.
Figure 4.5 Hours of Training in the First Three Months of Employment 
by Establishment Size, 1992 SBA Data
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There remain very significant racial and gender differences in the 
wage structure across the United States economy, and one might antic 
ipate that there would exist very substantial differences in the access to 
on-the-job training as well. Surprisingly, both the EOPP and SBA data 
provide little evidence that women receive significantly fewer hours of 
training in the first three months of employment than men. Unfortu 
nately, the EOPP data contain no controls for the employee©s race, but 
the SBA data do not indicate significant racial differences in hours of 
training in the first three months. In contrast, figure 4.6 shows that 
there are significant racial and gender differences in the time to 
become fully trained and qualified. Blacks occupy jobs that take about
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9 weeks to become fully trained and qualified, nonblack women 
occupy jobs that take about 17 weeks to become fully trained, and non- 
black men occupy jobs that take over 35 weeks to become fully trained 
and qualified. Given these differences, it is surprising that we find no 
significant differences in the hours of training in the first three months 
of employment, although we do find some evidence that limiting train 
ing to the first three months of employment might be partially respon 
sible for not finding any gender differences. Because our measures of 
training are limited to the first three months, it is possible that men will 
obtain more total training if they are more likely than women to have 
training last beyond our three-month horizon.
Figure 4.6 Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified by Race and 
Gender, 1992 SBA Data
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Statistical Patterns Regarding Access to On-the-Job Training
The differences in training identified above still appear when we 
control for other factors with the use of regression analysis. In what 
follows, we analyze variations in on-the-job training in a more system 
atic fashion. For both the EOPP and the SBA data, we begin by esti 
mating the total hours of training in the first three months of 
employment. For the EOPP data, the training measure is the sum of 
formal training, informal management training, co-worker training, 
and watching others. For the SBA data, we use the same four catego 
ries, and we add the number of hours of off-site training, although the 
results change little if we exclude this measure.
For independent variables in the SBA data, we use the worker©s age, 
a vector of dummy variables indicating whether or not the worker is a 
high school dropout, whether or not the worker attended but did not 
graduate from college, and whether or not the worker has at least a
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four-year college degree. In both the EOPP and SBA surveys, employ 
ers were asked the number of years of labor market experience that an 
employee had in a job that the employer felt "had some application to 
the worker©s current position." We interpret this measure as "relevant 
experience." Because the data rejected the use of a simple gender 
dummy used in conjunction with the white-nonwhite dummy, we also 
initially separated our sample into the following categories: black 
male; black female; white female; white male; nonwhite, nonblack 
male; and nonwhite, nonblack female. After some initial specification 
checks, we found we could combine the workers into four groups: 
black males, black females, nonblack females, and nonblack males.
We also included dummy variables indicating whether or not the 
worker is a union member, the number of workers at the establishment 
where the new employee works, and the number of employees at other 
sites. For the EOPP data, we attempted to use the same independent 
variables that we used for the SBA data, but data limitations forced us 
to use a specification that differed in three ways. First, the EOPP sur 
vey did not ask about the worker©s race, so we used a simple gender 
dummy. Second, the EOPP did not have a measure of the number of 
employees at other sites, so we excluded this measure. Finally, the 
EOPP measure of unionization is the proportion of the workforce that 
is organized rather than a simple dummy variable. Also, for both data 
sets, we used hours worked occasionally as a control variable.
To obtain our samples, we excluded any worker who had a missing 
training measure or a missing value for any independent variable. 
These exclusions resulted in a sample of 888 workers for the SBA data. 
In addition, for the EOPP we excluded temporary or seasonal workers, 
which resulted in a sample of 1,473 workers. Table 4.1 reports 
unweighted means for both samples. We can immediately see the dif 
ferences in the two data sets© sampling strategies. Workers in the EOPP 
data, which oversampled low-income workers, were about two years 
younger than workers in the SBA data and had about 0.9 less years rel 
evant experience. More dramatic differences appear in educational 
attainment. For instance, only about 10 percent of the EOPP sample 
have a college degree or above, whereas over 25 percent of the SBA 
sample have a college degree. The SBA data, which oversampled large 
firms, has a mean establishment size of about 182 workers, compared 
to the EOPP©s average of about 72 workers.
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Table 4.1 Means for the 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Data
Variable
Total hours of training
Time to become fully trained
Worker©s age
Worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker is a high school graduate
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is a black
Worker is a female
Worker is a nonblack female
Union
Hours worked
Number of employees at establishment
Number of employees at other sites
Incidence of off-site formal training
Hours of off-site formal training
Incidence of on-site formal training
Hours of on-site formal training
Incidence of informal management training
Hours of informal management training
Incidence of informal co- worker training
Hours of co-worker training
Incidence of training by watching others
Hours of training by watching others
N
SBA
177.8
24.0
29.3
3.4
0.075
0.384
0.283
0.258
0.088
 
0.483
0.084
36.7
181.9
1197.8
0.107
6.2
0.301
25.2
0.920
62.1
0.695
40.6
0.688
43.6
888
EOPP
143.7
22.3
27.1
2.5
0.107
0.588
0.205
0.101
 
0.464
 
0.094
38.0
71.7
 
 
 
0.127
9.8
0.873
49.8
0.625
27.3
0.810
56.8
1,471
After some initial specification checks, we decided to use a double 
logarithm specification. To avoid taking the logarithm of zero, we 
added one to each employee©s experience, training measure, and our 
measure of time to become fully trained and qualified. Columns (1) 
and (3) of table 4.2 report the estimates for the SBA and EOPP data, 
respectively. We initially used a tobit procedure to estimate the equa 
tions because 11 observations in the SBA data and 64 observations in
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Table 4.2 Total Hours of Training for the 1992 SBA 
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s 
relevant experience
Worker is a high school 
dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of 
employees at the 
establishment
Logarithm of number of 
employees at other 
establishments
Logarithm of hours worked
R2
N
SBA
(1)
4.446*
(7.62)
-0.132 
(0.72)
-0.104 
(1.65)
0.031 
(0.20)
-0.089 
(0.82)
0.460* 
(3.97)
-0.214
(1.16)
-0.143
(1.59)
 
0.085
(0.60)
0.125* 
(4.70)
0.031* 
(2.39)
~
0.095
888
SBA
(2)
1.932*
(2.65)
-0.165 
(0.92)
-0.136* 
(2.18)
0.150 
(0.93)
-0.036 
(0.33)
0.440* 
(3.89)
-0.154
(0.88)
-0.039
(0.43)
 
0.072
(0.51)
0.099*
(3.77)
0.033* 
(2.69)
0.751* 
(5.47)
0.132
888
EOPP
(3)
5.093*
(10.10)
-0.356* 
(2.24)
-0.108 
(1.90)
-0.434* 
(3.40)
0.264* 
(2.89)
0.513* 
(3.62)
 
 
0.019
(0.25)
-0.151
(0.96)
0.092* 
(3.40)
--
-
0.045
1,471
EOPP
(4)
2.169*
(2.94)
-0.355* 
(2.27)
-0.147* 
(2.59)
-0.280* 
(2.12)
0.286* 
(3.16)
0.504* 
(3.58)
 
 
0.122
(1.61)
-0.146
(0.92)
0.081* 
(3.04)
"
0.808* 
(5.19)
0.063
1,471
NOTE: Absolute values ot f-statistics, calculated using robust standard errors, are in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Ordinary least squares esti 
mates are reported.
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the EOPP data are truncated at zero. The Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimates, however, are very similar, which is not surprising 
given the low incidence of truncation. Because OLS parameters are 
easier to interpret than tobit parameters, we present the OLS estimates 
in table 4.2. To guard against any possible heteroskedasticity, we report 
^-statistics calculated using Huber©s (1967) and White©s (1980) robust 
standard errors. Despite the dissimilarities in the sample and the speci 
fication, the basic estimates appear similar except for the education 
profiles. In both data sets, large establishments provide more training. 
Both coefficients are statistically significant and similar in magnitude. 
A 10 percent increase in the size of the establishment increases the 
quantity of training by about 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent.
The differences in the education profiles are intriguing. The EOPP 
estimates show a strong relationship between education and training: 
Workers with more education receive more training. In the SBA data, 
however, there appears no significant relationship between education 
and training except for workers with college degrees. One might be 
tempted to ascribe this difference to a change in the pattern of training 
between 1992 and 1982, but using data from the 1991 Current Popula 
tion Survey (CPS), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993) find patterns in 
their educational coefficients that are similar to the patterns we find in 
the EOPP. In addition, as we shall see, the "time to become fully 
trained and qualified" variable is strongly correlated with education. 
Thus, the lack of a relationship between training and education at 
lower levels of education may be a sample anomaly rather than a 
change in the pattern of training. Both data sets agree, however, that 
college-educated workers receive much more training than high school 
graduates. From the EOPP data, we estimate that college graduates 
receive 56 percent more training; from the SBA data, we estimate they 
receive 60 percent more training. 1
Neither data set shows any statistically significant differences in the 
acquisition of on-the-job training by gender, race, or union status. In 
the SBA data, the race and gender coefficients are substantial; the point 
estimates indicate that black workers receive roughly 26 percent less 
training than nonblack males, while nonblack females receive roughly 
17 percent less training than nonblack males, although the coefficients 
are imprecisely estimated. The EOPP data indicate a statistically sig 
nificant negative relationship between age and training while the SBA
On-the-Job Training 61
does not, although the coefficient in the SBA data is insignificantly 
negative. Also, the SBA data indicate that firms with more off-site 
employees provide more training to these employees, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient is about one-third the size of the coeffi 
cient for the size of the establishment.
In columns (2) and (4), we include hours of work as a control to 
explore the relationship between hours worked and training. In both 
data sets, employees who work longer hours receive more training, and 
both coefficients are statistically significant and similar in magnitudes. 
A 10 percent increase in the number of hours worked increases the 
amount of training about 7.5 percent to 8.1 percent. These estimates, 
however, should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. Hours of 
work are clearly the result of a decision made between the firm and the 
worker. If a position requires a more highly trained worker, both firm 
and worker have an incentive to increase the hours of work for that 
position.
We use a similar specification to examine the determination of the 
number of months to become fully trained and qualified, or what we 
refer to as "the total human capital" of the job. OLS estimates for the 
total human capital measures from the SBA and EOPP data are pre 
sented in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.3. We again use a double log 
specification, and we add one to each observation to avoid taking the 
logarithm of zero. In the SBA data, 12 observations are censored at 
zero, and in the EOPP data, 38 observations are truncated at zero. We 
initially used a tobit procedure to estimate the parameters, but because 
the OLS estimates were quite similar and easier to interpret, we report 
them. We again calculate the /-statistics using the robust standard 
errors suggested by Huber (1967) and White (1980).
Interestingly, the coefficients on experience are both positive and 
significant in both data sets, and their magnitudes are similar. Unlike 
the training equations, the coefficients on the education dummies 
exhibit the same pattern in the two data sets: the total human capital of 
the job appears to be increasing in the worker©s education. While the 
coefficient for some college experience from the SBA data is about a 
sixth the size of the corresponding coefficient from the EOPP data, the 
coefficients on high school dropouts and college graduates are of simi 
lar magnitudes in both data sets. The coefficient on establishment size
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is negative and significant for the EOPP data, but is positive and not 
significant in the SBA data.
Unlike the training equations, the gender and race dummies indicate 
a difference in the job©s total human capital by race and gender. For the 
EOPP data, women occupy jobs that require about 36 percent less time 
to become fully trained and qualified. In the SBA data, the race con 
trols make for even more dramatic differences. Blacks occupy jobs that 
take about 58 percent less time, and nonblack women occupy jobs that 
take about 46 percent less time to become fully trained and qualified 
than nonblack males. 2 Thus, although there is no statistically signifi 
cant evidence that minority workers receive less training than nonblack 
males or that women receive less training than men in the first three 
months of employment, there is considerable evidence that black 
workers and nonblack women occupy jobs with a good deal less total 
human capital than nonblack men.
Columns (2) and (4) of table 4.3 include hours of work as a control 
in the model specification. The inclusion of the hours variable reduces 
somewhat the coefficients for blacks, nonblack women, and women, 
but the coefficients remain highly significant. Thus, the fact that 
women work fewer hours than men explains only a small portion of the 
gender difference in the total human capital of jobs.
The use of these two different training measures, total hours of 
training in the first three months and the time to become fully trained 
and qualified, gives two pictures of the workers© access to on-the-job 
training. There may be differences in the type of training that we mask 
in our use of hours of training. For instance, if we think of training dif 
fering in quality, we might expect that blacks and nonblack women are 
systematically sorted into jobs that provide low-quality training, while 
nonblack males have access to jobs with high-quality training. An 
obvious limitation of the hours of on-the-job training measure is that it 
includes only the training received in the first three months of employ 
ment. As we saw in chapter 3, data from the NLSHS72 and NLSY sug 
gest that the distributions of training spells have extremely long tails. 
Moreover, by focusing on the training received in the first three 
months, data sets, such as the SBA and EOPP surveys cut off that long 
tail, which may cause us to miss racial and gender differences in train 
ing when using the hours of training measures. 3
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Table 4.3 Time to Become Fully Trained and Qualified for the 1992 SBA 
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s 
relevant experience
Worker is a high school 
dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of 
employees at the 
establishment
Logarithm of number of employ 
ees at other
establishments
Logarithm of hours worked
R2
N
SBA
(1)
1.176*
(2.41)
0.289* 
(1.99)
0.222* 
(4.10)
-0.432* 
(3.34)
0.038 
(0.39)
0.525* 
(4.80)
-0.804*
(6.18)
-0.570*
(6.69)
-
-0.139
(0.84)
0.029
(1.22)
0.008
(0.68)
~
0.162
888
SBA
(2)
-2.708
(4.97)
0.239 
(1.73)
0.174* 
(3.45)
-0.248* 
(2.06)
0.120 
(1.29)
0.494* 
(4.87)
-0.712*
(5.87)
-0.409*
(4.99)
 
-0.159
(0.97)
-0.012
(0.51)
0.012
(1.06)
1.160* 
(11.65)
0.271
888
EOPP
(3)
3.032
(7.26)
-0.207 
(1.59)
0.197* 
(4.17)
-0.446* 
(4.01)
0.189*
(2.35)
0.476* 
(4.16)
 
 
-0.422*
(6.66)
0.169
(1.19)
-0.049*
(2.26)
 
 
0.075
1,471
EOPP
(4)
1.757
(3.24)
-0.206* 
(1.67)
0.133* 
(2.91)
-0.194 
(1-79)
0.225* 
(2.91)
0.463* 
(4.24)
 
 
-0.253*
(4.09)
0.179
(1-28)
-0.066*
(3.12)
-
1.323* 
(13.08)
0.141
1,471
NOTE: Absolute values ot ^-statistics, calculated using robust standard errors, are in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Ordinary least squares esti 
mates are reported.
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With the SBA data, however, we can control for this truncation at 
three months because we know not only the total hours of training but 
also the number of weeks of training. If we were to assume that the 
random error term in the training equation was drawn from a particular 
distribution, we could estimate the training equation accounting for the 
truncation. For instance, if we assume that the error term was normally 
distributed, we could use a censored regression model. Unfortunately, 
the prevailing wisdom is that such estimates are somewhat susceptible 
to misspecification (see Greene, 1993).
Rather than risk misspecification of the distribution of the error 
term, we estimate a Cox model, which is based on the Lehmann alter 
native of nonparametric statistics. The essential idea of nonparametric 
statistics is to allow researchers to make inferences without having to 
make assumptions about the distribution of random variables. For 
instance, letting T denote our training measure, the regressions 
reported in table 4.2 and 4.3 assume a model of the form
(4.1) r = *P + e
where e is normally distributed with mean zero and variance o2, X is a 
vector of covariates, and ft is a vector of parameters that we wish to 
estimate. If the assumption about the distribution of e is true, the ordi 
nary least squares is the most efficient estimator of the parameters fi 
available. The nonparametric statistician asks the question, "How do 
you know that e is normally distributed?" A truthful answer is often 
that such an assumption is convenient.
Of course, ordinary least squares estimation may still be justified as 
a method of moments estimator, with the caveat that tests of hypothe 
ses are still going to require some additional assumptions about the 
second moment of the distribution. Cox (1972) recognized, however, 
that by focusing only on the rank of the dependent variable, parameters 
could be estimated and hypotheses tested without having to specify a 
distribution of the stochastic variable. Moreover, the Cox model easily 
handles the truncation of the dependent variable, a limitation that is rel 
evant to both the EOPP and SBA data.
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For the Cox model, the cumulative distribution function for the ith 
worker is expressed as
(4.2) F(Tpi
where F(-) is what is commonly referred to as the "baseline" cumula 
tive distribution function and a, is an "index" function for the ith 
worker. If the term a^ < 1, then the ith worker is more likely to have a 
short training spell, and if a^ > 1 the worker is more likely to have a 
long training spell. (By definition, the "baseline" cumulative distribu 
tion function corresponds to the distribution of training spells for the 
person with ai =1.) Using this approach, we must only specify the 
functional form of a-v or
(4.3) a-expHQp).
The Cox model, by focusing on the ranks of the dependent variable, 
allows the researcher to estimate ft without specifying distribution of 
the dependent variable.4 Thus, the Cox model affords two advantages 
of standard parametric estimates such as those we presented in tables 
4.2 and 4.3. First, the Cox model does not require researchers to spec 
ify the distribution of the random variable. Second, the model allows 
researchers to account for the truncation of the dependent variable.
This approach is a fundamental departure from standard parametric 
estimation where we generally assume a probability distribution func 
tion of the form
(4.4)
In contrast, the Cox model has the probability density function:
(4.5) J(Th Xj) =
where f(T{) is the derivative of F(Ti). Thus, while the standard paramet 
ric estimators assume that the independent variables affect only the 
mean of the distribution of training, the Cox model assumes that the 
independent variables affect the entire distribution of training spells. 
As a result, we cannot compare the two approaches and determine
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which approach better fits the data. The Cox model, however, does pro 
vide an important specification check on the results that we present in 
tables 4.2 and 4.3. It allows us to assess the robustness of our results 
with respect to the truncation of the training measures at three months 
and to evaluate our assumptions about the distribution of the error 
terms.
In table 4.4, we present the results from the Cox model. The results 
are generally consistent with those reported in table 4.2, with a couple 
of notable exceptions. First, the coefficient on the logarithm of 
employees at other sites is not significant. Second, the coefficient on 
nonblack females is negative and statistically significant, indicating 
that nonblack women received significantly less training than nonblack 
males. The coefficient on black workers, while not statistically signifi 
cant, is about the same magnitude as the coefficient on nonblack 
females. Moreover, the lack of significance on the black coefficient is 
not a robust result. In Barren, Berger, and Black (1994), we report 
results using a slightly different specification and a larger sample size 
where the coefficient on black workers is negative and significant in a 
Cox model.5 Using the EOPP data, Barron, Black and Loewenstein 
(1993) report that while women were placed in less complex jobs, they 
did not receive less training than males; in tables 4.2 and 4.3, we 
obtained similar results. In our view, these results should be viewed 
with suspicion. When we do not account for the truncation of training 
at three months, we obtain a similar result for the SBA data; therefore, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that nonblack females receive the same 
quantity of training as nonblack males. Accounting for the truncation 
of training, however, reverses this result. 6 This suggests that research 
ers should be extremely careful when viewing racial and gender differ 
ences with truncated data.
One final finding of interest concerns the considerable change in the 
distribution of wages in the time between the EOPP and SBA samples. 
Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990); Katz and Murphy (1992); 
Becker (1992); and Berger (1992) document an increase in the returns 
to higher education during the 1980s. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) 
show that in the 1970s and 1980s wages become much more disperse, 
with low-wage workers experiencing a fall in real wages while workers 
from the upper end of the distribution saw a growth in real wages. 
Given these fundamental changes in the distribution of wages, one
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might anticipate that changes in the distribution of on-the-job training 
are responsible for some of the changes in the distribution of wages. 
Surprisingly, we find little evidence for this hypothesis. The EOPP and 
SBA data sets provide reasonably consistent answers to the question of 
who receives training despite the ten-year difference in the age of the 
surveys. Thus, researchers will have to look beyond differences in 
training at least training in the first three months of employment to 
explain the dramatic increase in earnings inequality.
Table 4.4 Total Hours of Training for the 1992 SBA Data, Cox Model
Independent variables SBA
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N_______________ __
NOTE:. Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are sig 
nificant at the 5 percent level.
-0.021 
(0.13)
-0.050 
(0.93)
-0.118 
(0.75)
-0.106 
(1.09)
0.478* 
(4.24)
-0.222 
(1.50)
-0.203* 
(2.33)
0.108 
(0.69)
0.060* 
(2.40)
0.011 
(0.87)
59.75
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In the next section, we explore the determination of the incidence of 
training. This exercise will allow us to compare our results to many 
studies where the measures of training are binary (e.g., 1983 CPS 
data). In addition, it will allow us to examine differences in the inci 
dence of each type of training.
Variations in the Incidence of Training
The incidence of training is inherently a dichotomous variable. 
Workers either receive a certain type of training or they do not. Because 
the incidence of training is a binary variable, we employ a logit proce 
dure. In table 4.5, we present the logit estimates for the probability of 
receiving off-site formal training. The coefficient from a logit model 
may be interpreted as the rate of change in the logarithm of the ratio of 
probability that the variable is one, which we denote P, divided by the 
probability the variable is equal to zero, which we denote (1 - P). The 
logarithm of the ratio of these two probabilities is often referred to as 
the "log odds© ratio." To convert this coefficient to a derivative of the 
probability, it is necessary to multiply the coefficient by P(l - P). 
About the sample mean, this can be easily done by referring to the mean 
incidence rates in table 4.1. For instance, evaluated about the mean, a 
worker with a college degree increases the probability of off-site train 
ing by about 0.122 [1.272 x 0.107(1 - 0.107)], or a worker with a col 
lege degree more than doubles the probability of receiving off-site 
training. The relationship among training, the size of the establishment, 
and the number of workers at other sites provides some insights into 
training decisions. Larger establishments tend to be less likely to pro 
vide off-site training to their employees, although the coefficient is not 
quite significant at the 10-percent level. In contrast, the larger the num 
ber of employees at other sites, the more likely the firm will offer off- 
site formal training, perhaps sending their newly hired workers to other 
company sites.
Table 4.6 presents logit estimates for the probability of receiving on- 
site formal training for the SBA and EOPP data. The two sets of esti 
mates have some interesting similarities and dissimilarities. Both data 
sets indicate that college graduates are more likely to receive on-site
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Table 4.5 Incidence of Off-Site Formal Training for the 1992 SBA Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N
SBA
-2.055
(1.27)
-0.200
(0.40)
-0.067
(0.44)
-0.424
(0.66)
0.426
(1.37)
1.272*
(4.46)
-0.529
(1.02)
0.064
(0.28)
0.760*
(2.23)
-0.106
(1.56)
0.108*
(3.16)
43.21
888
NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are signif 
icant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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Table 4.6 Incidence of On-Site Formal Training for the 1992 SBA and 
1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at 
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other 
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N
NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses, 
icant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
SBA
-2.059*
(1.97)
-0.017 
(0.05)
-0.195 
(1.85)
0.523 
(1.72)
0.062 
(0.31)
0.639* 
(3.21)
0.181
(0.63)
0.250
(1.52)
 
0.686*
(2.64)
0.170* 
(3.64)
0.107* 
(4.56)
94.52
888
Coefficients marked with an
EOPP
-1.997
(1.88)
-0.163 
(0.49)
-0.012 
(0.11)
-0.321 
(1.03)
0.541* 
(2.87)
0.617* 
(2.56)
 
 
-0.070
(0.44)
-0.190
(0.61)
0.160* 
(3.04)
 
25.58
1,471
* are signif-
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formal training than are high school graduates the differential is 
about 0.13 for the SBA and about 0.07 for the EOPP. Similarly, larger 
establishments are more likely to offer formal training; a doubling of 
the establishment size increases the probability of training by 0.036 for 
the SBA data and by 0.018 for the EOPP data.
The EOPP data indicate, however, that those workers who attended 
but did not complete college have about the same probability of under 
going formal training as college graduates; indeed, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the two groups have the same incidence of training. In 
contrast, the SBA data indicate that college graduates do have a higher 
incidence of training than high school graduates. Similarly, for the 
SBA data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that high school dropouts 
have the same incidence of on-site formal training as college gradu 
ates, but for the EOPP data, that hypothesis is easily rejected.
For the SBA data, we find that union members are more likely to 
receive on-site formal training than nonunion members; the differential 
is about 0.14. In contrast, in the EOPP data, firms with unions appear 
to be no more likely to offer on-site formal training than firms without 
unions. Thus, for the SBA data, union members appear to receive more 
off-site and on-site formal training. This result contrasts with the find 
ings of Mincer (1983), who uses the 1978 PSID data; Barren, Feuss, 
and Loewenstein (1987), who use the 1982 EOPP data; and Lillard and 
Tan (1992), who use the 1983 CPS data. All of these studies find that 
union members receive less training than nonunion workers. Lynch 
(1992) and Veum (1993), using data from two different time periods of 
the NLSY, report that union members are more likely to receive formal 
training. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993), using 1991 CPS data, 
report that, in a parsimonious specification that includes only race, 
gender, marital status, and education controls, union members are 
more likely to receive training than nonunion members, but the coeffi 
cient on union membership becomes insignificant yet still positive 
once controls for experience and tenure are included.
There are at least two potential explanations for the differences in 
these findings. First, differences in the sampling strategies might pro 
vide one rationale. Both the SBA and the NLSY have younger samples 
than the CPS or the PSID, although the EOPP is somewhat younger 
than the SBA sample. This suggests that younger union members are 
more likely to receive formal training than young nonunion members,
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but this difference dissipates over time and eventually reverses itself. 
Given that union workers have lower turnover probabilities than non 
union members, there is less reason to delay training among union 
members than among nonunion members.
Changes in the union sector in the last decade may provide another 
explanation. With the importance of international trade in the United 
States economy, there has been a rapid reduction in the domestic man 
ufacturing sector of the economy, as other countries have assumed 
many semiskilled manufacturing jobs previously performed in the 
United States. A corresponding decrease in union membership has 
accompanied this trend. Given the United States© relatively advanced 
educational system and given that on-the-job training and education 
appear to be positively correlated, it may be that the United States© 
comparative advantage lies in jobs that require workers to obtain sig 
nificant amounts of on-the-job training. If competitive pressures have 
eliminated the low-training union jobs, the difference between the 
1982 EOPP data and the 1992 SBA data may indicate that there has 
been a structural shift in the economy.
With informal management training, it is important to remember 
that the incidence is quite high about 92 percent for the SBA data and 
about 87 percent for the EOPP data. There are, therefore, few workers 
whom managers do not informally train. Table 4.7 presents the logit 
estimates for the probability of obtaining informal manager training for 
the SBA and EOPP data. Not surprisingly, we cannot reject the hypoth 
esis that all the coefficients are insignificant for the SBA data. For the 
EOPP data, only two coefficients are significant. Workers with more 
experience are less likely to receive training, and larger establishments 
are more likely to offer this type of training.
For informal co-worker training, both the SBA and the EOPP data 
indicate that larger establishments are more likely to offer co-worker 
training. Table 4.8 presents the logit estimates for the two data sets. 
Evaluated at the sample means, a 100 percent increase in the size of the 
establishment increases the probability of co-worker training by 0.056 
for the SBA data and 0.058 for the EOPP data. This finding probably 
reflects the fact that larger establishments are more likely to have a 
worker performing similar tasks, which reduces the cost of co-worker 
training. There are some minor differences in the two data sets. The 
EOPP results suggest older workers are less likely to receive co-worker
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Table 4.7 Incidence of Informal Management Training for the 1992 SBA 
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at 
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other 
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N
NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses, 
icant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
SBA
2.454
(1.50)
0.058 
(0.11)
-0.179 
(1.09)
-0.577 
(1.24)
-0.536
(1.77)
0.060 
(0.17)
-0.087
(0.18)
-0.095
(0.36)
 
0.224
(0.41)
0.064 
(0.80)
0.008 
(0.21)
9.21
888
EOPP
2.525*
(2.55)
-0.291 
(0.94)
-0.262* 
(2.54)
-0.101 
(0.39)
0.191 
(0.91)
-0.037 
(0.14)
 
 
-0.043
(0.27)
-0.099
(0.30)
0.218* 
(3.72)
 
30.93
1,471
Coefficients marked with an * are signif-
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Table 4.8 Incidence of Informal Co-Worker Training for the 1992 SBA 
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at 
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other 
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N
NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses, 
icant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
SBA
(1)
0.857 
(0.87)
-0.323 
(1.07)
-0.165 
(1.70)
0.317 
(1.02)
0.211 
(1.13)
0.312 
(1.54)
0.021 
(0.07)
0.151 
(0.94)
 
-0.253 
(0.90)
0.265* 
(5.21)
0.044 
(1.79)
63.55
888
EOPP
(2)
2.313* 
(3.31
-0.769* 
(3.50)
0.055 
(0-74)
0.006 
(0.03)
0.080 
(0.56)
-0.244 
(1.31)
 
 
0.117 
(1-04)
0.074 
(0.32)
0.247* 
(6.17)
 
72.77
1,471
Coefficients marked with an * are signif-
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training, and the coefficient for the worker©s age is highly significant. 
In the SBA, while the coefficient for the worker©s age is negative, it is 
not significant. The coefficients for college-educated workers have the 
opposite signs in the two data sets, although neither is significantly dif 
ferent from zero.
Finally, both data sets again indicate a preference for "watching oth 
ers" training among larger establishments. The logit estimates for the 
SBA and EOPP data are given in table 4.9. Evaluated at the sample 
means, a 100 percent increase in the size of the establishment increases 
the likelihood of this type of training by 0.029 in the SBA data and 
0.027 in the EOPP data. Again, there are some minor differences in the 
two data sets. For the EOPP data, workers with more experience are 
less likely to undergo training by "watching others," while the same 
coefficient for the SBA data is negative but not significant. Similarly, 
for the EOPP data, workers with some college education are more 
likely to "watch others," while the same coefficient for the SBA data is 
positive but not significant.
Taken together, the two data sets provide a reasonably similar 
description of the incidence of the various types of training. Three 
major themes run through these regressions. First, large firms have 
higher rates of training incidence. These establishments tend to be 
more likely to offer formal on-site training, informal co-worker train 
ing, and training by watching others. Also, the EOPP data indicate that 
larger establishments are more likely to offer informal management 
training, and the SBA data indicate that firms with larger numbers of 
employees at other sites were more likely to offer off-site formal train 
ing. Second, both the SBA and EOPP data agree that college graduates 
are more likely to receive formal training than are high school gradu 
ates. And finally, the SBA data indicate that union members are more 
likely to receive formal training, but the EOPP does not provide any 
evidence of this differential.
Truncated Spells of Training
Because the SBA survey asked for the number of weeks of training 
and the number of hours of training per week, we may also assess how
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Table 4.9 Incidence of Training by Watching Others for the 1992 SBA 
and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant experience
Worker is a high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is a college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is a nonblack female
Worker is female
Union
Logarithm of number of employees at 
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at other 
establishments
Chi-squared statistics
N
SBA
(1)
1.026
(1.06)
-0.221 
(0.74)
-0.115 
(1.21)
0.158 
(0.52)
0.191 
(1.03)
-0.017 
(0.08)
0.209
(0.73)
0.060
(0.39)
 
-0.047
(0.17)
0.133* 
(2.83)
0.022 
(0.92)
20.24
888
NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an 
icant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
EOPP
(2)
0.978
(1.12)
0.029 
(0.11)
-0.282* 
(3.10)
-0.051 
(0.23)
0.396* 
(2.11)
-0.271 
(1.26)
 
 
0.253
(1.82)
-0.352
(1.36)
0.180* 
(3.67)
-. 
39.96
1,471
* are signif-
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many spells of training are truncated by the three-month time frame. 
For the SBA data, we treat any spell lasting at least 12 weeks as trun 
cated. 7 Conditional on receiving each type of training, the rates of trun 
cation are 0.19 for off-site formal training, 0.16 for on-site formal 
training, 0.24 for informal management training, 0.26 for co-worker 
training, and 0.19 for "watching others." We have seen in chapter 3 that 
data from the NLSY and NLSHS72 indicate that many spells of formal 
training last beyond three months. Also, while the NLSHS72 data had 
an extremely low incidence rate of informal training, many spells of 
informal training were longer than three months. The SBA data indi 
cate that informal training spells are also likely to last at least 12 
weeks.
In table 4.10, we present logit estimates of the probability for each 
type of training that a training spell lasts at least 12 weeks. In column 
(1), we list the estimates for the off-site formal training. Only one of 
the coefficients is significant at the 5 percent level. Nonblack females 
are less likely than nonblack males to have undergone off-site training 
spells that last at least 12 weeks. Evaluated at the sample means, non- 
black women©s probability is about 0.30 smaller than nonblack men©s. 
Thus, the truncation of the training measure at three months hides the 
gender differences in the off-site training variable. In column (2), we 
present the estimates for on-site formal training, and again, only one 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Nonblack 
females are less likely to have on-site training spells that last at least 12 
weeks than are nonblack males. Evaluated at the sample means, non- 
black women©s probability is about 0.12 lower than nonblack men©s. 
Thus, for both formal training measures, nonblack women are less 
likely to experience a long spell of formal training, and the truncation 
of the training measures at three months hides the true gender differen 
tial. We also note that while the coefficient on blacks in the on-site for 
mal training equation is not statistically significant, it is much larger 
than the nonblack female coefficient. Because there are only a limited 
number of blacks in the sample, it is difficult to obtain a precise esti 
mate of the coefficients, and the reader should not interpret the insig 
nificance of the coefficient as strong evidence that blacks are as likely 
as nonblack males to have long spells of on-site formal training.
Also in both formal training equations, it was necessary to eliminate 
the high school dropouts because no high school dropout had a spell of
Table 4.10 Incidence of Training Spells Lasting at Least 12 Weeks for the 1992 SBA Data
Independent variables
Constant
Logarithm of worker©s age
Logarithm of worker©s relevant
experience
Worker is high school dropout
Worker has some college
Worker is college graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Union
Off-site 
formal 
training
(1)
4.560
(0.85)
-1.293
(0.75)
0.499
(1.20)
 
-1.185
(1.24)
-0.308
(0.41)
1.395
(1.04)
-1.928*
(2.64)
1.249
(1.58)
On-site 
formal 
training
(2)
0.645
(0.24)
-0.018
(0.02)
0.311
(1.30)
 
-0.486
(0.94)
0.352
(0.87)
-1.126
(1.38)
-0.866*
(2.30)
0.445
(0.95)
Informal 
manager 
training
(3)
-1.703
(1.54)
0.263
(0.77)
-0.125
(1.13)
-0.257
(0.72)
-0.520
(2.25)
0.605*
(2.98)
-0.489
(1.44)
-0.242
(1.39)
0.189
(0.66)
Informal 
co-worker 
training
(4)
-0.718
(0.54)
-0.054
(0.37)
0.196
(1.54)
0.008
(0.02)
0.010
(0.04)
0.852*
(3.60)
-0.201
(0.55)
-0.224
(1.14)
0.397
(1.24)
Train by 
watching 
others
(5)
1.974
(1.37)
0.234
(0.53)
-0.022
(0.16)
-0.073
(0.16)
-0.029
(0.10)
1.061*
(4.04)
-0.350
(0.82)
-0.256
(1.17)
-0.234
(0.59)
Logarithm of number of employees at 
establishment
Logarithm of number of employees at 
other establishments
Chi-squared statistic
N
-0.292 
(1.47)
-0.111 
(1.17)
21.77
92
-0.164 
(1.65)
-0.034 
(0.64)
18.98
244
-0.019 
(0.38)
-0.006 
(0.24)
30.58
817
-0.028 
(0.47)
-0.026 
(0.90)
25.95
617
-0.106 
(1.63)
0.002 
(0.05)
26.14
611
NOTE: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with an * are significant at the 5 percent level. Logit estimates are reported.
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training lasting at least 12 weeks. As such, dropping out of high school 
perfectly predicts that the training spell is not truncated. The estimation 
procedure cannot determine a coefficient, and so it is necessary to drop 
the observations. In the case of off-site formal training, we exclude 
only three cases, and we should not overemphasize this exclusion. In 
the case of on-site formal training, however, we exclude 23 cases, 
which makes it highly likely that dropouts are less likely to have long 
spells of training. Given that dropouts have revealed an aversion to or a 
lack of aptitude for formal schooling, it is not surprising that they pos 
sess jobs that do not require long spells of formal training.
Column (3) presents the logit estimates for the probability of under 
going a spell of formal management training lasting at least 12 weeks. 
Two coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. Workers who 
attended but did not graduate from college are less likely to have a long 
spell of informal management training than are high school graduates. 
At the sample mean, a high school graduate has a 0.096 higher proba 
bility of having a truncated spell of informal management training than 
a worker with some college education. This finding further demon 
strates that the SBA sample of workers with some college education is 
somewhat anomalous because almost all other studies have found that 
training increases with education. Workers with college degrees, on the 
other hand, are more likely to have a truncated spell of informal man 
agement training. Evaluated at the sample mean, college-educated 
workers have about a 0.112 higher probability of undergoing a spell of 
informal management training that lasts at least 12 weeks than do high 
school graduates.
In columns (4) and (5) of table 4.10, we present the logit estimates 
for the co-worker training and "watching others" equations. In both 
equations, only one coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level: col 
lege graduates have a greater chance than high school graduates of 
undergoing a training spell that lasts at least 12 weeks. Evaluated at the 
sample means, the college graduates have a 0.164 greater probability 
of undergoing a training spell that lasts at least 12 weeks for both train 
ing measures than do high school graduates. Thus, for each type of 
informal training, college graduates have a significantly higher proba 
bility of undergoing a spell lasting at least 12 weeks than do high 
school graduates. This suggests that the 43 percent differential in the 
number of hours of total training between college graduates and gradu-
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ates of only high school understates the true differentials in the training 
experiences of newly hired employees.
Thus, the three-month sampling frame of the EOPP data and the 
SBA data appears to have two major consequences. First, the sampling 
frame may hide a gender differential in formal training measures. Non- 
black women are significantly less likely to have formal training spells 
that last at least 12 weeks than are nonblack men. Second, the sampling 
frame also understates the training differential that college graduates 
receive; college graduates are significantly more likely to have infor 
mal training spells that last at least 12 weeks than are high school grad 
uates.
Conclusions
There are four conclusions that emerge from both the EOPP and 
SBA data. First, college graduates receive much more training than 
high school graduates. Even after controlling for other factors, college 
graduates receive between 56 to 60 percent more training than high 
school graduates in the first three months of employment. Moreover, 
analysis of the SBA data suggests that this difference is understated 
because college graduates are more likely to have their training spells 
continue past three months. When labor economists estimate the 
returns to college education without controls for on-the-job training, 
perhaps some of the presumed return to college education may be a 
return to the greater quantities of on-the-job training.
Second, when hiring workers for more complex jobs, firms appar 
ently hire workers with greater prior relevant work experience for a 
couple of reasons. First, firms may find it more expensive to train 
workers themselves than to hire experienced workers. This would be 
especially true for positions in which the worker was expected to 
"learn by doing," or learn by actually performing the task at hand. Sec 
ond, by hiring experienced workers, firms may reduce the risk that they 
have hired a worker who is incapable of doing the job. As we shall see 
in chapter 7, firms spend much more time evaluating workers when hir 
ing for jobs with more training and greater total human capital.
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Third, we find evidence that large establishments offer more train 
ing, which might explain some of the wage premium earned by work 
ers at these larger sites. We find that a 10 percent increase in the size of 
the establishment increases the hours of training in the first three 
months of employment by about 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent. Larger 
establishments are also more likely to offer on-site formal training than 
are smaller establishments, and using the SBA data, we find some evi 
dence that employees of large firms who work at small sites are more 
likely to undergo off-site training, as they presumably receive training 
at larger sites within the firm.
Finally, both data sets indicate substantial gender difference in the 
time to become fully trained and qualified, and the SBA data indicate a 
substantial racial difference in the time to become fully trained. Even 
after we control for other factors, blacks hold jobs that require about 60 
percent less time to become trained and qualified while nonblack 
women occupy jobs that require between 36 and 46 percent less time 
than the jobs of nonblack males. Interestingly, we find that the trunca 
tion in the hours of training may hide gender differences in hours of 
training; women are significantly less likely than men to have spells of 
formal training that last longer than three months.
NOTES
1. We use the adjustment that Kennedy (1991) develops, where the differential g is approxi 
mated by g = exp[$ - 0.5 VAR $ ) ] - 1.
2. Again, we sue the adjustment that Kennedy (1991) develops to estimate the differential.
3. The time to become fully trained, however, also suffers from some biases. The time variable 
does not measure the intensity of training, and the intensity of training may vary by the type of 
job. Moreover, certain jobs may require very little training, but workers may take a great deal of 
time to master fully the tasks that the job requires; they may learn by actually doing the job. Other 
jobs may require workers to be continuously in training while becoming fully trained and quali 
fied, thus, two workers may take the same time to be fully qualified but may have much different 
training experiences. Because of these limitations, we interpret the "time to become fully trained" 
variable as a measure of a job©s total human capital rather than as a measure of on-the-job train 
ing. As wel shall see in chapter 6, the evidence from wage growth equations supports this view: 
wage growth is more highly correlated with total hours of training than the time to become fully 
trained and qualified.
4. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for details of the estimation procedure.
5. Given the similarity in magnitude, the reader may wonder if the two groups should be 
pooled. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on black and nonblack female work 
ers are the same. If we do pool these two groups, the coefficient is negative and significant with a 
z-statistic of-2.43.
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6. As in the OLS case, controlling for hours reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on non- 
black female workers and eliminates its statistical significance. When controlling for hours, the 
coefficient is -0.121 with az-statistic of-1.38.
7. Although there are 13 weeks in a three-month period, there was an unusually large fre 
quency of responses at 12 weeks, indicating that many respondents used a 12-week horizon.

CHAPTER J_____________
How Well Do We Measure 
On-the-Job Training?
The Upjohn Institute Survey
In previous chapters, we examined different employer and employee 
measures of training and studied who receives training. This chapter 
addresses the issue of how well training is measured. In particular, we 
examine the causes and consequences of errors in the measurement of 
training. Several studies in the last few years have considered this 
issue, but most have examined the impact of measurement error on the 
estimation of wage equations; none has analyzed measurement errors 
in training, or the effects of training measurement errors on the esti 
mated returns to training in wage equations. Consequently, economists 
are lacking information on how accurately training can be measured 
and on the consequences of the mismeasurement of training.
To examine measurement error issues, we designed and imple 
mented a new survey that matches employer and employee responses 
to training questions. This survey permitted analysis not only of errors 
in the measurement of training, but also wages, productivity, and other 
commonly used variables in labor economics. This new data set allows 
us to address several questions: How accurate are measures of on-the- 
job training? Do employers© and employees© responses to identical 
questions concerning on-the-job-training differ? If answers to these 
common questions do differ, who reports more training? Do firm and 
worker responses to formal training questions show more agreement 
than responses to informal training questions?
The Upjohn Institute commissioned this new survey, which we con 
ducted in spring 1993. Approximately 300 firms and workers partici 
pated in the survey. Each firm was asked about its last worker hired,
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and we conducted interviews with both the firm and the worker. Mea 
surement error is more apparent for some variables than others. Figure 
5.1 shows the scatterplot of firm and worker starting wages.
Workers and firms agree for the most part on the rate of pay at the 
start of employment. In fact, the correlation between worker and firm 
reports is 0.974. The level of agreement between the worker and the 
firm is somewhat lower for hours worked per week and months of rele 
vant experience prior to employment. The scatterplots for these vari 
ables are shown in figures 5.2 and 5.3. The correlation between worker 
and firm reports for hours worked is 0.769 and 0.727 for months of rel 
evant experience. Firms and workers disagree to an even greater extent 
about the amount of training provided. Figure 5.4 shows the scatterplot 
of worker and firm reports of total hours of training provided in the 
first four weeks of employment. The correlation coefficient is 0.475. 
Firms report 25 percent more hours of training on average than do 
workers, although firms and workers report similar incidence rates.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first examine previous measure 
ment error studies in labor economics and then describe our new data 
set. The results of the survey are then discussed, beginning with the 
correlations between employer and employee responses for a number 
of variables considered in previous studies. We then turn to an analysis 
of the measurement of on-the-job training. Finally, we examine the 
determinants of training and the correlates of differences in employer- 
and employee-reported training.
Previous Validation Studies in Labor Economics
A number of papers have considered the issue of reporting errors. 
Mellow and Sider (1983) use an employer-employee matched supple 
ment taken from the 1977 January Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and the first wave (1980) of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project 
(EOPP). While there is a fair amount of disagreement between 
employers and employees on industry and occupation, it appears to 
have little effect on cross-section wage structure. Further, the structure 
of wages is independent of whether employer- or employee-reported 
wages are used.
Figure 5.1 Firm- and Worker-Reported Wages
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Greenberg and Halsey (1983) investigate the effects of reporting 
error in the Seattle and Denver income maintenance experiments by 
comparing employer reports with respondent self-reports. Previous 
studies based on respondent self-reports find appreciable reductions in 
work efforts by those eligible for experimental income maintenance 
payments. Using employer-reported data, they find that the reductions 
in the work effort of husbands, wives, and young workers who are not 
heads of households are much smaller than the self-reported data 
would imply. The estimates for female heads appear to be unaffected 
by reporting error.
Freeman (1984) examines differences in reporting union status 
between worker and firm reports. He uses the 1977 January CPS 
employer-employee matched data as well as the 1979 May CPS regular 
survey and the pension supplement. Assuming differences between 
employer and worker reports are the result of measurement error, he 
argues that such error may negate the value of using longitudinal data 
to estimate union wage effects because the measurement error biases 
the union wage effects downward.
Duncan and Hill (1985) use a unique set of data from a single manu 
facturing company that provides unprecedented detail on the work his 
tory of employees. They compare administrative records with 
information obtained from a sample of workers as a validation exercise 
for the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They report estimates 
of wage equations that include schooling and tenure using both worker 
and firm reports. They find a bias of 30 percent in the estimated return 
to tenure due to the correlation between measurement error and tenure.
In related work, Lillard, Smith, and Welch (1986) examine measure 
ment error induced by the Census Bureau imputation procedure used to 
fill in missing observations in the CPS. They find that the Census 
imputation procedure severely understates income in some occupa 
tions. Because the evidence suggests that nonreporting is tied to 
income, the imputation procedure also probably causes an understate 
ment of average income.
Bound and Krueger (1991) use matched CPS-Social Security data to 
examine the prevalence of measurement error. They find that measure 
ment error in panel data is not as significant as previously thought 
because positive serial correlation and mean reversion of the measure 
ment error increase the reliability of panel earnings data.
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Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990, 1994) also use the 
matched CPS-Social Security data and a later wave of the PSID valida 
tion survey. They find annual earnings to be fairly reliably estimated. 
Hourly earnings estimates are quite unreliable, however, because hours 
worked are imprecisely reported. Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993) 
also examine errors in survey reports of earnings, hours worked, and 
hourly wages using the two waves of the PSID validation study. They 
find that measures of hourly earnings are "distressingly unreliable," 
arguing their findings suggest the importance of measurement error.
A New Validation Survey
None of the studies described in the previous section considers 
errors in reporting on-the-job training, or the effects of reporting errors 
on the estimated returns to training. Our survey, conducted in the 
spring of 1993, obtained evidence on this question from employers and 
employees. A major focus of the survey (hereafter referred to as the 
Upjohn Institute survey) was to provide worker-firm comparisons of 
on-the-job training measures. Because the intensity of on-the-job train 
ing is likely to be highest for newly hired workers, we decided to target 
those workers, similar to the EOPP and SBA surveys. We asked both 
firms and their last worker hired a series of training questions based on 
those used earlier in the EOPP and SBA surveys.
One of our major concerns centered on the accuracy of responses 
given by employers and employees. We did not want employers or 
employees to have to recall details of training that took place months or 
even years prior to the interview. To minimize this problem, we twice 
interviewed employers and employees about training, once after two 
weeks of employment, and a second time after four weeks of employ 
ment. This meant that we had to conduct interviews within narrow win 
dows of time, within a couple days of the end of the second and fourth 
week of employment.
Because of the survey design, we needed to contact firms that were 
hiring at the time we conducted the survey. Given our experience with 
the EOPP and SBA surveys, we were concerned that a number of 
establishments, especially small ones, would be ineligible for the sur-
On-the-Job Training 91
vey simply because they were not hiring. Therefore, we eliminated 
establishments with fewer than 100 workers from our sample universe 
to increase the chances of locating suitable establishments.
We obtained a nationwide random sample of 5,000 establishments 
with 100 or more employees from Survey Sampling, Inc. The survey 
was conducted in 1993 by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the 
University of Kentucky. Each of the 5,000 establishments was first 
sent a letter describing the survey and the general nature of the training 
questions. Telephone interviewing began on March 22, 1993 and was 
completed on June 21, 1993. In the initial interview we asked back 
ground information about the firm and the characteristics of the last 
worker hired. If firms had not hired in the past ten days or were not 
planning to hire soon, they were deemed ineligible for the survey and 
dropped from the sample. 1
Once we had completed the initial firm interview, we asked to speak 
with the worker. We then asked the worker a set of background ques 
tions similar to what we had asked the firm. The second interview of 
the employer and employee occurred after the employee had been with 
the employer for two weeks. At that time, we asked both the worker 
and the firm a set of questions about the training activities of the 
worker during the first two weeks of employment. The last interview 
occurred after the worker had been with the employer for four weeks. 
This interview consisted of the same set of questions about training as 
the second interview and concluded with a few questions about worker 
productivity and promotion probabilities.
There were a couple of drawbacks to our survey design and sam 
pling strategy. Restricting the original sample to establishments with 
100 or more workers meant that the sample would not be nationally 
representative of all establishments. Second, with three interviews for 
both the firm and the worker, there was the potential of attrition bias. 
While there was some attrition, it did not appear to be a significant 
problem. Eighty-five percent of the worker-firm pairs that completed 
the initial interview completed the entire set of interviews.
Given the level of commitment required from the firm and the 
worker, we anticipated a much lower level of response than a typical 
one-time interview would provide. From our initial sample of 5,000, 
we did not attempt to contact 1,603 establishments due to budget con 
siderations. The hiring restriction eliminated a number of firms imme-
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diately from the analysis. Out of the 3,397 establishments that we 
attempted to contact, 1,359 reported that they were not hiring. Others 
were ineligible to complete the survey due to a number of reasons: 229 
had disconnected phones; in 111 establishments we only received 
answering machines, busy signals, computer tones, or no answer in 
repeated attempts; 60 establishments had gone out of business; we had 
language communications problems with eight establishments; 76 
establishments had moved or closed, and we could not obtain a new 
address or verify closure. These exclusions left 1,554 establishments 
eligible to complete the survey. Of these, 541 directly refused to partic 
ipate, 241 said it was against company policy to answer a survey, 255 
were unwilling to let an employee participate in a survey, and 212 
repeatedly scheduled callbacks, which we took as an implicit refusal. 
There were 258 completions of all six interviews, and 47 partial com 
pletions. We only counted as a partial completion those cases in which 
we completed at least one employer and one employee interview. The 
response rate of partial and full completions was approximately 20 per 
cent.
To compare our sample of completions with our original sample, we 
obtained from Survey Sampling a few characteristics of each of the 
establishments in our initial sample of 5,000. These included Standard 
Industrial Code (SIC), Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) code, and 
status, state, and establishment size code. We distinguished among four 
establishment size categories: 100-249 employees, 250-499 employ 
ees, 500-999 employees, and 1000 or more employees. To summarize 
the representativeness of our sample, we estimated a probit model indi 
cating a partial or full completion for a particular establishment. The 
explanatory variables consisted of eight one-digit SIC industry dum 
mies (The first two SIC codes were combined to avoid empty cell prob 
lems), eight Census region dummies, three establishment size 
dummies, and a MSA status dummy. This analysis indicated that there 
were no significant differences at the 5 percent level in the industry and 
establishment size composition of the completions and the original 
sample. The sample of completions, however, was significantly more 
likely to come from rural areas and from the Mountain and Pacific 
Census regions than the overall sample of 5,000.
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Correlations Between Employer and Employee Reports and 
Comparisons with the Results of Previous Studies
The survey provides us with two potentially inaccurate measures on 
the same variable. Thus, for a continuous variable of interest x, such as 
on-the-job training, we have the firm©s report
(5.1) y{= X{ + i/i
where yf is the firm©s report for the ith worker, X; is the true value of the 
variable for the ith worker, and \4 is a random error term. The survey 
also provides the worker©s report
(5.2) ri^Xi + u*
where yw{ is the ith worker©s report and «"  is a random error term. We 
assume that the two random error terms are uncorrelated with each 
other and *,. We allow the distributions of the error terms to contain 
mass points at zero, which would allow for the worker and firm mea 
sures to agree with positive probability. We do not require that error 
terms have zero mean, and so the measures may be biased. In such a 
model, the correlation coefficient between the worker and firm reports 
gives a type of signal-to-noise ratio; as the variance of the worker©s or 
firm©s report increases, the correlation coefficient declines. In the limit 
ing case of degenerate distributions for both the worker©s and firm©s 
error terms, the correlation coefficient would be one.
We may subtract equation (5.2) from equation (5.1) to obtain
(5.3) Ayz = y{ -ywt = i/i~ uwt = AM,-.
We may use a paired Mest to test the hypothesis that E(Au) = 0. Condi 
tional on Ayi ^ 0, the Wilcoxon rank test examines the hypothesis that 
the error terms from the firm©s and worker©s measures are drawn from 
the same distribution, and similarly, the sign test examines if the 
median of the distribution of differences is zero.
To summarize differences in employer and employee reports and to 
facilitate comparisons of the Upjohn Institute data to other matched
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data sets, we present in table 5.1 a series of means, correlations, and 
significance tests of differences between employer and employee 
reports on a number of demographic, human capital, wage, fringe ben 
efit, and productivity variables. For binary variables, in addition to the 
employer and employee means and the correlation, we show the per 
centage agreements and disagreements and the results of a test of 
equality of means. For continuous variables, we show means, correla 
tions, and the results of three tests of differences in the employer and 
employee reports.
There is little disagreement between firm and worker race reports. 
Only 2.73 percent of workers and firms disagree about whether or not 
a worker is nonwhite and the correlation between the responses is over 
0.9. We next consider employer and employee responses on whether 
the worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The sim 
ple correlation between the employer and employee responses is 0.689, 
and the means are similar: employers report 10.5 percent of workers 
are covered and employees report 9.7 percent. Because the distribu 
tions are binomial, we use Fisher©s exact test to determine if the 
reported rate of unionization is the same; the one-tail p-value from 
Fisher©s test is 0.594, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that the rates 
are the same. From the 1977 January CPS employee-employer match, 
Mellow and Sider (1983) report that 7.1 percent of the employees dis 
agree with their employers on their union status. Using a somewhat 
smaller sample from the same data set, Freeman (1984) finds only 3.45 
percent of the employees disagree with their employers on union sta 
tus. In the Upjohn Institute survey, 5.65 percent of the employees dis 
agree with their employer on collective bargaining coverage. Thus, the 
Upjohn Institute data appears to compare favorably with the matched 
1977 January CPS data about union coverage.
Variables 3 through 10 in table 5.1 show employer and employee 
responses to a series of schooling completion questions. There is a fair 
amount of disagreement between employers and employees, and it is 
especially dramatic in some of the schooling categories. College atten 
dance, in particular, shows a massive amount of disagreement. Almost 
42 percent of the observations disagree on whether the worker attended 
college! The correlation between the employer and employee©s reports 
is only 0.186. Firms are almost twice as likely to report that the worker 
has attended, when the worker says he or she did not attend, as are the
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
Wilcoxon-Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level 
(two-tailed binomial test)
Paired Mest (significance level)
(7) 
Attended 
college
0.553
0.414
0.186
41,80%
58.20%
0.001
244
-
-
-
(8) 
Earned 
associate 
degree
0.175
0.179
0.546
13.25%
86.75%
0.860
234
-
-
-
(9) 
Earned 
bachelor©s 
degree
0.304
0.279
0.861
5.84%
94.16%
0.109
240
-
-
-
(10) 
Attended 
graduate 
school
0.065
0.056
0.850
1.73%
98.27%
0.318
231
-
-
-
(11) 
Age
31.458
31.611
0.961
-
-
-
218
0.40
(0.6868) 
(N=115)
0.0150 
(N=115)
-0.83 
(0.4060)
(12) 
Relevant 
experience 
(in months)
5.284
6.954
0.727
-
-
-
248
-5.90
(0.0001) 
(N=181)
0.0000 
(N=181)
-5.35 
(0.0000)
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p-value)
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test 
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)
(13) 
Starting wage
8.95
8.84
0.974
-
-
-
210
1.06 
(0.2845) 
(N=86)
0.450 
(N=86)
1.31 
(0.1932)
(14) 
Wage after two 
years
10.00
10.84
0.828
-
-
-
153
-4.41 
(0.0001) 
(N=148)
0.0002 
(N=148)
-3.36 
(0.0010)
(15) 
Hours worked
36.98
38.50
0.769
-
-
-
263
-4.73 
(0.0001) 
(N=113)
0.0000
(N=113)
-3.95 
(0.0001)
(16) 
Health 
insurance 
(initially)
0.385
0.486
0.590
21.01%
78.98%
0.0004
257
-
-
(17) 
Health 
insurance 
(after two
years)
0.880
0.928
0.469
9.57%
90.43%
0.025
209
-
-
(18) 
Paid 
vacation 
(initially)
0.331
0.350
0.247
33.84%
66.16%
0.597
263
-
-
(continued)
Table 5.1 (continued)
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
Isignificance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)
(19) 
Paid vacation 
(after two 
years)
0.192
0.916
0.490
7.98%
92.02%
0.828
263
-
-
-
(20) 
Eligible for 
sick pay 
(initially)
0.395
0.472
0.294
35.08%
64.92%
0.0414
248
-
-
-
(21) 
Eligible for 
sick pay (after 
two years)
0.756
0.831
0.428
19.30%
80.70%
0.0064
254
-
-
-
(22) 
Reitrement 
plan (initially)
0.289
0.362
0.312
30.60%
69.40%
0.0434
232
-
-
-
(23) 
Retirement 
plan (after 
two years)
0.730
0.772
0.327
25.32%
74.68%
0.1973
237
-
-
-
(24) 
Child/elderly 
care (initially)
0.086
0.113
0.298
12.67%
87.33%
0.258
221
-
-
-
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
Isignificance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)
(25) 
Child/elderly 
care (after two 
years)
0.162
0.281
0.252
26.87%
73.13%
0.0035
160
-
-
-
(26) 
Life insurance 
(initially)
0.448
0.556
0.516
25.10%
74.90%
0.0007
239
-
-
-
(27) 
Life insurance 
(after two
years)
0.841
0.841
0.508
13.18%
86.82%
1.0000
182
-
-
-
(28) 
Disability 
(initially)
0.433
0.585
0.283
37.33%
62.67%
0.0002
217
-
-
-
(20) 
Disability 
(after two
years)
0.725
0.812
0.206
28.75%
71.25%
0.0386
160
-
-
-
(30) 
Profit sharing 
(initially)
0.122
0.187
0.197
21.30%
78.70%
0.0318
230
-
-
-
(continued)
Table 5.1 (continued)
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements
Test of means (/?-value)
N
Wilcoxon-Rank Test 
(significance level)
Sign Test (significance level)
Paired f-test (significance level)
(31) 
Profit sharing 
(after two 
years)
0.413
0.468
0.426
28.51%
71.49%
0.1124
235
-
-
(32) 
Discounts 
(initially)
0.517
0.492
0.468
26.66%
73.34%
0.4544
240
-
-
(33) 
Discounts 
(after two
years)
0.583
0.574
0.509
23.97%
76.03%
0.7935
242
-
-
(34) 
Productivity 
in first two 
weeks 
(relative to 
fully trained 
worker)
57.42
58.09
0.312
-
-
-
227
-0.55 
(0.5845) 
(N=205)
1.000
(N=205)
-0.35 
(0.7293)
(35) 
Productivity 
in second two 
weeks
76.64
80.35
0.382
-
-
-
218
-2.57 
(0.0101) 
N=190)
0.0045) 
(N=190)
-2.59 
(0.0101)
(36) 
Probability of 
promotion 
within two 
years
25.77
45.61
0.259
-
-
-
211
-6.58 
(0.0001) 
(N=183)
0.0000 
(N=183)
-7.13 
(0.0000)
o o
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workers to report attendance when the firm does not. Not only does this 
discrepancy affect measurement of schooling completion levels, but it 
may also have some effect on the estimated returns to schooling.
The employer and employee mean ages are almost identical. Work 
ers report 31.61 years and firms report 31.46 years (Variable 11). The 
correlation between the two is 0.961 (n=218). Interestingly, conditional 
on disagreement, the sign test that the two variables have the same 
median can be rejected at the 1.5 percent confidence level (n=115); 
workers report that they are younger than firms believe. Thus, despite a 
high correlation and virtually identical means, the sign test cautions us 
against accepting the hypothesis that the two error terms have the same 
median.
Variable 12 provides reports of relevant experience. Workers report 
more relevant experience than do firms, and the correlation between 
the reports is 0.727. While this variable also appears in the EOPP and 
SBA surveys, it has not been included in household surveys. Given the 
relatively high correlation between worker and firm reports of relevant 
experience, this question may warrant inclusion in future household 
surveys.
Variables 13 and 14 show the mean values and correlations reported 
by employees and employers between the starting wages and predicted 
wages after two years. The mean starting wages are almost identical, 
and the correlation between the employer and employee reports is 
0.974. This figure is significantly higher than the correlations reported 
by Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990) and Rodgers, Brown, 
and Duncan (1993) using the PSID validation survey. Rodgers, Brown, 
and Duncan report a correlation for annual earnings of 0.792, and 
0.601 and 0.456 for the previous pay period and the usual pay period, 
respectively. Using a slightly different sample from the same data set, 
Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990) find a correlation of 
0.806 for annual earnings, and 0.456 and 0.461 for the last pay period 
and the usual pay period. 2 Perhaps employees and employers disagree 
less when the worker has just begun employment. However, the corre 
lation in the Upjohn Institute survey for the predicted wage in two 
years is 0.828, which is still higher than that obtained using the PSID 
validation survey. 3 The mean differences in starting wages also appear 
small in the Upjohn Institute survey. Workers underreport wages by 
$0.12, compared to figures of $0.63 and $0.66 reported by Duncan and
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Hill (1985) for the first wave of the PSID validation survey. The mean 
differences for wages also appear to be in line with those obtained 
from the 1977 January CPS by Mellow and Sider (1983). Workers 
report higher predicted wages in two years by $0.84 when compared to 
their employers in the Upjohn Institute data. These numbers, however, 
do not represent actual wage data but rather predictions on the part of 
employers and employees about what will occur in two years. Overall, 
the differences in reported wages appear to be quite low in the Upjohn 
Institute survey.
Variable 15 shows that workers report on average 1.5 more hours 
worked (workers report 38.5 and firms report 37.0), and the correlation 
between worker and employer measures is 0.769 (n=263). Conditional 
on disagreement, a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis 
that the two error terms are drawn from the same distribution with a z- 
statistic of 4.73 (n=113). Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1990) 
and Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993) find that the log of hours dur 
ing the previous pay period from administrative data and the log of 
usual hours from employee measures are correlated between 0.60 and 
0.64 using the PSID validation survey. When the Upjohn Institute 
hours of work data are converted to logs, the correlation between 
employer and employee measures is 0.61, essentially identical to the 
correlation obtained from the PSID validation study. Mellow and Sider 
(1983) report that the mean difference in the log of hours worked is 
0.039. We find that workers overreport the log of hours worked by a 
somewhat smaller amount (0.031).
Variables 16 through 33 show employer and employee reports of 
various components of the fringe benefit package. The correlations 
range from 0.197 for the initial provision of profit sharing to 0.59 for 
initial eligibility for health insurance. Duncan and Hill (1985) report on 
the level of agreement between employees and administrative records 
on various components of the fringe benefit package. These differences 
only come from employee errors and not employer errors because of 
the use of administrative records in the PSID validation survey. On the 
other hand, the Upjohn Institute survey contains disagreements result 
ing from errors on the part of both employers and employees. In addi 
tion, the PSID only surveyed a single manufacturing firm, where 
workers are likely to have long tenure with the company, while the 
Upjohn Institute surveyed newly hired workers. For these reasons,
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there is more agreement about fringe benefit provision in the PSID val 
idation survey than in the Upjohn Institute survey.
Only 1 percent of the employees in the PSID validation study dis 
agree with their employers on the provision of health insurance. On the 
contrary, 21 percent of employees in the Upjohn Institute survey dis 
agree about the provision of health insurance at the beginning of 
employment and 9.6 percent disagree about health insurance provision 
after two years. The level of agreement after two years is probably 
more meaningful because many workers may be confused about when 
health insurance coverage starts.
In the PSID validation survey, 9 percent of the employees disagree 
with their employer about the provision of sick pay, and 10 percent dis 
agree about life insurance. This compares to 35 percent and 30 percent 
in the Upjohn Institute survey at the start of employment and 19 per 
cent and 13 percent after two years. Only 1 percent and 3 percent of the 
employees disagree with their employer about the provision of paid 
vacation days and a retirement plan in the PSID validation survey, 
while 34 percent and 31 percent disagree with their employer in the 
Upjohn Institute survey at the beginning of employment and 8 percent 
and 25 percent disagree after two years with the employer.
While there is a large amount of agreement between employers and 
employees on well-measured variables such as age, race, gender, start 
ing wages, and completion of a bachelor©s degree, there is less agree 
ment on variables more difficult to measure, such as attendance of 
college, and for variables about which the newly hired worker is not 
likely to know, such as fringe benefits. As a whole, the responses we 
received are more or less comparable with those found in the literature.
The Upjohn Institute survey also asked several more subjective 
questions. For example, we asked the employer and new employee to 
rate on a scale of 0 to 100 the employee©s productivity relative to a fully 
trained worker in the first two weeks of employment and after the sec 
ond two weeks of employment. Variable 34 shows the reported produc 
tivity during the first two weeks, and Variable 35 shows the reported 
productivity at the end of the second two weeks. The mean responses 
for productivity during the first two weeks are almost identical, yet the 
correlation is only 0.312. The correlation increases slightly to 0.382 for 
the second two weeks, and workers report somewhat higher productiv 
ity on average. Variable 36 shows that workers report a much higher
104 How Well Do We Measure On-the-Job Training?
probability of promotion in the first two years than do firms for typical 
workers in the same position, and the correlation between responses is 
0.259.
Measures of On-the-job Training
We now turn to table 5.2, in which we report the employer and 
employee measures on training. For each type of training, we report 
the firm mean, the worker mean, the correlation between the two mea 
sures, the Wilcoxon signed rank test, the sign test, and the paired r-test. 
In general, firms report more training than workers. Employers report 
more on-site training (/-statistic of 2.32), informal management train 
ing (/-statistic of 0.56), informal co-worker training (/-statistic of 3.06), 
and "watching others" (/-statistic of 1.55). Workers report more off-site 
training (/-statistic of 1.46). The Wilcoxon test, which does not require 
the normality assumption of the f-test, indicates the only significant 
differences are for on-site formal training and informal co-worker 
training, although the sign test cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
median of on-site formal training is the same for workers and firms. 4 
While all the correlations are statistically significant, they are surpris 
ingly low. The formal training measures have a correlation of about 
0.4. Informal management training has a correlation of only 0.176. Co- 
worker training and "watching others" have correlation coefficients of 
0.379 and 0.287, respectively. When we aggregate the five different 
variables into a single training measure, the correlation increases to 
0.475. Firms report nearly 25 percent more training than workers (t- 
statistic of 2.72 and a Wilcoxon z-statistic of 2.73).
The Upjohn Institute data also contain PSID-like questions that 
measure the time to become fully trained and qualified. Unlike the 
PSID, however, we asked the firm and worker to evaluate how long it 
would take a worker with no experience to become fully trained and 
qualified, which is the same question asked by both the SBA and 
EOPP data. Of course, workers are being asked to evaluate how long it 
will take to become fully trained and qualified after only four weeks on 
the job. The means of the two distributions are quite similar (/-statistic 
of 0.44), and, indeed, the means are quite similar to those we reported
Table 5.2 Employer and Employee Measures of Hours of Training
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
N
Wilcoxon-Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test Significance Level
Paired Mest (significance level)
Hours of
on-site 
formal 
training
9.31
6.06
0.398
248
1.98
(0.0475 
(N=103)
0.1145 
(N=103)
2.32 
(0.0210)
Hours of
off-site 
formal 
training
1.64
2.45
0.457
251
-1.35
(0.1774) 
(N=38)
0.4177 
(N=38)
-1.46 
(0.1465)
Hours of
informal, 
managerial 
training
26.90
25.56
0.176
219
0.89
(0.3709) 
(N=211)
0.0732 
(N=211)
0.56 
(0.5793)
Hours of
informal, 
co-worker 
training
26.31
19.67
0.379
216
3.13
(0.0017) 
(N=192)
0.0048 
(N=192)
3.06 
(0.0025)
Hours of
training by 
watching 
others
24.48
20.54
0.287
209
1.46
(0.1433) 
(N=186)
0.2125 
(N=186)
1.55 
(0.1266)
Total 
hours of 
training
87.50
71.83
0.475
179
2.73
(0.0064) 
(N=177)
0.0350 
(N=177)
2.72 
(0.0072)
Time to
become
fully 
trained
(weeks)
18.88
20.99
0.172
222
2.48
(0.0131) 
(N=208)
0.0313 
(N=208)
-0.44 
(0.6630)
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in the SB A and EOPP data in chapter 3. The employer and employee 
responses, however, have a correlation of only 0.172, and, when we 
test the hypothesis that the two are drawn from the same distribution, 
the Wilcoxon z-statistics lead us to reject that hypothesis. Similarly, the 
sign test rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions have the same 
median. The difference between the nonparametric Wilcoxon and sign 
tests and the parametric /-test suggests that there are several large outli 
ers, and when we repeated the Mest with observations that differed by 
less than 48 months, the /-test indicated that firms reported a longer 
time to become fully trained and qualified (f-statistic of 2.90).
One may be tempted, given the differences in the correlations 
among the formal and informal training measures, to conclude that we 
measure formal training more accurately than informal training. This is 
not the case. In table 5.3, we aggregate the training measures into a for 
mal and informal training measure. The correlation coefficients are 
very similar (0.419 for formal training and 0.408 for informal training). 
While the difference between firm and worker mean measures is statis 
tically significant for informal training and is not significant for formal 
training at the 5-percent level, firms report 28.9 percent more formal 
training and "only" report 19.3 percent more informal training. Thus, 
this experiment does not offer much evidence for the belief that infor 
mal training is more difficult to measure than formal training.
Table 5.3 Employer and Employee Measures of Hours of Formal and 
Informal Training
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
N
Wilcoxon Rank Test
(significance level)
Sign Test
Significant Level
Paired Mest (significance level)
Hours of formal 
training
10.66
8.30
0.41.9
245
1.10
(0.2713)
(N=106)
0.2065
(N=106)
1.55
(0.1220)
Hours of informal 
training
77.44
64.67
0.408
184
2.65
(0.0081)
(N=182)
0.0451
(N=182)
2.34
(0.0206)
Table 5.4 Employer and Employee Measures of Training Incidence Rates
Firm mean
Worker mean
Correlation
Percentage disagreements
Percentage agreements that training 
occurred
Percentage agreements that training did 
not occur
Test of equality of means (p- value)
N
On-site 
formal 
training
0.310
0.270
0.318
28.23%
14.92%
56.85%
0.2327
248
Off-site 
formal 
training
0.084
0.120
0.377
11.56%
84.06%
4.38%
0.0947
251
Management 
training
0.954
0.900
-0.0731
14.61%
85.39%
0.00%
0.0336
219
Co-worker 
training
0.842
0.819
0.227
21.76%
72.22%
6.02%
0.4671
216
Training by 
watching 
others
0.847
0.790
0.269
22.01%
70.81%
7.18%
0.0768
209
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Because many survey instruments are concerned with the measure 
ment of incidence rates of training, in table 5.4 we present statistics for 
these rates. For each of the five training measures, we list the firm 
mean, the worker mean, the correlation between the firm and worker 
measures, the percentage of disagreements between the firm and 
worker measures, the percentage of time that the firm and worker agree 
that the worker received the training, and the /?-value for Fisher©s exact 
test of the equality of means for binomial variables. It is important to 
note that firms and workers agree that the incidence of informal train 
ing is quite high. The lowest rate of agreement is for "watching oth 
ers," and nearly 71 percent of the sample agree that the worker was 
trained by watching others. These rates are similar to those reported in 
chapter 3 for the EOPP and SBA data and offer further evidence that 
the incidence rate of informal training is extremely high for new hires. 
Indeed, there are no observations for which worker and firm agree that 
the worker did not receive informal management training, and there are 
only 13 observations that agree there is no informal co-worker training. 
The means are similar for each of the five training incidence rates. 
Thus, although not highly correlated, firm and worker measures give 
very similar estimates of the incidence rates.
Determinants of Training and Reported Differences in Training
Our survey data suggest significant deviations in worker- and firm- 
reported training measures. While we cannot examine measurement 
error directly, we can examine the determinants of differences in 
worker- and firm-reported training. In table 5.5, we regress the log of 
the total hours of worker- and firm-reported training in the first four 
weeks of employment and deviations in reported training on a series of 
worker- and firm-reported variables. Columns 1 and 2 contain regres 
sions explaining the amount of training, and columns 3 and 4 contain 
regressions explaining differences in reported training. In column 1, 
using firm-reported training and independent variables, there is some 
evidence that high school dropouts receive less training than high 
school graduates. In column 2, using worker-reported training and 
independent variables, there are no significant determinants of train-
Table 5.5 Regression Explaining Levels of Training and Worker-Firm Differences in Reported Training
Ii dependent variables
log (age)
log (relevant experience)
High school dropout
Some college
College graduate
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is covered by collective bargaining
log (establishment size)
Levels of training
(Da (2)b
0.339
(1.01)
-0.130
(1-22)
-0.844
(1.98)
0.307
(1.45)
0.188
(0.786)
0.385
(1.31)
0.0030
(0.016)
-0.161
(0.628)
0.115
(1.66)
0.117
(0.334)
-0.119
(1.18)
0.396
(0.719)
-0.023
(0.103)
-0.172
(0.689)
0.480
(1.70)
0.044
(0.251)
0.052
(0.194)
0.034
(0.483)
Worker-firm differences in training
(3)c (4)d
0.340
(0.781)
-0.016
(0.122)
0.189
(0.369)
-0.628
(2.39)
-0.682
(2.35)
0.111
(0.288)
0.167
(0.740)
-0.338
(1.10)
-0.084
(0.935)
-0.340
(0.850)
0.127
(1.08)
0.377
(0.599)
-0.244
(0.941)
0.376
(1.27)
0.492
(1.450)
0.0087
(0.041)
0.121
(0.409)
0.048
(0.583)
(continued)
Table 5.5 (continued)
Independent variables
Levels of training
(Da (2)b
Worker-firm differences in training
(3)c (4)d
log (number of firm employees at other 
establishments)
log (hours worker per week)
Constant
R2
N
0.031 
(0.501)
0.095 
(0.348)
1.94
(1.37)
0.099
152
0.031 
(0.488)
-0.019 
(0.100)
3.463
(2.44)
0.036
206
0.0338 
(0.446)
-0.272 
(0.756)
0.314
(0.168)
0.110
128
0.074 
(1.02)
-0.500 
(1.67)
2.28
(1.25)
0.081
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a. The dependent variable is the log of total hours of firm-reporting training plus one. The independent variables are firm reports.
b. The dependent variable is the log of total hours of worker-reported training plus one. The independent variables are worker reports except for the log of
establishment size that was asked of firms.
c The dependent variable is the log of worker-reported training plus one minus the log of firm reported training plus one. The independent variables are
firm reports.
d. The dependent variable is the log of worker-reported training plus one minus the log of firm reported training plus one. The independent variables are
worker reports except the log of establishment size that was asked of firms.
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ing. 5 These differ greatly from the SBA and EOPP training regressions 
in chapter 4 in which prior experience, establishment size, and school 
ing were all significantly related to the amount of training. One impor 
tant difference is that the Upjohn Institute training measures include 
only training in the first month and not in the first three months. In 
addition, the Upjohn Institute sample sizes are much smaller, making it 
more difficult to find significant relationships between training and 
other variables.6
Columns 3 and 4 show the regressions explaining log differences in 
worker- and firm-reported training. There is some evidence using firm- 
reported characteristics that the difference between worker- and firm- 
reported training is negatively related to the level of schooling. No 
variables are significantly related to the difference in reported training 
when worker-reported characteristics are used.
Given the lack of any significant correlates of differences in reported 
training, it may be that the differences in employer- and employee- 
reported training result largely from measurement error. Hours of train 
ing may simply be difficult to estimate for the employee and the 
employer. If measurement error is present, then estimated effects of 
training on wages and productivity are biased toward zero (Greene 
1993, p. 283).We investigate this issue further in chapter 6.
Conclusions
In this chapter we reported the results of a matched survey of 
employers and employees in which both employers and employees 
were interviewed three times over the course of a month. The survey 
focused on training activities of the last worker hired but also sought to 
obtain demographic information about the worker from both the firm 
and the worker.
There is very little difference in the quality of demographic informa 
tion about the worker obtained from the firm and the worker. For vari 
ables such as race and age, the correlations between worker and firm 
reports are over 0.9. Surprisingly, given that previous studies have 
obtained much lower correlations for wages, the correlation between 
worker- and firm-reported starting wages is 0.974. Lower levels of
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agreement between firm and worker reports are obtained for variables 
such as hours worked and union status; however, the correlations are in 
line with previous studies. The agreement of fringe benefits in the 
Upjohn Institute data are somewhat below previous estimates, perhaps 
because the Upjohn Institute survey focused on newly hired workers.
Correlations between worker and firm reports of training activities 
are in general lower than most other variables. There are no significant 
determinants of worker- or firm-reported total hours of training in the 
first month, except perhaps that those with very low schooling levels 
receive less training. Similarly, there are in general no significant deter 
minants of differences in worker- and firm-reported hours of training in 
the first month. A significant amount of measurement error in the 
worker- and/or firm-reported training variables may in part explain 
these findings.
There are some conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis in 
this chapter about whether investigators should obtain information 
from the firm or from the worker. For many variables, such as relevant 
experience, the differences in the effects of firm-reported and worker- 
reported variables are slight. Since the correlations for many variables 
are fairly high, if firm information is unavailable, it should be obtained 
from the worker. For example, questions about previous experience are 
not often asked of the worker in household surveys, but the correlation 
with firm-reported previous experience is quite high. Workers have 
much more difficulty answering questions about specific elements of 
the fringe benefits package. While the correlation between worker- and 
firm-reported training is quite low, both are significantly related to pro 
ductivity. It would be useful to have similar training and productivity 
questions appear in future household surveys.
We believe our analysis offers several insights into the measurement 
of on-the-job training. First, there is a great deal of measurement error 
in attempts to gauge the quantity of on-the-job training. Even using the 
aggregate measure of training, the correlation between worker and firm 
measures is less than 0.5, which is much lower than other variables that 
have been used in wage equations. Differences between firm and 
worker reports, however, appear uncorrelated with any of the normal 
variables used in wage equations. Second, firms report more training 
(about 25 percent more) than do workers. Heckman and Smith (1993) 
find evidence that workers underreport the incidence of training when
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comparing administrative and self-reported data for a group of Job 
Training Partnership Act recipients. Given our data, however, we can 
not determine whether this difference arises because workers underre- 
port training or firms overreport training (or both).
Third, both firm and worker measures indicate a large amount of 
informal training for newly hired workers. The incidence rate of each 
type of informal training exceeded 75 percent, and the mean number of 
hours for each type of informal training was 20 hours or more in the 
first four weeks of employment for both worker and firm measures. In 
contrast, formal training measures had relatively low incidence rates, 
and the mean hours of formal training in the first four weeks of training 
was about ten hours. This suggests that surveys such as the NLSY that 
focus only on formal training spells are missing a majority of the spells 
of training. Similarly, surveys such as the NLSHS72 and the CPS that 
ask retrospective questions about the informal training also appear to 
miss most of the spells of informal training.
Fourth, in surveys of newly hired workers, there is not much evi 
dence that formal training is more accurately measured than informal 
training. When one aggregates the five measures of training into a for 
mal training measure and an informal training measure, the correla 
tions between worker and firm measures are almost identical for 
formal and informal training. Fifth, firm and worker measures of the 
time to become fully trained and qualified, at least for our sample of 
newly hired workers, have lower correlations than measures of train 
ing. And finally, the agreement between worker and firm measures is 
higher for the aggregate training measure than for any individual train 
ing measures. This suggests that, where possible, researchers may be 
better served using an aggregate measure than using each measure sep 
arately.
Among the findings cited above, one of particular significance con 
cerns the size and reliability of informal training measures relative to 
formal training measures. The substantial magnitude of informal train 
ing suggests that the focus of the federal government on formal train 
ing may be misplaced. In fact, formal training, both as an activity to 
measure (e.g., the 1993 Survey of Employer-Provided Training funded 
by the Employment and Training Administration) and as an activity to 
fund (e.g., tax incentives for training personnel, instructional materials, 
and schools) appears less important than informal training. 7 If policy
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makers choose to subsidize formal training, they will ignore an over 
whelming fraction of the training that workers receive. Moreover, as 
we demonstrated in chapter 4, small firms are less likely to utilize for 
mal training than their larger counterparts. A subsidy of formal training 
programs, therefore, is an implicit decision to subsidize larger firms.
NOTES
1. If the establishment reported that they would be hiring in the near future, a callback was 
scheduled for the expected hiring date.
2. Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993) and Bound, Brown, duncan, and Rodgers (1990) 
report correlations between log earnings. In the Upjohn data, the correlation between the logs of 
the employer- and employee-reported starting earnings is 0.980.
3. The correlation between the logs of the predicted wage after two years as reported by the 
employer and employee in the Upjohn data is 0.842.
4. We perform the Wilcoxon sign rank test and the sign test on those pairs in which the 
worker©s and firm©s reported disagree.
5. The worker has not asked about the establishment size so the firm-reported establishment 
size is used in all of the regressions reported in the paper.
6. Another important difference is that the Upjohn Institute training measure includes off-site 
formal training while the SBA training measure excludes off-site formal training. The SBA data 
report significantly different effects of off-site training from other types of training in wage and 
productivity equations. We find no evidence of different effects of off-site formal training using 
the upjohn Institute data and therefore aggregate all types of training into a single measure.
7. The 1993 Survey of Employer-Provided Training is a survey of about 12,000 employers that 
attempts to measure only the incidence of formal training programs.
CHAPTER
The Impact of Training 
on Wages and Productivity
Economists have long believed that on-the-job training is an impor 
tant determinant of the structure of wages. Since the seminal work of 
Mincer (1962), economists have attributed the growth in wages associ 
ated with increases in the labor market to rising productivity generated 
by on-the-job training. Moreover, researchers have nearly always 
found that wages increase with a worker©s tenure at the firm. 1 Econo 
mists have generally interpreted this return to tenure as evidence of 
firm-specific training; as noted in chapter 2, on-the-job training theory 
justifies such an interpretation. Consider two workers with the same 
years of experience in the labor market, but the first worker has been at 
his or her current firm for a year while the second worker has just 
started at a new firm. As both workers have the same total labor market 
experience, they should have accumulated similar general human capi 
tal. If the first worker has accumulated some firm-specific training, the 
theory of on-the-job training suggests that he or she should receive 
some of the returns to that training.
In the first section of this chapter, we review two theories that chal 
lenge the traditional training view of the source of wage growth: the 
incentive-based compensation models and the learning/job matching 
models first discussed in chapter 2. We note that, while these theories 
may contribute to the links between wage growth and work experience, 
available evidence indicates that on-the-job training remains an impor 
tant determinant of wage growth. However, establishing the predicted 
effects of on-the-job training can be difficult at times. The second sec 
tion of this chapter illustrates some of the difficulties in testing the pre 
diction that on-the-job training reduces a worker©s starting wage. In 
contrast, the next two sections reaffirm the predicted impact of training 
on wage and productivity growth, although even here questions arise
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because investments in training appear overwhelmingly to be financed 
by employers. We then examine the effect of measurement error on the 
estimated effects of training wages and productivity. The final section 
reviews various modifications to the simple on-the-job theory that may 
explain the apparent small impact of training on starting wages.
Alternative Theories of Wage Growth
There have been significant challenges to the traditional interpreta 
tion that employee wage growth reflects a return to on-the-job training. 
For instance, Lazear (1979, 1981) offers an incentive-based compensa 
tion model where wage profiles slope upward to guard against worker 
shirking. In essence, the worker posts a bond with the firm by agreeing 
to work for a low wage early in his or her career in return for higher 
wages later in the career. If workers shirk and the firm fires them, they 
lose the high wages or pension payments they would have otherwise 
received. Thus, it is possible for wages to increase with tenure without 
any on-the-job training. Moreover, Lazear©s theory can explain the 
existence of several other features of labor contracts that are difficult to 
explain using human capital theory. For instance, firms restrict the 
number of hours many employees can work. But, if firms are paying 
these workers the value of their marginal products or perhaps less 
because the workers and firms share the returns to specific training, 
firms should be content to let these employees work more hours. In 
contrast, in Lazear©s theory, firms would not want senior employees to 
work more hours because they are receiving a wage more than the 
value of their marginal products to compensate them for accepting the 
low initial wages.
Taking a different approach, Johnson (1978) and Jovanovic (1979a) 
have constructed job-matching models that may account for the corre 
lation of wages and job tenure. We can capture the essence of the job- 
matching model in a simple two-period example. Consider a model 
where a worker©s productivity is given by
(6.1) p/ = p  + e
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for t = 1,2, where p° is the worker©s expected productivity across firms 
and e is a random variable with E(e) = 0. The term 8 is a match-specific 
error term that neither the firm nor worker knows before employment. 
During the first period, the firm and worker learn the value of e. 
Because £ is not initially known, a firm, competing with other firms for 
workers, will offer a first period wage equal to the worker©s expected 
productivity, or w{= p°. In the second period, however, both the worker 
and the firm know the true value of e. If changing jobs costs nothing, 
when £ < 0 it is inefficient for the match to continue because the 
worker©s expected productivity elsewhere is p° The worker and firm 
will agree to terminate the relationship, and the worker will earn the 
value of his or her expected productivity, or p°. If £ > 0, it is efficient 
for the match to continue and presumably the firm and the worker will 
do so. For ease of exposition, let us assume that the firm pays the 
worker the value of his or her marginal product, or w2 = p° + £.
In the above example, workers who change employers receive the 
wage /? , while workers who remain at their previous period employer 
receive the expected wage p° + E(e I £ > 0) > p°. Thus, seniority (ten 
ure) and wages are positively correlated. Yet, this in no way reflects a 
return to firm-specific training but rather demonstrates that good 
matches survive. While we may add many complications to make this 
example more realistic, the example does illustrate the essential insight 
of the job-matching literature: when good matches survive and bad 
matches do not, there may be a return to tenure that is a "statistical arti 
fact."2 While both the worker-shirking model and the job-matching 
model offer alternative explanations of the correlation between wages 
and tenure, neither theory offers a particularly compelling explanation 
for the correlation of labor market experience and wages. These mod 
els do suggest, however, that special care must be used when trying to 
measure the impact of training on wages.
Fortunately, there have been numerous studies that have used direct 
measures of on-the-job training to examine the impact of that training 
on wages; see Mincer (1989a) for a review. Mincer reports that even 
when allowing for a 15 percent depreciation rate, the returns from 
training range from 10.5 to 25.6 percent in the five studies that he 
reviews. If some of this training is firm-specific and if firms share in 
some of the returns to specific training, these rates of return understate 
the return to the economy as a whole. 3
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On-the-Job Training Effects on the Starting Wage
While research has typically confirmed the predicted impact of 
training on wage growth, the second major prediction of on-the-job 
training theory has proven more difficult to confirm. In fact, most pre 
vious research has failed to find the negative relationship between 
training and the starting wage predicted by this theory. Barren, Black, 
and Loewenstein (1989), using the EOPP data, found no statistically 
significant relationship between the starting wage and the quantity of 
training that a worker receives. As we discuss in more detail below, 
they argue that lack of a negative relationship between training and the 
starting wage may be the result of productivity differences that are not 
observed in the data. If high-ability workers are matched to jobs that 
require much training and those high-ability workers command a wage 
premium, there may be a spurious correlation between training and the 
starting wage.
Difficulties in Testing the Starting Wage Prediction Given 
Heterogeneous Labor
To see how heterogeneity across workers introduces difficulties in 
testing on-the-job training©s predictions concerning the starting wage, 
consider the following wage equation:
(6.2) ln(w) = X|3 + -yln(r) + a + e
where w is wages, X is a vector of firm and worker characteristics, T is 
the quantity of training that the worker receives, a is a measure of the 
worker©s ability not captured in the data, 8 are the standard error terms, 
and /3 and /are parameters to be estimated. If the labor market matches 
workers with large a's to jobs with high levels of required human capi 
tal, the coefficient /will be biased upward. This problem is probably 
unavoidable in cross-sectional data. For instance, consider a class of 
graduating seniors majoring in economics from the same university. 
From the standpoint of most standard cross-section data sets, this is a 
remarkably homogeneous group. They all have the same level of edu 
cation, their college major is the same, and they have graduated from 
the same university. Yet, we would hardly expect earning differences
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among this group to be completely random. Employers would have a 
wide range of information about these prospective employees that are 
generally unavailable to the econometrician. For instance, employers 
will have access to certain quantifiable measures such as grade point 
average, test scores, and past job earnings. In addition, employers will 
have access to subjective information such as workers© appearances, 
skills in handling interviewers© questions, personality traits, recom 
mendation letters, and other informal sources of information.
Despite the homogeneity of this group, we would not be surprised to 
learn that there are substantial earnings differentials among the gradu 
ates. If training and worker ability are complements in the production 
process so that high-ability workers have larger increases in productiv 
ity for a given level of training than do low-ability workers, then we 
would expect the "good" economics majors from the university to hold 
jobs that have more training than their less able classmates. Although 
the more able students receive more training, we still might find that 
they are paid a higher starting wage than the less able if the wage pre 
mium for their superior abilities exceeds their portion of the training 
costs.
To buttress the case that unobserved ability differentials may explain 
the lack of a negative correlation between initial wages and training, 
chapter 7 documents that firms look at more applicants and spend more 
time evaluating applicants when filling jobs that require more training. 
While this evidence is consistent with the lack of correlation, others 
disagree. Parsons (1989), using the NLS youth cohort, finds that there 
is a positive relationship between training and the starting wage, but 
the relationship is generally not statistically significant. As the NLS 
youth cohort is a panel data set with a much richer collection of worker 
characteristics (including their Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery scores) than the SBA and EOPP data, Parsons (1990) argues 
that the improved controls suggest that unobserved heterogeneity may 
not explain the failure of starting wages to be negatively correlated 
with training. Similarly, Lynch (1992), using a sample from the NLSY 
data of people who had attended college but did not graduate, reports 
that uncompleted spells of training are positively associated with the 
higher wages, suggesting that workers are not bearing the costs of 
training. While Lynch does find some differences by the level of educa 
tion, there is little evidence in her study that training lowers the starting
120 The Impact of Training on Wages and Productivity
wage.4 If the panel data do offer substantially more controls for worker 
abilities than do cross-sectional data, the failure of researchers to find a 
negative correlation between the starting wage and training represents 
a serious challenge to traditional on-the-job training theory.
A slightly more complicated model than equation (6.2) will demon 
strate, however, the inherent difficulty in testing this proposition, even 
with panel data. Suppose that the wage equation is of the form
(6.3) ln(w) = X{3 + y ln(7) + a r| + £
where a is again the worker©s unmeasured ability, r\ is a measure of the 
total human capital of the job, and the other variables are as before. 
The term 77 reflects the intrinsic human capital necessary to do the job, 
and, presumably, 77 is highly correlated with the quantity of training 
that workers receive. Of course, if we hold 77 fixed, variation in the 
workers© experience, schooling, and other forms of human capital will 
affect the quantity of training that workers receive, so r\ and training 
are not perfectly correlated.
Suppose that workers and firms learn about the true values of a over 
time. Thus, workers moving from low-training to high-training jobs (or 
more precisely, from low- 77 to high- 77 jobs) are more likely to be high- 
ability workers. If the labor market matches high ability workers to 
more complex jobs, then, as we discussed in chapter 2, even first "dif 
ferencing" the equation does not necessarily remove the bias from the 
estimated coefficients for
(6.4) Aln(w) = AX(3 + y ln(T) + ccAri +Ae
where A preceding the variables reflects the changes in those variables. 
We have assumed for convenience that the worker©s previous job 
required no on-the-job training. High-ability workers will tend to have 
larger changes in 77 than low-ability workers. As unobserved ability is 
positively correlated with increases in 77, and training is positively cor 
related with increases in 77, then the spurious correlation between train 
ing and the wage will not be eliminated unless we have accurate 
measures of 77 over the worker©s job history, which to our knowledge 
no panel data set contains. Workers will still have to finance their part 
of the training costs through accepting lower wages than firms would
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have paid to workers requiring less training, but the matching of high- 
ability workers to more complex jobs will hide the negative relation 
ship between training and the starting wage.
An Intrafirm Test of the Starting Wage Prediction of On-the-Job 
Training
Fortunately, the SBA data allow a direct test of the proposition that 
workers finance a part of their training cost through accepting a lower 
starting wage. As part of the survey, we asked whether the worker had 
more training, less training, or the same training as the typical worker 
hired into the position. In addition, we asked if the worker was paid 
more than, less than, or the same as the typical worker hired into the 
position. Human capital theory predicts that workers receiving more 
training than average should receive lower wages than the typical 
worker hired into the position, and those workers receiving less train 
ing than average should receive higher wages than the typical worker 
hired into the position. In table 6.1, we report cross tabulations for the 
responses to these two questions. There are several interesting observa 
tions. First, 21.8 percent of the sample were paid a wage higher than 
the typical wage whereas only 2.6 percent of the sample were paid a 
wage lower than the typical wage. Similarly, many more workers 
received less training than the typical worker (25.7 percent) than 
received more training than the typical worker (6.9 percent). These fig 
ures indicate that respondents© determination of the typical worker is 
biased; the worker identified as a "typical" worker is actually paid less 
and requires more training than the median worker. Of the small seg 
ment of the sample who received more training than the typical worker, 
more workers (16.5 percent) received wages higher than normal than 
received lower wages than normal (7.1 percent). Thus, there appears to 
be little evidence in column (1) to support the notion that workers are 
paying for their training when they receive more training than the typi 
cal worker.
When workers receive less training than the typical worker, which 
occurs 25.8 percent of the time, they are much more likely to receive 
higher than typical wages; 48.3 percent of these workers receive higher 
wages compared to only 12.2 percent of the workers who receive the 
typical amount of training. This suggests that while firms are unwilling
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to penalize workers who require more training than the typical new 
employee, they are willing to (or must) increase the wages of well- 
trained workers who need less training than the typical new employee. 
Moreover, firms© hiring decisions seem to mirror this form of rent shar 
ing. They are much more likely to hire workers who require less train 
ing than they are to hire workers who require more training than the 
typical new worker. As firms appear reluctant to pass the increased 
training costs on to workers by lowering wages, it is not surprising that 
they would not hire workers needing more training than the typical 
worker.5
Table 6.1 Training and Starting Wage, 1992 SBA Data (percent)
More Same Less
training training as training
than typical typical than typical
worker worker worker Total
Higher wage than typical 
worker (n=268)
Same wage as typical 
worker (n=931)
Lower wage than typical 
worker (n=32)
Total3
Sample size
16.5
76.5
7.1
100.0
85
12.2
85.6
2.2
100.0
829
48.3
49.2
2.5
100.0
317
21.8
75.6
2.6
100.0
1231
a. Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
A flaw in the above analysis is that it does not consider interfirm 
variation in wages and training. For instance, certain employers hiring 
clerks may specialize in hiring workers without much experience in the 
field, but they may offer these inexperienced workers a great deal of 
training. Other firms may only hire clerks with a great deal of experi 
ence who require very little training. While all workers hired at either 
firm may be offered the same wage, wages may differ between the 
firms, with the firm offering a great deal of training providing a rela 
tively low starting wage. This high-training firm will not be able to 
attract workers with a great deal of experience because of the low start 
ing wage. The low-training firm will offer a relatively high starting
On-the-Job Training 123
wage but may not be willing to hire workers without substantial experi 
ence. Thus, in the labor market as a whole, the predicted trade-off 
between the starting wage and training would exist, but we may not see 
this relationship if we look only at relative wages within the firm.
An Interfirm Test of the Starting Wage Prediction of On-the-Job 
Training
The prior discussion relied on firms© characterizations of a worker©s 
wage and training relative to the "typical" worker to test for the 
expected trade-off between training and the starting wage. In this sec 
tion, we use the 1992 SB A data set to test whether differences in train 
ing across firms explain differences in starting wages. The SB A survey 
differs from most other data sets because of its focus on newly hired 
workers. To help the reader compare the SB A data with other data sets, 
table 6.2 presents estimates of a wage equation without the measures 
for training but includes many of the standard controls that economists 
use in wage equations: age, age squared, experience, experience 
squared, years of education, the logarithm of the size of the establish 
ment, hours worked, and hours squared. In addition, we use dummy 
variables indicating the worker©s union status and whether the worker 
is black or a nonblack female. 6 The reader will recall that our measure 
of experience is the employer©s estimate of the number of years of rele 
vant experience that a worker possesses. The results offer few sur 
prises. Experience has a concave relationship, as do age and hours 
worked. More highly educated workers earn more, with one additional 
year of schooling increasing wages by about 10 percent. Black workers 
earn about 23 percent less than nonblack males, and females earn about 
17 percent less than nonblack males.
In the appendix to this chapter, we provide a detailed comparison of 
estimates from similarly specified wage equations using the 1992 Cur 
rent Population Survey (CPS), the 1990 Census, and the SBA data. The 
estimates are similar. The largest differences are that the returns to edu 
cation are much higher in the SBA data and the gender gap is much 
smaller in the SBA data. 7 Because workers have no tenure with the firm 
in the SBA data, the higher return to education may reflect the fact that 
employers use formal education as a signal for the productivity of 
newly hired workers more than for a sample of workers as a whole.
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Table 6.2 Impact of Training Proxies on the Starting Wage, 
1992 SBA Data
Independent Variables
Constant
Worker©s age/ 10
Age squared / 1000
Worker©s relevant experience / 10
Experience squared / 1000
Years of education
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is union member
Logarithm of establishment size
Hours worked 710
Hours squared / 1000
R2
N
-0.255
(1.60)
0.342
(3.82)
-0.426
(3.31)
0.476
(7.56)
-0.933
(3.72)
0.100
(15.75)
-0.235
(4.96)
-0.171
(6.22)
0.072
(1.56)
0.040
(5.36)
0.082
(1.88)
-0.982
(1.65)
0.513
796
NOTE: Absolute value of f-statistics given in parentheses. The dependent variable is the loga 
rithm of the starting wage. Ordinary Least Squares estimates are reported.
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The smaller gender wage gap is consistent with the recent findings of 
Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993). In their study of Michigan Law 
School graduates, they found that the gender gap was an increasing 
function of the time since graduation. Perhaps the largest difference, 
however, is that the SBA sample©s equation has an R2 over 0.51, while 
the R2 for the CPS is 0.36. This is not surprising, however, since wages 
become more dispersed as workers gain experience, and the SBA sam 
ple is limited to newly hired workers.
Our initial approach to estimating the impact of training on the start 
ing wage is to estimate equation (6.3). This requires that we not only 
use measures of on-the-job training but also of the total human capital 
of the job. After some initial experimentation with the specification 
using the SBA data, we decided to use two measures of training. The 
first measure is the sum of the intensity measures for on-site formal 
training, informal management, informal co-worker, and "watching 
others," while the second is the intensity measure of off-site formal 
training. We justify this separation purely on statistical grounds for we 
know of no theoretical reason why we should treat off-site formal 
training differently from other forms of training, although this has the 
advantage of insuring that EOPP and SBA training measures are simi 
larly defined.
For the correct estimation of equation (6.3), however, it is necessary 
to exclude measures of previously acquired on-the-job training. To see 
why, consider a production function for human capital. The inputs to 
the production function are on-the-job training acquired before 
employment at the firm (denoted POJT) and on-the-job training that 
the firm offers (denoted OJT), or
(6.5) #=/(POJT,OJT)
where/( ) is a production function with the standard properties. In fig 
ure 6.1, we depict two isoquants for production of total human capital, 
with the lower level of total human capital depicted by the curve 
denoted H° and the higher level of total human capital denoted Hl . 
These two isoquants correspond to two jobs with differing total human 
capital requirements. Standard human capital models would predict 
that a movement from point A to point B should reduce the worker©s 
starting wage. If we hold fixed the quantity of previously acquired on-
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the-job training and increase the quantity of current on-the-job train 
ing, we then have a movement from point A to point C. If better work 
ers are matched to positions that require more training, however, we 
would expect the worker at point C to be more able than the worker at 
point A. If we could perfectly control for worker ability, we would 
expect to find a negative relationship between training and the starting 
wage, but it is doubtful that we can achieve such a control. 8 Indeed, we 
include the measure of H as a control for the unmeasured ability com 
ponent.
Figure 6.1 Human Capital Production Function
POJT
H
OJT
If we include measure of POJT, OJT, and H into an equation simul 
taneously, however, we are identifying only random fluctuations in 
training. To see why, consider the following parameterization of the 
human capital production function, equation (6.5),
(6.6) In// + YO + y, POJT + y2 OJT + u
where the /s are parameters and u is an error term. The inclusion of 
any two of the variables POJT, OJT, and H on the right-hand side of
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equation (6.3) would allow, in principle, the estimation of the trade-off 
between training and wages. Including POJT and OJT, one can identify 
how, holding fixed the amount of previously acquired human capital, 
increases in training affect the starting wage; this is the approach of 
Barren, Black, and Loewenstein (1989). If markets match more able 
workers to jobs that require the accumulation of more human capital, 
however, workers at point C will be more able in observed ways than 
workers at point B, which will cause the coefficient on training to be 
biased upward.
To control for this ability bias, we propose using our measure of 
total human capital, the length of time it takes an untrained worker to 
become fully trained and qualified, as a proxy for unmeasured ability. 
As equation (6.6) indicates, however, the inclusion of POJT, OJT, and 
H into a wage equation creates some difficulty in interpretation. Hold 
ing constant POJT and H, movements in OJT require movements in «, 
unobserved factors that affect human capital accumulation. Thus, a 
regression so specified would not be informative. Our approach is to 
consider movements along the human capital isoquant such as move 
ments from point A to point B in figure 6.1. One can think of there 
being many different workers located on the locus H°. In a labor mar 
ket equilibrium, firms should be indifferent, ceteris paribus, between 
hiring workers with a lot of experience who command high starting 
wages and workers with limited experience who have lower starting 
wages.
To consider movements from point A to point B, however, it is nec 
essary that we allow for changes in prior on-the-job training to accom 
pany changes in the current employer©s on-the-job training. Labor 
economists use age (or potential experience, which is age minus the 
number of years of schooling minus six) as a substitute for general 
human capital, and our relevant experience is also a substitute for labor 
market experience. Thus, both are used as measures of prior on-the-job 
training. We exclude age and relevant experience from our estimation, 
but include our measure of H, which allows us to interpret changes in 
current on-the-job training as movements along the human capital iso 
quant.
In columns (1) through (3) of table 6.3, we report the wage equation 
estimates for the SB A data set using three specifications. (To avoid tak 
ing the logarithm of zero, we take the logarithm of one plus the training
Table 6.3 The Impact of Training on the Starting Wage, 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent variables
Logarithm of job©s human capital
requirement
Logarithm of hours of training in first
three months
Logarithm of off-site training in first
three months
Age and square of age added
Relevant experience and its square
added
R2
n
SBA data(Da
0.108
(8.59)
-0.046
(4.29)
0.024
(1.91)
no
no
0.442
796
SBA data(2)a
0.091
(7.53)
-0.035
(3.39)
0.032
(2.64)
yes
no
0.500
796
SBA data(3)a
0.077
(6.91)
-0.022
(2.22)
0.033
(2.82)
yes
yes
0.545
796
EOPP data(4)b
0.053
(7.18)
-0.017
(2.91)
 
no
no
0.343
1636
EOPP data(5)b
0.050
(7.03)
-0.011
(1.90)
 
yes
no
0.3924
1636
EOPP data(6)b
0.041
(5.96)
-0.004
(0.81)
...
yes
yes
0.425
1636
NOTE: The absolute values of r-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variables are logarithms of starting wage. Ordinary Least Squares estimates are 
reported.
a. Other control variables are the number of years of schooling, the logarithm of the number of employees in the establishment, hours worked, the square 
of hours worked, and dummy variables indicating whether or not the worker is black, a nonblack female, and .a union member.
b. Other control variables include years of education, a dummy variable equal to one if the worker is a female, fraction of the establishment that is union 
ized, the natural logarithm of the number of employees at the establishment, hours worked, hours squared, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the worker is a temporary or seasonal employee.
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measures and the required human capital measure.) As mentioned ear 
lier, we use two measures of training. The first measure is the sum of 
the measures for on-site formal training, informal management train 
ing, informal co-worker training, and "watching others"; the second is 
the measure of off-site formal training. 9 In column (1) we present our 
preferred estimates, in column 2 we add age and age squared to the 
equation, and in column 3 we add relevant experience and its square to 
the equation. In column (1), the coefficient for the on-site training is 
negative (-0.046) and highly significant. A 10 percent increase in train 
ing decreases the starting wage by about 0.5 percent. When we add age 
and age squared to the equation, the coefficient on training increases 
from -0.046 to -0.035, and when we add relevant experience and its 
square, it increases to -0.022, although it remains statistically signifi 
cant at the 5-percent level. While the sign of the coefficient for on-site 
training is negative and consistent with the theory, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is small.
The coefficient for off-site formal training, however, is positive 
(0.024) and significant at the 10-percent confidence level. When we 
add age and its square, the coefficient increases to 0.032 and becomes 
significant at the five percent level, and remains significant when we 
add experience and its square to the equation. We tried numerous spec 
ification checks to see if we could eliminate the positive sign for off- 
site training, but none were successful. 10
In columns (4) through (6) of table 6.3, we report the estimates for 
the EOPP data. In column (4) our preferred specification the coeffi 
cient on the logarithm of training is -0.017 with a ^-statistic of -2.91. 11 
Again, while highly significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
quite small. A 10 percent increase in training decreases the starting 
wage only 0.2 percent. If we add age and its square to the equation, the 
coefficient increases to -0.011, and if we add relevant experience and 
its square to the equation, the coefficient increases to -0.004 and ceases 
to be statistically significant even at the 10-percent confidence level.
For our preferred specification columns (1) and (4) the empirical 
tests provide mixed support for the human capital model. For both data 
sets, the coefficients for on-site training are negative and significant, 
confirming the predictions of the theory. Yet, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are small, with estimated elasticities of less than -0.05. 
Indeed, for the SBA data, a 10 percent increase in training an
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increase of about 17 hours when evaluated at the mean results in a 
reduction in the wage of $0.04. In addition, for the SBA data, the coef 
ficient on off-site training is positive and significant, directly contra 
dicting the theory.
Some alternative measures of training provide somewhat larger esti 
mated elasticities. Mincer (1974), in his derivation of the earnings 
equations, emphasizes that the appropriate measures of training should 
be "the fraction of time (or ©time equivalent© if the investment costs 
include direct outlays as well as time costs) the worker devotes to 
improving his earning power" (p. 19). This suggests that the appropri 
ate measure of training is the intensity of training rather than the total 
number of hours of training received. For the SBA data, we know both 
the number of weeks of training and the hours per week of training that 
the worker receives, so we may construct a measure of the intensity of 
training. This allows us to construct an on-site training intensity mea 
sure as the total number of hours per week of on-site training and an 
off-site training measure as the number of hours of off-site training. 
Unfortunately, we cannot replicate the measure for the EOPP data set 
because it does not contain a measure of weekly hours of training. For 
the SBA data, the coefficient for on-site training intensity is -0.056 
with a r-statistic of -4.05. For off-site training intensity, however, the 
coefficient is 0.039 with a ^-statistic of 2.33. 12
Contrasting On-the-job Training Impact on Wages 
Versus Productivity
While the results above support the contention that on-the-job train 
ing and the starting wage are negatively correlated, the magnitude of 
the starting wage adjustment is small. This may be due in part, how 
ever, to our inability to control fully for worker heterogeneity. In this 
section, we present a second test of human capital theory that involves 
a comparison of the effects of training on productivity and wage 
growth, a test that under certain assumptions controls for worker heter 
ogeneity. To see why, consider the following simple representation of 
the on-the-job training model developed in chapter 2.
On-the- Job Training 1 3 1
Assume that workers hired into the same position have similar 
unobserved abilities. Recall from chapter 2 that on-the-job training the 
ory predicts that, if training is general and competition exists across 
employers, then the starting wage and the wage paid to a fully trained 
worker will adjust such that for each position, the worker bears all the 
costs and reaps the entire return to such training. That is, the beginning 
wage, wb, and the wage after training, wa, are such that:
(6.7) wa =fb =p(E, a, 0, 0) - c(E, a, Tg, 0)
(6.8) wb =fa
where fb is the productivity net of training costs of a worker with initial 
human capital E and ability a who receives general training Tg and 
zero specific training, while fa is the productivity of this worker after 
training.
Equation (6.7) highlights the key claim of human capital theory that 
an increase in training T will lower the starting wage given dc/dT > 0. 
If positions with increased training are filled with more able individu 
als (i.e., dcddT > 0), and we cannot fully control for this matching of 
more able workers to positions with greater training, then our estimate 
of the negative effect of training on the starting wage will be biased 
upward.
Equations (6.7) and (6.8) suggest, however, an alternative test for 
the prediction that workers will bear the entire costs of general train 
ing. Specifically, dividing (6.8) by (6.7) and differentiating this expres 
sion with respect to a change in training, we obtain the following 
expression:
(6.9) d(fa /fb)/dT=d(wa /wb)/dT.
Equation (6.9) implies that the effect of general training on an index 
measuring productivity growth, fa/fb, and an index measuring wage 
growth, w/wfo , should be identical. That is, it is predicted that d (/*a//b) / 
dT = d(wc/wb) I dT > 0. Thus, we can restate the prediction as follows: 
an increase in training should result in identical increases in the growth 
rates of productivity and wages.
132 The Impact of Training on Wages and Productivity
Unfortunately, the SBA and EOPP data sets do not have measures of 
the worker©s posttraining wage. Both data sets do, however, contain 
measures of the wage paid to the typical worker in the same job two 
years after beginning employment. While there may be some jobs in 
which the worker is not fully trained at the end of two years, we think 
the wage after that time period is a good proxy for the posttraining 
wage. By taking the log difference of the wage paid to a typical worker 
in the same job after two years and the worker©s starting wage, we con 
struct an index of wage growth.
Table 6.4 reports the regression for the wage index. Ideally for this 
regression, we would like to have all the training that the worker 
receives in the first two years of employment, but both the EOPP and 
the SBA data contain only the training that the worker receives in the 
first three months. In column (1) we report the estimates for the SBA 
data. A 10 percent increase in the quantity of on-site training increases 
the wage growth only 0.2 percent. A 10 percent increase in off-site 
training decreases the wage growth 0.05 percent, although the coeffi 
cient is not significant. In column (3) of table 6.4, we report estimates 
using the EOPP data. A 10 percent increase in training increases wage 
growth by 0.3 percent as well. Thus, both of these coefficients suggest 
that increases in the quantity of training increase wage growth, and 
both give quantitatively similar estimates of the magnitude.
The magnitude of the trade-off, however, is not large. One would 
expect that a 10 percent increase in training would reduce the worker©s 
initial productivity by much more than 0.2 percent. Fortunately, both 
the EOPP and SBA data contain measures of the worker©s productivity 
so that we may compare the change in wages to the change in produc 
tivity. In the EOPP data, respondents were asked the following ques 
tion:
Please rate your employee on a productivity scale of zero to 100, 
where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your 
employees [in this] position can attain and zero is absolutely no 
productivity by your employee. What is the productivity of [the 
last worker hired] during (his/her) first two weeks of employ 
ment?
We asked a slightly different version of this question to the SBA 
respondents. They were asked:
Table 6.4 Wage and Productivity Growth Index, 1992 SBA and 1982 EOPP Data
Independent Variables
Logarithm of training
Logarithm of off-site training
Chi-squared statistic
Wage index 
SBAa
(1)
0.020
(4.20)
-0.005
(0.76)
 
Productivity index 
SBAb
(2)
0.283
(10.01)
0.045
(1.23)
102.82
Wage index 
EOPP3
(3)
0.028
(8.98)
...
 
Productivity index 
EOPPb
(4)
0.230
(14.49)
 
200.02
R2 0.020 — 0.046
N________________________860_________860_________1683_________1683_____
NOTE: Absolute value of t-statistics is given in the parentheses.
a. The dependent variable is the difference between the logarithm of the wage paid to the typical worker after two years and the logarithm of the starting
wage of the last worker hired. Ordinary Least Squares estimates are reported.
b. The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the index of the productivity of the fully trained worker relative to the productivity of the last worker
hired. Tobit estimates are reported.
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Please rate (name of last worker hired) on a productivity scale of 
zero to 100, where 100 equals (name©s) productivity when (he/ 
she) is fully trained and zero is absolutely no productivity by 
(name). . . . What was (name©s) productivity on this scale during 
his/her first two weeks of employment?
Because the reciprocals of the productivity indices are estimates of 
productivity growth, we may see if the impact of training on worker 
productivity growth is similar to the impact of training on wage 
growth.
In column (2) and (4) of table 6.4, we report estimates for the pro 
ductivity growth in the SBA and EOPP data, respectively. Because the 
productivity index is bounded by zero and 100, we use a tobit to esti 
mate the coefficients. A 10 percent increase in training in the first three 
months of employment decreases initial productivity by 2.3 percent in 
the SBA data and 1.9 percent in the EOPP data. 13 A comparison of the 
impact of training on starting wage indices and on the productivity 
indices reveals that training lowers the initial productivity of workers 
11 times more for the SBA and eight times more for the EOPP data 
than do the starting wage indices. This suggests that workers pay for 
only a small portion of their training.
Indeed, in our view, it is too small a portion to be consistent with the 
prevailing theories of on-the-job training. While the elasticities of 
wage growth with respect to training are 0.02 for both data sets, the 
elasticities of productivity growth with respect to training are about 
0.23 and 0.19 for the SBA and EOPP data. In addition, the use of a pro 
ductivity measure to calculate the cost of training understates the true 
cost of that training. Such a variable fails to account for the reduction 
in productivity of managers and co-workers who spend time away 
from their duties to train newly hired workers.
An obvious objection to this comparison questions the validity of 
the productivity measures. One could argue that employers are not very 
good about rating employees on a productivity scale. It could be that 
employers exaggerate the swings in productivity that new employees 
experience when using the productivity index. While this may be true, 
the underlying index values do not appear unreasonable. In table 6.5, 
we compare the distributions of the productivity index and a wage 
index for the SBA and EOPP data. The mean value of the productivity 
index is 51.39 percent for the SBA data and 51.01 percent for the
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EOPP data. The 25th percentile is 30 percent for both data sets, the 
median is 50 percent for both data sets, and the 75th percentile is 75 
percent for both data sets. 14 In our view, these values do not seem an 
implausible description of the productivity of newly hired workers in 
the first two weeks of their employment compared to the productivity 
of workers who are fully trained and qualified. In contrast, the fluctua 
tion of wages is much smaller. For the sake of comparison, we define 
the wage index to be the ratio of the starting wage to the wage paid to a 
worker after two years, and multiply by 100 to scale the index. 15 The 
mean of this index is 86.88 percent for the SBA data and 87.85 percent 
for the EOPP data. The 25 percentiles are 80.91 percent for the SBA 
and 78.27 percent for the EOPP data, the medians are 88.50 percent for 
the SBA and 88.78 percent for the EOPP data, and the 75 percentiles 
are 94.13 percent for the SBA and 98.09 percent for the EOPP data. 
Thus, the underlying distribution of the wage index is much more com 
pressed than that of the productivity index.
Table 6.5 A Comparison of Productivity and Wage Index, 1992 SBA Data 
and 1982 EOPP Data
SBA data 
productivity 
index
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
Mean
Standard
deviation
N
30
50
75
51.39
 
860
SBA data 
wage index
106
113
124
86.88
 
860
EOPP data 
productivity 
index
30
50
75
51.01
 
1683
EOPP data 
wage index
102
113
128
87.85
 
1683
Further Evidence on Wage and Productivity Growth
The SBA data allow another test to determine if productivity growth 
greatly exceeds wage growth. This test is based completely on the 
experiences of the newly hired worker instead of relying on the experi-
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ences of the typical worker. For the SBA data, we asked about the 
worker©s productivity after three months of employment as well as the 
worker©s productivity relative to a fully trained worker. In table 6.6, we 
report the regression estimates for wage and productivity growth. For 
independent variables, we include the two measures of training: total 
off-site training in the first three months and total hours of other forms 
of training.
In columns (1) and (2) of table 6.6, we report the estimates for the 
wage and productivity growth equation. Interestingly, training is posi 
tively correlated with wage growth with an elasticity of 0.011, but off- 
site training is negatively associated with wage growth. Training is also 
positively associated with productivity growth with an elasticity of 
0.190. Off-site training has no significant relationship with productiv 
ity growth in the first three months of employment. Thus, again, the 
growth in productivity greatly exceeds the growth in wages.
Table 6.6 Wage and Productivity Growth in the First 3 Months of 
Employment, 1992 SBA Data
Independent 
variables
Logarithm of training
Logarithm of off-site 
training 
R2
N
Wage 
growth Productivity 
SBAa growth SBAb
(1) (2)
0.011
(3.78)
-0.010 
(2.58) 
0.019
929
0.190 
(9.00)
-0.005 
(0.16) 
0.082
929
Wage 
growth Productivity 
SBAa growth SBAb
(3) (4)
0.026 
(3.30)
-0.018 
(1.59) 
0.039
326
0.241 
(6.11)
0.002 
(0.38) 
0.105
326
NOTE: Absolute value of r-statistics is given in the parentheses. Ordinary Least Squares estimates
are reported.
a. The dependent variable is the difference between the logarithm of the wage of the last worker
hired after three months of employment and the logarithm of the starting wage of the last worker
hired.
b. The dependent variable is the difference of logarithm of the productivity index of the last
worker hired at the end of three months of employment and the logarithm of the productivity
index of the last worker hired in the first two weeks of employment.
An objection to this test is that firms may find it costly to adjust 
wages continuously because of what the macroeconomics literature
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refers to as "menu costs." The essential idea of menu costs is that price 
changes, or in this case wage changes, are costly to the firm. For 
instance, we might imagine that the decision to give a worker a raise 
may require the worker©s manager to meet with him or her. In addition, 
the worker©s manager may not have the authority to give the worker a 
raise and may need approval from other individuals within the firm. In 
addition, in many jobs workers and firms sign formal contracts that 
may cover a period longer than three months. For instance, each of the 
authors of this monograph has an annual contract that specifies his 
wages for a year in advance, and while none of us would object to our 
employers renegotiating our contract to give us a raise, we do note, 
sadly, that such renegotiations have not been common. 16
To guard against a bias created by any costs to changing the wage, in 
columns (3) and (4) we reestimate the equation on the sample of work 
ers who have received wage increases in that period. While the wage- 
training elasticity increases to 0.026, the productivity-training elastic 
ity increases to 0.241 and remains over nine times as great at the wage- 
training elasticity. Thus, again, productivity growth is much larger than 
wage growth. 17 Moreover, while menu costs may account for some of 
the lack of responsiveness of wages to productivity changes, they do 
not explain the whole story. Indeed, given that firms have incurred any 
menu costs associated with an increase in wages, we would expect this 
group to be free of this form of bias. If those workers who receive gen 
eral training are more likely to receive a raise in the first three months 
of employment, this group may well yield a coefficient on training that 
is biased upward.
The Effect of Measurement Error on the Estimated Effect 
of Training on Wages and Productivity?
If there is measurement error in training, the effects of training on 
wages and productivity are biased toward zero. One way to correct for 
the effects of measurement error is through the use of instrumental 
variables (Greene 1993). A variable must be found that is correlated 
with the variable that is measured with error but not correlated with the 
measurement error. If we assume that firm estimates of training fulfill
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this condition for worker-reported training and worker estimates of 
training do the same for firm-reported training, then we can apply 
instrumental variables to correct for the effects of measurement error. 18 
This is similar to the approach of Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), who 
use one twin©s estimate of the other twin©s schooling as an instrument 
for estimating the return to schooling for the other twin.
The first step in the estimation of the instrumental variables model 
involves estimating the variable measured with error as a function of 
the instrument or instruments. In this case, we use only a single instru 
ment the other party©s reported total hours of training. We use the 
training instrument for starting wage equations, wage index, and pro 
ductivity regressions similar to those estimated earlier in this chapter. 
The wage growth regressions explain the growth in starting wage to the 
wage of a typical worker in the same position after two years. The pro 
ductivity growth is the inverse of a productivity index of the new hire 
measured relative to the fully trained worker on a scale from 0 to 100. 
The productivity regressions indicate how much training increases the 
productivity of the new worker relative to a fully trained worker. The 
first stage equations for training in the first four weeks of employment 
are:
log(worker-reported training) = 2.09 + .414 log(firm-reported training) 
R2 =.156 n=179
log(firm-reported training) = 2.64 + .376 log(worker-reported training) 
R2 =.156 n=179
Table 6.7 shows ordinary least squares and instrumental variable 
estimates for starting wage, wage growth, and productivity growth 
regressions using the Upjohn Institute, SBA, and EOPP data sets. 
Using the Upjohn Institute data, the instrumental variable training esti 
mates are greater in absolute value than the ordinary least squares esti 
mates in four out of six cases. Correcting for measurement error does 
not appear to have a dramatic effect on the estimated training effects in 
the Upjohn Institute data. The estimated training effect in the firm- 
reported wage growth regression, however, is significant after correct 
ing for measurement error.
Table 6.7 Estimates of the Impact of Training on Starting Wages, and Wage and Productivity Growth
Ordinary least squares
Upjohn Institute data
log (worker-reported starting wage)3
log (worker-reported wage growth)b
log (worker-reported productivity growth)c
log (firm-reported starting wage)a
log (firm-reported wage growth)13
log (firm-reported productivity growth)0
SBA data
log (starting wage)3
log(wage growth)5
log(productivity growth)0
EOPP data
log (starting wage)d
log(wage growth)5
log(productivity growth)6
Parameter
0.0031
0.0113
0.1490
0.0173
0.0100
0.1557
-0.046
0.020
0.283
-0.019
0.027
0.230
t
0.143
1.11
4.38
0.634
0.87
4.98
4.26
4.20
10.01
2.96
8.98
14.47
n
180
171
222
158
150
197
796
860
860
1,386
1,683
1,683
Instrumental variables©
Parameter
0.0476
0.0074
0.2259
-0.0134
0.1286
0.1854
-0.122
0.053
0.753
-0.051
0.072
0.612
t
0.760
0.223
2.48
0.206
3.02
2.18
4.26
4.20
10.01
2.96
8.98
14.47
n
146
138
181
172
159
207
796
860
860
1,386
1,683
1,683
a. The other independent variables used with the Upjohn Institute and SBA starting wage regressions are years of schooling; dummies for black male, 
black female, other male, other female, white female, and collective bargaining coverage; log of establishment size, hours of work, hours of work squared; 
and log of job complexity. Training is measured by the log of total hours of training plus one in the first four weeks in the Upjohn Institute regressions, and 
the log of total hours in the first three months plus one in the SBA regressions. The SBA regressions include off-site training as a separate variable, 
b. Wage growth is growth in the log of the starting wage calculated using the wage of the typical worker in the same position after two years
(continued)
c. Productivity growth is the inverse of the log of the productivity in the first two weeks of employment relative to the productivity of a fully trained worker 
in the same position on a scale of 0 to 100.
d. The other independent variables used in the EOPP starting wage regressions are years of schooling, a female dummy variable, percent of the firm©s labor 
force covered by collective bargaining, log of establishment size, hours worked, hours worked squared, and log of job complexity., Training is measured 
by log of total hours of training plus one in the first three months (excluding off-site formal training).
e. Productivity growth in the EOPP data in the inverse of the log of productivity in the first two weeks of employment relative to maximum possible pro 
ductivity on a scale of 0 to 100.
f. Firm reported training is the instrument in the worker-reported regressions, and worker-reported training is used as the instrument in the firm-reported 
regressions. The Upjohn Institute worker-reported training regression estimates are combined with firm-reported training data from the SBA and EOPP 
data.
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The bottom half of table 6.7 uses the estimated regression of 
worker-reported training on firm-reported training from the Upjohn 
Institute data and the actual firm-reported training from the SBA and 
EOPP data to illustrate the effects of measurement error in those data 
sets. 19 The estimated training effects increase by almost a factor of 
three in absolute value in each case over the estimates reported in 
Barron, Berger, and Black (1993a), illustrating the effect of the 
measurement error on the estimated effects of training on wages and 
productivity.
Why is the Impact of Training on the Starting Wage so Small?
Gary Becker, in his 1992 lecture accepting the Nobel Prize for Eco 
nomics (1993), said, "A close relation between theory and empirical 
testing helps prevent both the theoretical analysis and the empirical 
research from becoming sterile. Empirically oriented theories encour 
age the development of new sources and types of data, the way human 
capital theory stimulated the use of survey data, especially panels. At 
the same time, puzzling empirical results force changes in theory" (p. 
403). For both the SBA and EOPP data, we find a small impact of 
training on the starting wage, and an impact of training on productivity 
growth that is several times bigger than the impact of training on wage 
growth.
Are these findings consistent with theory? To be consistent, virtually 
all of the training must be specific and firms must bear an overwhelm 
ing share of the cost of training, or the returns to training must be 
deferred past our two year horizon by long term contracts. Fortunately, 
the EOPP survey asked directly about how specific their training was. 
The survey asked:
"How many of the skills learned by employees in this job are use 
ful outside of this company?
1. Almost all
2. Most
3. Some
4. Or almost none
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We report the responses in table 6.8. Nearly 60 percent of the sample 
report that the training is almost all general human capital. Only about 
8 percent report that almost none of the skills are of value outside the 
company. Thus it appears that employees pay only a fraction of the 
training costs and employers feel much of that training is general train 
ing. We think that our findings represent one of the puzzling empirical 
results of which Decker speaks that need further explanation.
Currently, there are four interesting and somewhat interrelated 
explanations for such a finding. Parsons (1989) proposes that work 
ers may be unable to fund their training costs because of financing 
constraints. We can find some evidence for this hypothesis in the 
SBA data. We broke up our sample into four groups: those without a 
high school degree (n = 65), those whose highest grade completed 
was 12 (n = 313), those who attended college but did not complete 
four years (n = 212), and those who completed at least four years of 
college (n = 206). If financial constraints are important, we would 
expect that the coefficient on the training measure should be mono- 
tonically increasing in education because more highly educated work 
ers earn more money and, hence, should be better able to finance 
their training. The SBA data support this hypothesis. For high school 
dropouts, the coefficient on training is 0.038 with a /-statistic of 1.2; 
for high school graduates, the coefficient on training is -0.023 with a 
/-statistic of -1.6; for those with some college, the coefficient on train 
ing is -0.058 with a /-statistic of -2.5; and for college graduates, the 
coefficient on training is -0.107 with a /-statistic of -4.2.
Table 6.8 The Degree to Which Skills are General, 1982 EOPP Data 
How many skills are general Fraction
almost all 59.59%
mostly 13.11
some 19.25
almost none 8.05
N = 2707_________________________100.0 ____
Unfortunately, other data are not so kind to this hypothesis. For 
instance, using the same four groups, we see no clear pattern in the 
EOPP data. For high school dropouts, the coefficient on the stock of
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training is -0.03 with a r-statistic of -2.0 (n = 192); for high school 
graduates, the coefficient on the stock of training is -0.021 with a r-sta- 
tistic of -2.9 (n = 960); for those with some college, the coefficient on 
the stock of training is -0.013 with a f-statistic of -2.1 (n = 331); for 
college graduates, the coefficient on the stock of training is -0.002 with 
a ^-statistic of -0.1 (n = 153). Lynch (1992), using data from the NLSY, 
divides her sample into three groups: high school dropouts, high school 
graduates, and those who attended but did not graduate college. She 
finds that the coefficient on current training spells is monotonically 
increasing in education, which directly contradicts the hypothesis. 
Indeed, of her three groups, only the coefficient for high school drop- 
outs is negative.
A second potential reason for the small impact of training on the 
starting wage focuses on the informational problem that workers and 
firms face. Firms have specialized in the production of their product, 
and presumably, they have learned a great deal about the market in 
which they operate. As such, these firms may know that the training 
they offer is general training, but convincing workers of that fact may 
be very difficult. Clearly, learning to use a word-processing program 
on a computer is general training, although many forms of training are 
less obvious. For instance, learning to operate a medium precision- 
measuring machine may facilitate learning about other pieces of elec 
tronic equipment. In addition, workers may find it difficult to signal 
their training to alternative employers. In other words, workers may 
believe that they are being provided with general training, but they are 
not convinced that they will be able to signal alternative employers of 
their skills.
Moreover, the extent of the market and the willingness of workers to 
relocate also affect the generality of training. For instance, in Scott 
County, Kentucky, the Toyota Motor Company has a large manufactur 
ing plant. Suppose that all the training that Toyota offers to their work 
ers is general training in the sense that it makes the workforce more 
productive at other automobile plants. Unfortunately for Toyota©s 
workers, the present worldwide excess capacity in automobile produc 
tion currently lessens the value of such training in the automobile mar 
ketplace. Should there be an increase in demand for experienced 
automobile workers, however, the training would be of use only to 
those workers who were willing to leave Scott County because there is
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only one automobile plant in Scott County. Thus, by forcing workers to 
bear the cost of training, Toyota may dissuade from applying those 
workers who wish to stay in Scott County for the rest of their lives. On 
the other hand, these may be the very workers Toyota wishes to attract.
A third possible explanation for the weak relationship between 
training and the starting wages focuses on the nature of labor contracts. 
This small literature includes Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1993), 
Black and Loewenstein (1990), and Kuhn (1993). 20 Each of these 
papers focuses on a prevalent feature of labor contracts: they seldom 
specify wages for long periods into the future. Apparently, workers and 
firms find it efficient not to specify the wage too far into the future 
because of the underlying uncertainty inherent in the economy. Rather, 
firms and workers rely on implicit agreements, or what Okun referred 
to as the "invisible handshake." Such contracts allow firms and workers 
to respond to the changing economic climate. The flexibility associated 
with such contracts, however, is not without costs. Because the agree 
ment is implicit, it is not enforceable by third parties, and contracting 
parties may renege on these implicit agreements. 21
One solution to this "hold-up" problem is for contracts to be self- 
enforcing; that is, neither party would have any incentive to break the 
underlying contract once it is signed. For instance, in Barron, Black, 
and Loewenstein (1993) and Black and Loewenstein (1990), firms are 
given the right to make "take-it-or-leave-it" offers. In return for giving 
the firm this monopsony power, workers receive a large starting wage. 
In Kuhn©s paper, workers and firms play a Nash-Rubinstein bargaining 
game to divide the surplus. In Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1993) 
and Kuhn (1993), workers who receive more specific training may 
receive a higher starting wage. In these models, the reason for this pre 
mium is that these workers have lower turnover probabilities and, 
hence, are more valuable to the firm. Rather than offering the workers 
higher initial wages, firms would ideally prefer to "backload" by offer 
ing to pay the workers high wages later in their career, but workers 
would not find such a promise credible.
Our fourth proposed explanation focuses on a broad class of models 
that economists call "efficiency wage" models. While this class of 
models is quite broad, the thread that relates these models is the notion 
that employers, for one reason or another, find it optimal to pay wages 
in excess of the market clearing wage (see Weiss 1990 for an excellent
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introduction to the various forms of efficiency wage models). To sim 
plify, we divide these models into five broad classes: effort-inducing, 
adverse selection, turnover-reducing, nutritional-based, and gift 
exchange.
In the effort-inducing efficiency wage models, with the classic refer 
ence being Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), firms pay higher than market 
clearing wages to induce employees to work hard. If workers should 
choose to shirk work and risk being fired, they also risk losing the 
quasi-rents associated with the employment at high-wage firms. In the 
adverse selection version of efficiency wage models (e.g., Weiss 1980), 
firms offer higher wages to attract the most talented workers. If work 
ers know their abilities while firms imperfectly observe the abilities of 
workers and lower the wages paid, high-ability workers will no longer 
apply, but relatively low-ability workers will. Hence, reducing wages 
may lower worker quality. The turnover-reducing efficiency wage 
models (e.g., Stiglitz 1975) emphasize that firms with differing turn 
over costs may offer similar workers differing wages because high- 
turnover-cost firms will want to reduce turnover by offering relatively 
high wages. The nutritional-based efficiency model deals with the 
nutritional needs of workers and is better suited for the developing 
world than the ILS. economy. The last form of efficiency wages the 
gift exchange takes a more sociological or psychological approach. 
Akerlof (1982) provides the classic paper in which he argues that 
employees will work harder when firms provide them a "gift" of higher 
wages.
Efficiency wage models remain controversial; the exchange between 
Carmichael (1990) and Lang and Kahn (1990) offers an interesting dis 
cussion of the controversies. The appeal of efficiency wage models is 
that they provide a cogent explanation of why labor markets may not 
clear in the sense that the quantity of labor demanded at a given wage 
is not equal to the quantity of labor supplied. In our context, if labor 
markets do not clear, there may be no requirement that training lower 
the starting wage. Unfortunately, as Carmichael (1990) emphasizes, 
efficiency wage models have not generated a rich set of predictions that 
economists have subjected to rigorous empirical tests. Indeed, many of 
the current forms of the efficiency wage models appear inconsistent 
with the observed patterns of wage profiles. For instance, the shirking 
explanation of efficiency wages fails to explain the covariance of wage
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premiums across firms. While workers in positions that are difficult to 
monitor should receive wage premiums, workers in jobs that are easily 
monitored should not receive the premiums. The existing empirical 
work (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988), however, suggests that wage 
premiums are highly correlated across occupations within industries, 
which suggests that monitoring costs are not driving these wage premi 
ums.
NOTES
1. Ransom (1993) is the exception. In his study of academic salaries, he finds that there is a 
negative relationship between a professor©s time at a university and the professor©s salary.
2. See Garen (1988) for a detailed review of the matching literature. The term "statistical arti 
fact" is from Mortensen©s (1984) working paper.
3. Altonji and Spletzer (1991); Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989, 1993); Booth (1993); 
Brown (1989); Duncan and Hoffman (1978); Lillard and Tan (1992); Loewenstein and Spletzer 
(1993); Lynch (1992); Mincer (1988); Parsons (1989); and Pergamit and Shack-Marquez (1987) 
all find that training is associated with wage growth. To our knowledge, only Veum (1993) has 
failed to find a positive correlation between training and wage growth.
4. In particular, Lynch finds that for high school dropouts, uncompleted spells of training are 
negatively correlated with wages, with a significant level of 11.6 percent two-tailed. For those 
with a high school degree, there is a positive correlation between uncompleted spells of training 
and wages, with a significance level of about 5.5 percent. For those with some college but no col 
lege degree, there is also a positive correlation between uncompleted spells of training and wages, 
which is significant at a 3.2-percent level.
5. Unfortunately, the EOPP data do not contain the same questions, so we cannot replicate 
these findings for that set.
6. We initially used separate gender-race controls for black, white, and other racial groups, but 
we could not reject the hypothesis that we could use the more parsimonious specification. See 
Barron, Berger, and Black (1993a) for results that use the more general specification. We also ini 
tially used the logarithm of the number of employees at other sites, a variable we used in our spec 
ification of the training equations, and we could not reject the hypothesis that its coefficient was 
zero.
7. Our analysis of the matched employer-employee Upjohn Institute data suggested that there 
may be substantial measurement error in the amount of education or workers. The SBA uses 
employer reports of worker education. If there is more measurement error in employer reports 
than in worker reports, the true gap between the SBA and the Census and CPS estimates is even 
wider.
8. We use ability here in a very general sense. For instance, workers with a lower turnover pro 
pensity would be considered "more able."
9. We tested to see if we could combine the four measures of training; the /-"-statistic was 1.11 
with a p-value of 0.35. In contrast, if we try to aggregate all five measures of training, the /©©-statis 
tics is 7.01 with ap-value of 0.001.
10. We used specifications that included one-digit industry and occupation controls, a dummy 
variable indicating multiple sites, the logarithm of the number of sites, and the logarithm of the 
number of employees at other sites. In addition, we estimated the various permutations that arise
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from these three controls. Finally, we estimated the equation using the three other site controls 
and the one-digit industry and occupation controls. In all specifications, the coefficient was posi 
tive.
11. For the same of comparison with the EOPP data, we also estimated an equation using the 
SBA data without the measure of off-site training. The coefficient for on-site training was -0.044 
with a f-statistic of -4.06.
12. A potential weakness of this measure of on-site training intensity is that it assumes all 
types of training are acquired simultaneously. For instance, it is possible that the workers may 
have types of training that begin at different times. Perhaps for the first two weeks, workers are 
sent to a formal training program, but for. weeks three and four, they receive informal training 
from their managers and co-workers. To guard against this potential bias, we define an alternative 
measure of training intensity as the maximum hours of any single component of training, which 
precludes any double counting but may understate the intensity of training. Using this alternative 
measure of training, the coefficient on the logarithm of training is -0.063 with a f-statistic of-4.03, 
while the other coefficients remain virtually unchanged. Thus, a 10 percent increase in training 
decreases starting wages by 0.63 percent. As another test of the robustness of the result, we define 
a third measure of training intensity to be the sum of the hours of all four types of training if that 
sum is less than or equal to the number of hours of work and equal to the number of hours of work 
otherwise, which may overstate the intensity of training. When we use this measure of training, 
the coefficient on training is -0.079 with a r-statistic of -4.49, while again the remaining coeffi 
cients hardly change.Using this estimate, a 10 percent increase in training lowers the starting 
wage by about 0.79 percent. Using these last two measures of on-site training intensity left the 
coefficient for off-site training virtually unchanged positive and significant at the 5-percent con 
fidence level.
13. One cannot interpret the coefficients from a tobit equation as derivatives. Evaluated at the 
means of the two samples, the derivatives are 0.8074 x P for the SBA data and 0.8238 x (3 for the 
EOPP data.
14. Both productivity distributions are centered at the 50th percentile and are the 75th percen- 
tile of both distributions are is at an index value of 75. These scores occurred without norming the 
productivity indices. That the medians occur exactly at 50 is probably due to the fact that employ 
ers are likely to pick round numbers when reporting the indices.
15. Because the literature has traditionally used the log difference in wages as an approxima 
tion for wage growth, we used the log difference in the starting wage and the wage after two years 
as an approximation of the wage index in our regression analysis. None of the results change 
much, however, if we use this real wage index.
16. Of course, many firms may have a probationary period and wage built into their wage pay 
ment structure over a fixed period of time, say three months, so wages may remain constant for 
other reasons than menu costs. Thus for either menu cost of account period reasons, firms may not 
adjust wages at the same time and rate they observe productivity growth.
17. We also estimated the wage growth equation using a tobit procedure, which resulted in a 
smaller coefficient on training than did restricting the sample to those with wage changes. We also 
ran a probit equation with the dependent variable equal to one if there was a wage change and zero 
otherwise. For independent variables we used the worker©s experience, logarithm of training, 
logarithm of off-site training, and years of education. In addition, we used the number of hours 
worker per week, the logarithm of the number of employees at the establishment, and a dummy 
variable indicating if the job was covered by a union contract. The worker©s education is negatively 
related to receiving a wage change in the first three months, the worker©s experience is negatively 
related to receiving a wage change, and each of these coefficients is significant at the 5-percent 
level. In addition, the coefficient on establishment size is negative with a f-statistic of -1.66. The
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coefficient on the logarithm of training in the first three months is positive (0.088) and statistically 
significant (^-statistic of 2.38). In contrast, the coefficient on the logarithm of off-site training is 
negative (-0.080) but has a /-statistic of only -1.70.
18. We are not assuming that the firm©s or worker©s reported training are measured without 
error. Rather, we are assuming that one party©s report can be used as a valid instrument for the 
other party©s report.
19. The SBA and EOPP data sets only asked firms about the training of the last worker hired 
and did not interview workers. Therefore, it is not possible to construct instruments directly from 
the SBA and EOPP data. Rather, one must rely on the estimates obtained from the Upjohn data. 
The estimated fs and standard errors remain the same because we are simply substituting a linear 
combination of the old variable back into the regression. Thus, these estimates are intended only 
to illustrate the effects of measurement error on estimated training effects. In addition, the training 
measures used in the SBA and EOPP data sets do not include off-site formal training. Therefore, 
another set of Upjohn instrumental regressions are estimated for use with the SBA and EOPP data 
that do not include off-site formal training.
20. Parsons (1990) also mentions problems associated with the lack of formal contracts, but he 
does not offer a formal model.
21. Indeed, it is often difficult to determine what that agreement actually is. For instance, IBM 
had a company "practice," as opposed to a "policy," of not laying off its employees. Recently, of 
course, IBM has fallen on hard times and has laid off some employees. Did IBM violate its 
implicit agreement with its employees? We conjecture that recently laid-off workers would be 
much more likely to say yes than the current stockholders. (That still doesn©t mean IBM violated 
a contract, since it was only "implicit" and not enforceable by law.)
Appendix to Chapter 6
In this appendix, we compare wage equation estimates from the SBA data 
with those from two commonly used micro data sets: the 1990 Census and the 
March 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS). For both the Census and the 
CPS, we limit our sample to wage and salary workers who are between 16 and 
64 years of age and not full-time students. In columns (1) and (2) of table A.6.1, 
we report wage equation estimates where the dependent variable is the hourly 
wage calculated from yearly earnings for the previous year (1991 for the CPS 
and 1989 for the Census), the number of weeks worked, and number of hours 
worked per week. Both data sets contain a large number of observations, nearly 
65,000 for the CPS and over 950,000 for the Census. For the independent vari 
ables, we include potential experience (age minus years of education minus 
six) and its square, years of education, a dummy variable indicating that the 
worker is black, a dummy variable indicating that the worker is a nonblack fe 
male, and hours worked per week and its square. The coefficients in columns 
(1) and (2) are similar except for the hours profiles, which are relatively impre 
cisely estimated. For comparison, we include a wage equation using similar 
specification with the SBA data. Several differences are apparent. First, the co 
efficient on education is much larger in the SBA data than in the Census or the 
CPS. Given that the SBA is a sample of newly hired workers, however, it is 
perhaps not surprising that employers reward newly hired workers more for 
their education than workers with some experience at the firm. Education is a 
readily available signal to employers that is observable at the time of hire. After 
employers have the opportunity to observe workers, wages may depend less on 
the workers© education and more on their on-the-job performance. In fact, the 
true magnitude of the difference may be larger than it appears if there are more 
problems with measurement error in employer-reported education than with 
worker-reported education.
There is also a dramatic difference in the coefficient on the dummy variable 
indicating that the worker is a nonblack female. For the SBA data, nonblack fe 
males earn about 19 percent less than nonblack males, while the corresponding 
figure for the CPS is 32 percent and is nearly 38 percent for the Census. We 
think this difference arises for two reasons. First, to the extent that women have 
higher turnover rates than men, we would expect women to have shorter tenure 
than men and hence the gender wage gap should be larger in a cross section of 
all workers than in a sample of newly hired workers. 1 Second, women are more 
likely to be temporary or seasonal employees than men, and temporary and 
part-year employees earn substantially less than permanent employees. Thus,
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by using a sample of all workers rather than permanent workers, the CPS and 
Census will yield lower wages for women than the SB A data, which is a sample 
of permanent workers.
In column (4), we report a wage equation for the outgoing rotation of the 
March 1992 CPS. The outgoing rotation, which comprises about a quarter of 
the March 1992 CPS, was asked questions about their February earnings and 
union status. Thus, only workers who were employed in February are included 
in this sample. As a result, the sample size is only about 22 percent of the sam 
ple in column (1). By focusing on only those employed in February, we elimi 
nate not only the 75 percent of the sample not in the outgoing rotation but also 
an additional 3 percent of the sample who are not currently employed. In addi 
tion to using a current wage variable, this specification also includes as controls 
current measures of union status and firm size. Restricting our sample to these 
workers has a dramatic effect on the coefficient on the nonblack female vari 
able. The coefficient now indicates that nonblack women are paid about 22 per 
cent less than nonblack men. If we remove the firm size and union variables, 
the difference rises to 23 percent. Thus, the change in the sample is responsible 
for most of the change in the coefficient. Also, the coefficient on education 
falls, which is again consistent with the notion that education matters less for 
more experienced workers.
In column (5), we report the same specification of the wage equation for the 
SB A data. While the inclusion of the firm size and union status variables low 
ers the coefficient on education somewhat, it is about 50 percent higher in the 
SB A data than the CPS data. Similarly, for the SB A the coefficient on nonblack 
females is about 80 percent the magnitude of the coefficient for the CPS data. 
The other coefficients are reasonably similar, although the hours profile is very 
imprecise in the SB A data. Taken as a whole, we think this represents a reason 
ably similar set of estimates, especially given the differences in the samples.
NOTE
1. See Ureta (1992) for a description of the gender difference in tenure in the CPS.
Table A.6.1 Wage Equation Estimates (Ordinary Least Squares) Using the 1992 March Current Population Survey 
and the 1990 Census
Independent variables
Constant
Potential experience 710
Potential experience squared / 1000
Years of education
Worker is black
Worker is nonblack female
Worker is union member
Logarithm of firm size
Hours worked / 10
CPS
(1)
0.667
(49.70)
0.399
(57.57)
-0.605
(38.82)
0.098
(113.37)
-0.292
(34.97)
-0.319
(65.10)
 
 
0.010
(1.93)
Census
(2)
0.607
(112.55)
0.362
(194.47)
-0.499
(122.01)
0.093
(406.98)
-0.301
(134.25)
-0.375
(270.31)
 
 
0.125
(70.67)
SBA
(3)
-0.104
(0.86)
0.311
(7.61)
-0.563
(4.58)
0.133
(20.80)
-0.257
(5.16)
-0.186
(6.36)
 
 
0.103
(2.29)
CPS
(4)
0.217
(6.33)
0.282
(24.50)
-0.419
(16.05)
0.085
(59.04)
-0.279
(19.60)
-0.224
(27.22)
0.137
(13.64)
0.039
(19.88)
0.238
(19.07)
SBA
(5)
-0.069
(0.58)
0.316
(7.86)
-0.571
(4.71)
0.128
(19.84)
-0.278
(6.16)
-0.178
(6.16)
0.070
(1.45)
0.035
(4.34)
0.057
(1.26)
(continued)
Table A.6.1 (continued)
Independent variables
Hours squared / 1000
R2
N
CPS
(1)
0.004
(0.31)
0.261
64,942
Census
(2)
-0.189
(99.97)
0.254
950,360
SBA
(3)
-0.099
(1.61)
0.444
796
CPS
(4)
-0.246
(16.41)
0.360
14,244
SBA
(5)
-0.046
(0.75)
0.461
796
NOTE: Absolute values of f-statistics are given in the parentheses. The dependent variables are the logarithms of wages. Ordinary Least Squares estimates 
are reported.
CHAPTER 7
Training and Firm Recruiting 
Strategies
The job-matching literature stresses that workers are not equally 
well suited for all positions. Rather, as noted by Topel (1986), a "heter 
ogeneity of talents and technologies generates job specific differences 
in productivity" (p. 200). Given complementarity between worker abil 
ity and training in production, we assumed in previous chapters that 
higher-ability workers are matched to positions requiring greater on- 
the-job training. As we have seen, because higher-ability workers com 
mand higher wages, the training variable in the starting wage regres 
sion is thus biased upward to the extent that we cannot control 
perfectly for ability differences among workers.
We have yet to explore the way in which high-ability workers are 
matched to positions with substantial training. A likely mechanism for 
achieving such matching is the recruiting and screening activity of 
employers. Employers do engage in considerable search for new work 
ers. For instance, using data from the second wave of the EOPP Sur 
vey, Barron and Bishop (1985) report that employers, on average, 
screen more than nine applicants before extending an offer. Moreover, 
Barron and Bishop (1985) document that, on average, employers spend 
a considerable amount of time evaluating applicants, but there is much 
variation in the time spent. They report that the mean time spent evalu 
ating applicants is about 10 hours, with a standard deviation of nearly 
17.2 hours.
The issue we address in this chapter is whether the recruiting activ 
ity of employers, or what we refer to as employer search, is the mecha 
nism through which high-ability workers are matched to positions with 
substantial training. To examine this issue, the first section develops a 
model of employer search behavior in which employers obtain a noisy 
signal about the quality of an applicant. Considering this signal, an
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employer determines whether to extend an applicant an offer or reject 
the applicant and continue searching. In the model, employers deter 
mine both their hiring standards and the accuracy of the signal that 
they obtain. For a fixed accuracy of a signal, the higher that employers 
set their hiring standards, or the greater their "reservation signal," the 
greater the expected ability of the worker. Higher reservation signals, 
however, increase the expected length of search, or require a more 
extensive search. For a fixed reservation signal, the greater the 
resources that employers devote to evaluating each applicant the 
greater the accuracy of the information they obtain from their search. 
Thus, firms face a choice of both extensive and intensive search.
The model of employer search allows us to examine how training 
and other characteristics of the position or applicants will affect 
employer search. Given that ability and on-the-job training are comple 
ments in production, we show that employers will adopt higher ability 
standards for positions requiring more training, which means that on 
the average they will screen more job applicants. Employers intent on 
matching high-ability workers to positions with more training can also 
raise the expected ability of a new hire by screening each applicant 
more intensively. By screening more intensively, an employer can raise 
the precision of the signals he or she obtains concerning applicants© 
abilities, and thus reduce the likelihood of hiring an unsuitable appli 
cant. Employers filling positions involving more training can therefore 
be expected to try to increase the ability of the new hire not only by 
examining more job applicants but also by engaging in more intensive, 
and more costly, screening of each applicant.
Predictions of the effect of training on employer search are tested 
using data from four national data sets: the 1980 first-wave EOPP sur 
vey, the 1982 second-wave EOPP survey, the 1992 SB A survey, and 
the 1993 Upjohn Institute survey. We find strong evidence that employ 
ers search more, both extensively and intensively, for positions that 
require substantial training. There is strong circumstantial evidence 
that higher-ability workers are indeed matched to positions with more 
training. We then consider the effect of training, as well as other vari 
ables, on the duration of a vacancy.
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Employer Optimal Search Strategy
Search by an employer to fill a vacancy can be viewed in the follow 
ing fashion. In each period there is the probability 8 that an applicant 
contacts the employer. 1 Then 1/8 denotes the expected number of peri 
ods between applicants. 2 The per period cost of the vacancy will be the 
sum of direct on-going recruiting cost as well as indirect costs reflect 
ing the loss of a vacancy remaining unfilled. Recall from chapter 2 that 
when an applicant contacts the employer, pb(E, a, 0) denotes the pro 
ductivity of the applicant in the absence of any training, where E 
denotes general human capital, a is a measure of the individuals ability 
level, and 0 denotes the zero vector of total acquired training, both gen 
eral and specific. Employers offering training during the first or begin 
ning period of employment incur costs c(T) reflecting the loss in 
productivity of the worker during training, the loss in productivity of 
co-workers who provide the training, and other training expenses. 
Thus, the net productivity of a "beginning" worker during the training 
period is given by:
(7.1) fb =pb(E,a,0)-c(T).
Recall from chapter 2 that if a trained worker remains with the firm, 
his or her productivity during the second period of employment is 
enhanced by the training received. That is, the productivity of a worker 
with ability a and education level E "after" receiving training T is 
given by:
(7.2) fa = Pa(E,a,T)
where 3paldT > 0 and dpjda > 0. We assume that increased ability a 
not only increases worker productivity, but also affects the return to 
training. In particular, it is assumed that oPpJdTda > 0. In words, the 
return to increased training is greater for more able workers (workers 
with a higher a).3
To introduce a rationale for employer search, we follow Jovanovic 
(1979b) and assume that the ability of an applicant, denoted by a, can 
be viewed as a random variable. We assume that the employer does not
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know oc at the time of hire. The employer, however, incurs screening 
and interview costs to obtain a signal concerning the ability a of the 
applicant. While the signal acquired for each applicant is directly cor 
related with the applicant©s true ability, the signal is not perfect. Thus, 
some mistakes will be made in hiring. Such errors in hiring will be dis 
covered after a period of employment. Unfortunately, this type of 
learning is expensive because the employer will have already made the 
investment in firm-specific training.
In the above setting, the employer optimal search strategy can be 
viewed as making two decisions. One is to determine the minimal or 
"reservation signal" for acceptable applicants. An employer searches 
until finding an applicant with an ability signal equal to or greater than 
this reservation signal. Such an applicant will be offered employment. 
To keep our focus on employer search, we assume that any applicant 
who is offered employment accepts. An employer can reduce hiring 
mistakes by raising the reservation signal, but the cost of doing so is an 
increase in the expected number of applicants seen before an accept 
able one is found. The extent of an employer©s extensive search is 
reflected by this expected number of applicants seen prior to an 
employment offer.
The second decision of an employer©s optimal search strategy is to 
determine the precision of the productivity signal obtained for each 
applicant. By spending more time screening and interviewing each 
applicant, the employer can obtain a better measure of the true ability 
of the applicant, and thus make fewer hiring mistakes. An increase in 
such intensive search, however, will raise the employer©s direct search 
costs per applicant. Casual empiricism suggests that some employers 
spend a great deal of resources in trying to evaluate potential appli 
cants. For instance, each year corporate recruiters come to campuses 
across the country to interview potential employees. Generally, the 
recruiters ask some of the students to make a visit to the company©s 
plant, where more interviews are conducted. The expense of such 
recruiting can be quite high. Yet, employers are attempting to avoid the 
costs associated with hiring an ill-matched worker.
Of course, not all jobs have such a heavy investment in information 
before the match has begun. Fast-food restaurants do not require their 
employees to undergo such a rigorous selection process. Why the dif 
ference? Apparently, fast-food employers are more willing to wait for
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the information to be revealed after the employment relationship has 
begun. The next section considers more formally four specific factors 
that can help explain differences in the extent of extensive and inten 
sive search.
Measures of Intensive and Extensive Search
To test our theory of employer search, and in particular the effect of 
training on employer search, we begin by obtaining explicit measures 
of an employer©s intensive and extensive search choices from actual 
events surrounding the hiring of a new worker. Two related measures 
of the amount of intensive search can be constructed from the time the 
employer spent screening and recruiting applicants, one being the time 
spent per applicant and the second being the time spent per applicant 
interviewed. Two related measures of the amount of extensive search 
are also constructed. One is the number of applicants screened per 
employment offer, and the other is the number of applicants inter 
viewed per offer. Below we suggest four propositions concerning fac 
tors that are likely to influence these measures of intensive and 
extensive search.
Four Propositions Concerning Employer Search
The following four factors can affect an employer©s choice of inten 
sive and extensive search: the level of training (I), the dispersion in the 
ability distribution across applicants, the rate at which applicants arrive 
at the employer (<5), and the implicit cost of vacancy. Our data allow us 
to identify variables to proxy each of these four factors.
One key factor that influences employer search choices is the extent 
of training. Positions with higher training will impose larger losses on 
employers during the first period of employment but provide offsetting 
greater gains to the employment of trained workers in subsequent peri 
ods. The model predicts that for positions that require higher training, 
employers will typically increase expenditures on screening and inter 
viewing each applicant (greater intensive search) as well as increase 
the reservation signal level, leading to an increase in the expected num 
ber of applicants (greater extensive search). The reason is straightfor 
ward. Positions that require greater training offer a greater gain to
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making fewer hiring mistakes, and both intensive and extensive search 
may reduce the number of mistakes. Thus, we have:
Proposition 1: Employers filling positions that require greater training 
will engage in greater extensive or intensive search.
Note that the reason why an increase in training may not increase both 
extensive and intensive search is the potential for substitution between 
the two types of search. For instance, an increase in training can lead to 
an increase in intensive search, which in turn may lower the gain to 
extensive search sufficiently such that the optimal level of extensive 
search falls. This substitution possibility is the reason for ambiguity 
not only here but in the next three propositions.
Naturally, factors other than training can influence employer search. 
A second factor that affects employer search is the inherent dispersion 
in the ability of workers. Leaving the mean unchanged, an increase in 
the dispersion of the ability distribution induces a gain to a more strin 
gent reservation signal. To see why, note that increased dispersion can 
be interpreted as an increase in the likelihood of visits by applicants 
with very high ability signals. Focusing first on extensive search, it fol 
lows that the employer faces a greater gain to continued search for such 
high-productivity applicants. To promote continued search, the 
employer raises his or her reservation ability signal. Thus, as predicted 
by standard search theory, the result is an increase in extensive search. 
As employer search occurs at both the extensive and intensive margins; 
however, employers have two ways of detecting the high-ability work 
ers. One way, just discussed, is for employers to increase the reserva 
tion signal level, which results in an increase in the expected number of 
applicants seen prior to hiring. But to better discover the high-ability 
applicants, the employer can also search more intensively, increasing 
the information content of the signal. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2: Employers filling positions for which the dispersion in 
ability is larger will engage in greater extensive or intensive search.
A third factor that affects employer search is the rate at which appli 
cants arrive at the employer (8). As an increase in the rate of flow of 
applicants reduces the costs of additional search, employers filling 
positions that have a greater applicant flow will raise the reservation 
productivity level, increasing the expected number of applicants. At the
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same time, such employers may reduce expenditures on screening and 
interviewing applicants, as increased extensive search substitutes for 
such expenditures. We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Employers filling positions where the applicant flow is 
greater will engage in either more extensive search or less intensive 
search.
A fourth factor that affects employer search is the implicit cost of hav 
ing a vacant position. Let us assume that sometimes an employer 
receives advanced notice of a vacancy. We interpret the existence of 
advance notice as a reduction in the cost of search to the employer 
because the employer can undertake the search while the current 
employee is still working. Such a reduction in per-period search costs 
increases the optimal reservation signal because the employer does not 
forgo the production associated with a vacant position. On the other 
hand, there is no clear prediction concerning the effect of such a 
change on intensive search. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4: When employers receive advance notice of an opening, 
they search more extensively, but the effect on intensive search is 
ambiguous.
Empirical Specification of Employer Search Equations
The above four propositions suggest five factors that affect extensive 
and intensive search. One is a measure of the total amount of initial 
training. From Proposition 1, we expect this measure of training to be 
directly correlated with both extensive search and intensive search, as 
employers increase efforts devoted to search in response to the greater 
loss from hiring mistakes in positions that involved greater amounts of 
initial training.
Proposition 2 indicates that increased productivity variation will 
lead to increased employer search, intensive and/or extensive. The pro 
ductivity of a randomly chosen applicant is a function of two factors: 
the applicant©s general level of human capital and his or her innate abil 
ity to perform the tasks required by the position of a particular 
employer. For workers with the same level of general human capital, 
the dispersion in the productivity distribution then depends on the 
underlying dispersion in innate abilities as well as the interaction of
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ability and general human capital in determining productivity. If gen 
eral human capital and ability are complementary inputs in determin 
ing productivity, which is what we assume, then a given distribution of 
abilities will generate a more dispersed distribution of productivity 
among individuals with a higher level of general human capital. One 
measure of general human capital is formal education. This leads us to 
expect greater productivity variation among workers with higher levels 
of formal education. Thus from Proposition 2 we expect that employer 
search will be greater for positions that are filled by more highly edu 
cated individuals. A second measure of general human capital is labor 
force experience. Our data contain measures of whether the worker 
who was hired had any relevant experience for the position. We use this 
as a proxy for the level of general human capital gained through expe 
rience, and expect that the dispersion of productivity among workers 
with no prior experience will be less because they have less general 
human capital. From Proposition 2, we thus expect employer search 
will be less for positions hiring workers with no experience.
Another factor affecting employer search is establishment size. We 
take the establishment size of the employer as one measure of the rate 
of flow of applicants 8. In particular, we expect larger employers to 
experience economies of scale in generating applicants for vacant posi 
tions.4 Thus from Proposition 3 we expect that larger employers will 
engage in either more extensive or less intensive search.
Finally, from Proposition 4 we expect that when an employer has 
advanced notice of a vacancy, the employer will see more applicants 
prior to an employment offer (greater extensive search).
To summarize, the model provides the following two equations to be 
estimated with regard to the determinants of employers© intensive 
search and extensive search to fill a position:
(7.3) IS = a0 + a, TRAIN + «2 EDUC + a3 ZEROEXP + a4 SIZE 
+ as ADVNOTICE + a6 X + e
(7.4) ES = b0 + b { TRAIN + b2 EDUC + b, ZEROEXP + b4 SIZE 
+ b5 ADVNOTICE + b6 X +e
where IS is the log of the intensive search measure (time spent per 
applicant or time spent per interview), ES is the extensive search mea-
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sure (number who applied or the number interviewed), TRAIN is the 
log of the measure of total training, EDUC is the log of the number of 
years of education required, ZEROEXP indicates that the worker had 
no prior experience in a similar position, SIZE is the log of establish 
ment size, ADVNOTICE indicates that the employer had advance 
notice of the vacancy, and X is a vector of two control variables that 
indicate whether the position was associated with a union and the loga 
rithm of the number of hours the position required per week. As dis 
cussed above, Propositions 1 through 4 imply the following signs for 
the coefficients: a\ > 0 and b { > 0; a2 > 0 and b2 > 0, with strict inequal 
ity for at least one of the two coefficients; a3 < 0 and b3 < 0 with strict 
inequality for at least one of the two coefficients; a4 > 0 and b4 < 0 with 
strict inequality for at least one of the two coefficients; and as > 0 and 
no predicted sign for b5 .
The Evidence on Employer Search Behavior
To test the predictions of the model as summarized by equations 
(7.3) and (7.4), we employ four data sets: the 1980 EOPP employer 
survey, the 1982 EOPP follow-up employer survey, a 1992 survey of 
employers financed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), and 
a 1993 employer survey financed by the W. E. Upjohn Institute. Except 
for search variables, the contents of the first surveys have been 
described in detail in earlier chapters. The Upjohn Institute Survey is 
described in detail in chapter 7. The four surveys asked employers a 
number of common questions about their search activities during the 
period prior to their most recent hire. In particular, all four surveys 
contained questions regarding the number of applicants interviewed for 
the position filled, the number of individuals who turned the employer 
down, if any, and the total number of hours spent by company person 
nel recruiting, screening, and interviewing all applicants. We obtain a 
measure of intensive search by dividing the total number of hours spent 
recruiting, screening, and interviewing applicants by the total number 
of applicants interviewed.5 We obtain a measure of extensive search by 
dividing the total number of applicants interviewed by the total number 
of offers made.6 Dividing the total number of offers made by the total
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number hired provides us with a measure of the number of offers made 
prior to an offer being accepted. In our discussions in the previous sec 
tion, we assumed this variable equaled one. Multiplying intensive 
search, extensive search, and the number of offers made per hire pro 
vides an overall measure of the total number of hours spent recruiting, 
screening, and interviewing applicants per hire.
Columns 1, 3, and 5 in table 7.1 report the means of these various 
"interview-based" measures of employer search for the four data sets. 
To illustrate the differences in sampling strategies across surveys, table 
7.1 breaks down the magnitude of these search measures by employer 
size. As the table indicates, there is a substantially larger proportion of 
smaller employers in the two EOPP surveys relative to the SBA and 
Upjohn Institute surveys. After controlling for size, however, the mag 
nitudes of the various measures of employer search are quite similar 
across the four surveys, with one key exception. The total hours spent 
recruiting, screening, and interviewing applicants is much lower for the 
1980 EOPP survey than for the other three surveys. The reason for this 
may be the way in which this question was framed. Unlike the other 
three surveys, the 1980 EOPP survey asked employers only about the 
number of job applicants interviewed for the position, not the total 
number of applicants. Thus, the answers may reflect hours involved in 
the interviewing process alone, not the total hours devoted to all phases 
of hiring for the position.
Except for the 1980 EOPP survey, the surveys also obtained infor 
mation on the total number of applicants for these positions. This per 
mits alternative measures of both intensive search and extensive 
search. The alternative extensive search measure is the total number of 
applicants seen prior to an offer, rather than the number of applicants 
interviewed prior to an offer. The alternative intensive search measure 
is the number of hours spent recruiting, screening, and interviewing 
applicants per applicant, rather than the number of hours spent search 
ing per applicant interviewed. Columns 2 and 4 of table 7.1 report 
means of these two variables where available.
The surveys asked employers to provide information concerning on- 
the-job training, although the surveys differ in the measures of training 
provided. The 1980 EOPP survey asked two training questions:
In the first month of employment, approximately how many hours 
did employees other than personnel and supervisory staff spend
Table 7.1 Employer Search, Vacancy Duration, and Training Variables by Size, 1980 EOPP; 1982 EOPP; 1992 SBA; 
1993 Upjohn Institute Surveys
Number of 
hours spent 
per 
Employer interview 
Size (1)
EOPP, 1980 .83
1-99 .80
100-299 .96
300+ .97
EOPP, 1982 2.12
1-99 1.97
100-299 2.78
300+ 3.33
SBA, 1992 2.73
1-99 2.04
100-299 2.68
300+ 3.63
UPJOHN, 1993 3.21
1-99 1.52
100-299 3.18
300+ 3.65
Number of 
hours spent 
per 
applicant
(2)
NA
NA
NA
NA
2.17
2.14
2.18
2.67
2.11
1.88
2.06
2.43
1.61
1.08
1.76
1.68
Number 
of interviews 
per offer
(3)
5.69
5.38
7.02
8.79
5.91
5.79
6.94
5.94
5.58
5.32
5.96
5.81
6.02
8.39
5.66
5.64
Number 
of applicants 
per offer
(4)
NA
NA
NA
NA
9.87
8.85
11.24
23.42
14.08
9.72
13.48
19.93
22.94
15.68
18.82
27.17
Total 
number of 
hours spent 
per offer
(5)
5.69
5.38
7.02
10.75
10.41
9.36
16.53
16.50
14.03
10.14
16.26
18.40
18.79
11.75
18.82
20.51
Number of 
offers made 
per hire
(6)
1.02
1.02
1.00
1.02
1.08
1.07
1.08
1.16
1.14
1.13
1.16
1.14
1.16
1.46
1.21
1.06
Duration of 
vacancy in 
days
(7)
13.39
13.46
12.02
15.13
17.21
16.66
22.52
16.67
NA
NA
NA
NA
30.35
19.23
29.67
33.41
Total 
training 
(hours)
(8)
33.71
32.91
37.87
39.33
136.15
131.99
123.30
223.33
168.43
152.72
161.35
191.07
83.42
81.1
78.40
86.38
Number 
of observations
(9)
2994
2552
300
142
1270
1083
118
69
859
428
102
329
210
30
58
122
NOTE: For comparability across the four surveys, the sample from each survey is restricted to only those who had been hired within the last two years of 
the survey. The 1982 EOPP, 1992 SBA, and 1993 Upjohn Institute surveys are for the last permanent new employee hired. Information on whether the new 
hire was temporary, seasonal, or permanent was not available for the 1980 EOPP survey.
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away from their normal work routines orienting and training the 
new hire?
In the first month of employment, approximately how many 
hours did personnel and advisory staff spend orienting and train 
ing the new hire?
The sum of these two measures provides a direct measure of the 
total amount of on-the-job training, TRAIN, received by a new worker 
during the first month. 7 Column 8 of table 7.1 reports averages of this 
measure of training for the 1980 EOPP sample.
The other three surveys contained a common set of four questions 
concerning various types of on-the-job training, although the period of 
time over which training was measured differed among the three sur 
veys. The 1982 EOPP survey and the 1992 SB A survey asked for the 
total number of hours typically spent during the first three months of 
employment (a) by specially trained personnel providing formal train 
ing to the most recently hired worker, (b) by line supervisors and man 
agement personnel providing the new worker with informal 
individualized training and extra supervision, (c) by co-workers away 
from other tasks in providing the new worker with informal individual 
ized training and extra supervision, and (d) by the worker watching 
others perform tasks. The average total time spent on these four train 
ing activities, reported in column 8 of table 7.1, is 136.14 hours for the 
1982 EOPP data and 168.43 hours for the SB A data. These sums pro 
vide direct measures of the total amount of on-the-job training, 
TRAIN, received by a new worker for the 1982 EOPP and 1992 SB A 
surveys, respectively. 8 For the 1993 Upjohn Institute survey, the train 
ing measure is obtained from questions almost identical to those of the 
1982 EOPP and 1992 SBA surveys, with the important difference 
being that the training questions concern only the first month, not the 
first three months, of employment. That explains why the average level 
of training for this survey, reported in column 8 of table 7.1 as 83.42 
hours, is substantially below the mean for the other two surveys.
With few exceptions, measures of the other variables included in 
equations (7.3) and (7.4) as determinants of employer search are avail 
able in all four data sets. In all four surveys, the employer provided 
information on the education level of the individual hired and whether 
the individual hired had any experience in jobs that had some applica 
tion to the position. We use responses to these two questions to infer
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the required education level of the position (EDUC) and if the 
employer did not require any prior experience (ZEROEXP). All four 
surveys also report the size of the establishment (SIZE). Three of the 
four surveys, the exception being the 1980 EOPP survey, contain a 
measure of the number of hours that the newly hired employee typi 
cally works. Each of the four surveys has a measure of the collective 
bargaining or union status of the position filled. For the two EOPP data 
sets, this union variable is the proportion of all positions at the estab 
lishment that are represented by a collective bargaining agreement. For 
the SBA and Upjohn data sets, this union variable is more specific; the 
employer identified whether the particular position filled was a union 
position. We control for union status because Holzer, Katz, and Krue- 
ger (1991), using the EOPP data, argue that queues may exist for union 
jobs. Only the 1982 EOPP and the 1993 Upjohn Institute surveys asked 
employers whether they knew in advance of the existence of the open 
ing.
Tables 7.2 through 7.5 report estimates of equations (7.3) and (7.4) 
for the 1980 EOPP data, 1982 EOPP data, the 1992 SBA data, and the 
1993 Upjohn Institute data, respectively. For the intensive search equa 
tions (both the number of hours per applicant interviewed measure and, 
for the most recent three data sets, the number of hours per applicant 
measure), we report the standard ordinary least squares estimates with 
results corrected for heteroskedasticity. These results appear in col 
umns 1 and 2 of tables 7.2 through 7.5. Because our measure of exten 
sive search involves sampling from a stationary distribution with a time 
invariant stopping rule, the theory suggests that the average number of 
applicants seen per acceptable offer is exponentially distributed. 9 
Therefore, the results reported in columns 3 and 4 of tables 7.2 through 
7.5 reflect the estimation of a maximum-likelihood exponential distri 
bution (number of applicants) model using individual-level data. 10
The results reported in tables 7.2 through 7.5 provide robust evi 
dence supporting the employer search model we developed. Using four 
data sets collected over a fifteen-year period, we find strong support 
that employer search varies systematically by the type of position 
filled. Our results, summarized in table 7.6, indicate that all four data 
sets support the prediction that employers will search more for posi 
tions that require greater training, with three of the four indicating sig 
nificantly greater search at both the intensive and extensive margins.
Table 7.2 Determinants of Employer Search, 1980 EOPP Survey
Intensive search (IS) Extensive serach (ES)
Variable Mean
Log of 
number of 
hours spent 
per interview
OLS 
White (Huber) 
correction
Coefficient 
(/-statistic)
Log of 
number of 
hours spent 
per applicant
OLS
White (Huber) 
correction
Coefficient 
(/-statistic)
Number of 
interviews 
per offer
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(/-statistic)
Number of 
applicants 
per offer
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(/-statistic)
Number of 
offers made 
per hire
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(/-statistic)
Constant
Log of total training, 1st month 2.81 
Log number of years education 2.48 
No prior experience in position .267 
Log of employer size 2.97 
Advanced notice of opening NA
-.757 
(3.95)
.044 
(5.63)
.272 
(3.55)
-.077 
(3.17)
-.004 
(0.48) 
NA
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
-1.40 
(4.05)
.161 
(11.76)
.975
(7.04)
-.216
(5.11)
.096 
(7.46) 
NA
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
-.051 
(0.15)
.002 
(0.13)
.039 
(0.29)
-.012 
(0.28)
-.009 
(0.67) 
NA
Proportion of firm unionized . 1 05
Log number of hours per week NA
Mean, dependent variable
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared or Chi-square
.035
(0.85)
NA
.013
2,994
.02
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
-.131
(1.89)
NA
5.69
2,994
317.41
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
-.007
(0.10)
NA
1.02
2,994
.74
Table 7.3 Determinants of Employer Search, 1982 EOPP Survey
Intensive search (IS) Extensive search (ES)
Variable Mean
Log of number 
of hours spent 
per interview
OLS
White
(Huber) 
correction
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
Log of number 
of hours spent 
per applicant
OLS
White
(Huber) 
correction
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
Number of 
interviews per 
offer
Exponential 
Distribution
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
Number of 
applicants per 
offer
Exponential 
Distribution
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
Constant -2.98 -3.11 -.422 .779
Number of 
offers made 
per hire
Exponential 
Distribution
Coefficient
(^-statistic)
-.042
(4.00) (3.72) (0.69) (1.19) (0.07)
Log of total training, 1st three 4.13 .117 .087 .057 .097 .005 
months (7.48) (4.34) (2.92) (5.07) (0.26)
Log number of years education 2.52 .716 .731 .472 .302 .023 
(2.52) (2.37) (2.28) (1.40) (0.11)
No prior experience in position .339 -.166 -.117 -.062 -.031 .044 
(3.41) (1.91) (1.03) (0.52) (0.73)
Log of employer size 3.03 .072 -.031 .053 .211 .007 
(4.06) (1.35) (2.53) (10.02) (0.33)
Advanced notice of opening .60 .133 -.019 .180 .335 -.014 
(2.80) (0.33) (3.09) (5.72) (0.24)
Proportion of firm unionized .098
Log number of hours per week 3.60
Mean, depend, variable
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared or Chi-square
.005
(0.05)
.239
(3.12)
.409
1,294
.11
-.268
(2.01)
.393
(3.58)
.341
1,294
.05
-.180
(1.64)
.146
(1.34)
5.91
1,270
43.12
.119
(1.06)
-.160
(1.46)
9.86
1,270
213.68
-.067
(0.61)
.005
(0.05)
1.08
1,270
1.15
Table 7.4 Determinants of Employer Search, 1992 SBA Survey
Intensive search (IS) Extensive search (ES)
Variable Mean
Log of number 
of hours spent 
per interview
OLS 
White (Huber) 
correction
Coefficient 
(^-statistic)
Log of number 
of hours spent 
per applicant
OLS
White (Huber) 
correction
Coefficient 
(^-statistic)
Number of 
interviews 
per offer
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(z-statistic)
Number of 
applicants 
per offer
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(z-statistic)
Number of 
offers made 
per hire
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(z-statistic)
Constant -4.30 -1.63 -1.13 -4.33 .248 
(6.77) (2.12) (1.75) (7.18) (0.39)
Log of total training, 1st three
months
Log number of years education
No prior experience in position 
Log of employer size
Advanced notice of opening 
Union position
4.41
2.59
.280
4.90
NA
.090
.122 
(5.18)
1.22 
(5.72)
-.140 
(1.92)
.043 
(3.41)
NA
.022 
(0.20)
.077 
(2.31)
.600 
(2.31)
-.077 
(0.86)
-.024 
(1.62)
NA
.127 
(0.88)
.018 
(0.69)
.777 
(3.37)
-.250 
(3.17)
.015 
(1.09)
NA
-.122 
(1.00)
.061 
(2.15)
1.59 
(7.39)
-.360 
(4.60)
.123 
(8.62)
NA
-.040 
(0.33)
.017 
(0.63)
-.040 
(0.18)
.021 
(0.27)
.003 
(0.22)
NA
.061 
(0.51)
3.54 .272 .034 .209 .545 -.033
(2.79) (0.33) (2.18) (5.79) (0.36)
Mean, dependent variable .545 .248 5.58 14.08 1.14
Number of observations 859 859 859 859 859
R-square or Chi-square .14 .02 42.53 267.58 1.01
Table 7.5 Determinants of Employer Search, 1993 Upjohn Institute Survey
Intensive search (IS) Extensive search (ES)
Dependent variable:
Model estimated 
Variable Mean
Log of 
number of 
hours spent 
per interview
OLS 
White (Huber) 
correction
Coefficient 
(^-statistic)
Log of 
number of 
hours spent per 
applicant
OLS 
White (Huber) 
correction
Coefficient 
(^-statistic)
Number 
of interviews 
per offer
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(z-statistic)
Number 
of applicants 
per offer
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(z-statistic)
Number 
of offers made 
per hire
Exponential 
distribution
Coefficient 
(z-statistic)
Constant
Log of total training, 1st month 4.05
Log number of years education 2.61
No prior experience in position .148
Log of employer size 6.14
Advanced notice of opening .743
Union position .100
-5.91 
(4.68)
.108 
(1.79)
1.86 
(4.14)
-.207 
(1.37)
.045 
(1.19)
.029 
(0.23)
-.114 
(0.59)
-2.98 
(2.02)
.044 
(0.58)
1.30
(2.54)
.129 
(0.61)
-.009 
(0.18)
-.119 
(0.61)
-.459 
(1.85)
-0.99
(0.72)
.135 
(1.93)
.607 
(1.29)
-.391 
(1.94)
-.077 
(1.83)
.197 
(1.21)
-.052 
(0.22)
-6.47 
(4.35)
.132 
(1.87)
1.96 
(3.86)
-.834 
(3.86)
.037 
(0.85)
.618
(3.75)
.292 
(1.99)
.651 
(0.47)
-.022 
(0.30)
-.254 
(0.52)
-.067 
(0.34)
-.043 
(0.95)
.006 
(0.03)
.009 
(0.04)
Log number of hours per week 3.57 .312 -.119 .283 .890 .145(2.11) (0.61) (1.29) (4.02) (0.68)
Mean, depend, variable .733 .000 6.02 22.94 1.16
Number of observations 210 210 210 210 210
R-squared or Chi-square .17 .04 17.81 79.59 1.96
Table 7.6 Summary of Findings Concerning Determinants of Employer Search and Vacancy Duration 
Across Four Surveys
1980 EOPP 1982 EOPP 1992 SBA 1993 Upjohn
Predicted
Interview signs for 
based extensive 
employer search (ES) 
search and intensive 
measures search (S)
Total ES+; IS+
training Duration: sign 
ofES
Years of ES or IS+
education Duration: sign 
ofES
No prior ES or IS+ 
experience Duration: sign 
ofES
Employer ES+ or IS- 
size Duration: ?
Advanced ES+; IS?
notice of Duration: sign 
opening of ES
Interviews 
per offer
(ES)
+*
+*
.*
+*
NA
Hours 
per 
interview
(IS)
Duration 
of a 
vacancy
+* +*
+* +*
.* .*
.*
NA NA
Hours 
Interviews per 
per offer interview
(ES) (IS)
Duration 
of a 
vacancy
+* +* +*
+* +* +*
.* -*
+* +* -*
+* +* +*
Hours 
Interviews per 
per offer interview
(ES) (IS)
+ +*
+* +*
.* .*
+ +*
NA NA
Duration 
of a 
vacancy
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Hours 
Interviews per Duration 
per offer interview of a 
(ES) (IS) vacancy
+* +* +*
+ +* +*
.* . .*
-* + +
+ + +
Applicant
based
employer
search
measures
Total ES+; IS+
training Duration: sign
ofES
Years of ES or IS+
education Duration: sign
ofES
No prior ES or IS+
experience Duration: sign
ofES
Employer ES+ or IS-
size Duration: ?
Advanced ES+; IS ?
notice of Duration: sign
opening of ES
Applicants
per offer
(ES)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Hours
per
applicant
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Applicants
per offer
(ES)
+*
+
-
+*
+*
Hours per
applicant
+*
+*
.*
-
.
Applicants
per offer
(ES)
+*
+*
.*
+*
NA
Hours per
applicant
+*
+*
-
_*
NA
Applicants
per offer Hours per
(ES) applicant
+* +*
+* +*
_*
+
+*
NOTE: An asterisk indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .10 significance level. Pluses and minuses indicate the sign of the coefficient.
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There is similarly strong support for the prediction that employers 
search more extensively for positions that require greater levels of edu 
cation. 11 Further, all four data sets provide at least partial support for 
the contention that employers search less on the extensive margin for 
positions that do not require prior experience, and three of the four data 
sets support the contention that larger employers search more at the 
extensive margin. On the other hand, there is no strong evidence that 
larger employers search less intensively. Estimates of equations (7.3) 
and (7.4) that include the advance notice variable for the 1982 EOPP 
and 1993 Upjohn Institute data sets indicate, as expected, that while 
advance notice has an indeterminate sign with respect to intensive 
search, the advance notice of a vacancy does lead to an increase in 
extensive search.
There is an additional finding from the four surveys that is of inter 
est. Column 5 in tables 7.2 through 7.5 reports the estimation of a sur 
vival model for the number of offers made per hire. All four surveys 
indicate that it is uncommon for applicants to reject wage offers (see 
column 6 of table 7.1): in all four data sets, workers accept at least 85 
percent of all job offers. Further, there is no systematic pattern to the 
rejection of wage offers across positions.
The Evidence on Vacancy Duration
The analysis in the previous section provides not only a framework 
for the analysis of factors affecting employer intensive and extensive 
search, but also suggests determinants of the duration of a vacancy. The 
model specifies that the duration of a vacancy is an exponentially dis 
tributed random variable with expected value 1 /(8(l - H(sr)), where 8 
is the per-period probability that an applicant will contact the employer 
seeking to hire and (l-H(sr)) is the probability that an applicant is 
acceptable given the distribution of ability signals //( ) and reservation 
signal sr Thus, the expected duration of a vacancy is an increasing 
function of the employer©s reservation ability signal choice, sn and a 
decreasing function of the probability that an applicant contacts the 
employer, 8.
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This implies the hazard rate function for vacancy duration is time 
independent. 12 In this case, letting D denote the log of the duration time 
for a vacancy, the model we estimate is given by:
(7.5) D = c0 + c, TRAIN + c2 EDUC + c3 ZEROEXP + c4 SIZE 
+ cs ADVNOTICE + c6 X + e
where the predicted signs for the coefficients in equation (7.3) are the 
same as those for the extensive search equation (7.4), with one excep 
tion. The exception is the employer size variable. Recall that while 
larger employers are predicted to search more extensively (higher sr), 
the rationale for this is that larger employers have a greater probability 
of an applicant contact each period (a higher 8). These two changes 
(higher sr and higher 8) have offsetting effects on the duration of a 
vacancy. Thus, the effect of size on the duration of a vacancy is ambig 
uous. Given that we have found that extensive search increases with 
training, education, and advance notice, and decreases in positions that 
require no prior experience, then these variables should have similar 
effects on the duration of a vacancy.
Because the data are measured in days and the number of observa 
tions in our data sets are relatively large, we treat the data as discrete. 13 
While our theory implies that the hazard function should be time 
invariant, van Ours (1988) and Renes (1989) report evidence of dura 
tion dependence. To check this result for U.S. data, we estimate the 
vacancy duration model using a discrete hazard model that Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice (1973) suggest. Meyer (1990) recently applied this model 
to unemployment spells. Let the duration time have a discrete distribu 
tion with mass points at 0 < z\ < Z2 • • •• Then the Kalbfleisch and Pren 
tice model implies the hazard at zt for covariate x is:
(7.6) l-(l-yt)exPt-* c i
where yt and the coefficient vector C are parameters estimated using 
maximum likelihood techniques. 14 The discrete, time-invariant hazard 
function is 1 - ( 1 - ^)exp[-*c] ? wm"ch is simply a special case of equa 
tion (7.6). We estimated both models for each of the three data sets that 
contain information on the duration of the vacancy and overwhelm-
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ingly reject the constant hazard function specification for each of the 
three data sets.
For the 1982 EOPP and 1993 Upjohn data sets, the duration of a 
vacancy is measured by the number of days "between the time (the 
employer) started looking for someone to fill the opening and the time 
(a new employee) started to work." For the 1980 EOPP, the term 
"recruit for the job" was used instead of "looking for someone to fill 
the opening." 15 Columns 1 through 3 of table 7.7 report the results of 
this estimation of the vacancy duration equation. The estimated hazard 
rates for the three separate data sets are plotted in figure 7.1. There is 
some evidence of time dependence. For instance, one pattern indicated 
by figure 7.1 is that the probability of filling a vacancy rises at the end 
of the first week. It appears that a common event is for an employer to 
fill a vacancy after a week of search. A second pattern, apparent in the
Figure 7.1 Vacancy Duration Hazard Rates (duration in days)
•EOPP 1982 — - — - Upjohn 1993\
two EOPP data sets, is a relatively high likelihood of a vacancy being 
immediately filled. These are positions for which the employer either 
indicated that there were no days between the time he or she started to 
look for someone to fill the opening and the time that the new 
employee started to work or that he or she did not have to look for 
someone to fill the position. One reason that the immediate filling of 
vacancies does not occur in the Upjohn Institute data set is that firms 
who fill positions immediately tend to be smaller employers, and
Table 7.7 Vacancy Duration Models
1980
EOPP
Coefficient
Variable (z-statistic)
1982
EOPP
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
1993
Upjohn
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
Duation
(in days)
1980
EOPP
Estimated
hazard rates3
1982
EOPP
Estimated
hazard rates3
1993
Upjohn
Estimated
hazard rates3
Log of total training 1 st three months
(1st month for EOPP 1980)
Log number of years education
No prior experience in position
Log of employer size
Advanced notice of opening
Proportion of firm unionized (union
position for Upjohn 1993)
Log number of hours per week
Median of dependent variable (in
days)
Number of observations
Log likelihood
.112
(8.33)
.574
(4.32)
-.201
(4.71)
.004
(0.34)
NA
-.015
(0.22)
NA
14
2,994
-6400.09
.108
(5.32)
.886
(4.88)
-.111
(1.79)
-0.16
(0.79)
.259
(4.38)
-.206
(1.81)
.490
(4.77)
14
1,270
-2794.35
.141
(1.78)
2.432
(4.50)
-0.888
(4.01)
.003
(0.68)
.281
(1.59)
.429
(1.65)
.491
(2.26)
22
210
-394.94
0
1
2
3
4
5-7
8-14
15-21
22-30
31-60
61-90
0.2706
0.1005
0.0829
0.0662
0.0235
0.1054
0.0685
0.0353
0.0494
0.0134
0.0107
0.1243
0.0528
0.0551
0.0700
0.0324
0.1013
0.0691
0.0384
0.0512
0.0172
0.0110
...
0.0039
0.0120
0.0163
0.0125
0.0261
0.0179
0.0405
0.0380
0.0247
0.0213
a. We calculate hazard rates using the mean value of the covariates for each sample.
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smaller employers were specifically excluded from the Upjohn Insti 
tute sample. Our findings generally support the presumption that 
changes in variables that lead to more extensive search are the same 
changes that lead to an increase in the duration of a vacancy. The one 
exception, employer size, supports our conjecture that it should have 
different effects on extensive search and vacancy duration. While 
larger employers do search more extensively, the expected duration of 
a vacancy is equal to or less than that of smaller employers.
Recently, van Ours (1988) and Renes (1989), using Dutch data, 
explored the determinants of vacancy duration. They found that 
vacancy duration was higher at positions with high education, experi 
ence, and skill requirements. Our findings for the United States across 
three data sets are consistent with these findings: we find that vacancy 
duration is significantly greater in positions requiring more training, 
more highly educated workers, and individuals with some prior experi 
ence. Our findings, however, indicate a much shorter duration of a 
vacancy than that found in the Dutch data. From table 7.1, mean 
vacancy duration is under a month, while the average vacancy duration 
for the Dutch data was about six months. Some of this difference may 
be explained by the fact that the Dutch data was drawn by sampling 
vacancies, then resampling the employers later to determine the time 
taken to fill that particular vacancy. Such a sampling strategy overrep- 
resents positions that have long vacancy durations. More in line with 
our data are Scottish data reported by Beaumont (1978), who found an 
average vacancy duration of between 10 and 15 days during the 1973- 
1975 period.
Conclusions
While much has been written concerning job search, researchers 
have placed less attention on employer search. This appears odd given 
our results, which confirm that systematic patterns to employer search 
do exist and that employer search is an important component of the 
matching of workers to positions. Table 7.8 indicates that the median 
duration of unemployment is substantially higher for workers in mana 
gerial and professional occupations, occupations that typically require
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higher levels of education and more training than service occupations. 
Our finding that employers search more extensively for positions that 
require greater formal education and training may help explain this dif 
ference in unemployment duration. More extensive search by employ 
ers means that workers must on average locate more vacancies per job 
offer. Our results on extensive search by employers are also consistent 
with Holzer©s (1994) finding that positions involving greater job skill 
requirements generally have higher vacancy rates. That we find that 
employers search more extensively to fill such positions (with a result 
ing longer duration of a vacancy at these positions) implies higher 
vacancy rates, other things equal.
Table 7.8 Employer Search and Unemployment Duration
Median duration Mean number of
(weeks) of applicants per
Occupation unemployment3 offer (SBA) 
Service 7.3 7.7
Operators, fabricators, and laborers
Technical, sales, arid
administrative support
Precision production, craft, and repair
Managerial and professional
9.0
10.1
12.2
12.6
12.9
14.8
14.5
18.7
a. As the duration of unemployment data is censored, we report the median rather than the mean 
of the interrupted duration spells as it is likely to provide a better measure of the underlying mean 
duration of completed spells of unemployment. Employer extensive search is measured by the 
mean number of applicants seen per offer reported by the Spring 1992 SBA survey. The median 
duration of unemployment is taken from the June 1992 issue of Employment and Earnings and for 
the month of May 1992.
One important extension of our analysis would be to consider fur 
ther the interplay between employer search decisions and worker job 
search. For instance, as Montgomery (1991) emphasizes, if workers 
know the search behavior of employers, then employers who make rel 
atively few offers per applicant will have to pay higher wages to com 
pensate applicants engaged in costly job search for the reduced 
likelihood of receiving a job offer. Another issue that warrants further 
examination is the implication of employer search for the sharing of 
on-the-job training costs and returns. We assumed for simplicity that
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employers bear all the costs and reap all the returns to training. In a 
more general setting, however, the employer©s share of training cost 
should be endogenously determined, with the employer bearing a 
larger portion of training costs and returns at positions requiring sub 
stantial training in order to induce a more careful matching of workers 
and positions (e.g., to induce the appropriate investment in employer 
search). This provides an additional rationale for the findings in chap 
ter 5 of a weak relationship between starting wages and training.
NOTES
1. In modeling employer search, there are several options available. The simplest approach, 
which is the one we adopt, assumes a sequential strategy. This is standard in the literature that 
examines search from the worker©s point of view. There are, however, situations in which the opti 
mal search strategy combines elements of the fixed-sample-size approach with the sequential 
approach. The optimality of a search strategy that includes a. fixed-sample-size element is demon 
strated by Morgan and Manning (1985). For instance if there is a delay between the interviewing 
of an additional worker and the decision to hire, the fixed-sample-size element of search increases 
the speed at which the vacancy can be filled. Naturally, offsetting this gain is the potential of a 
fixed-sample-size strategy to result in an overinvestment in information. Bull, Ornati, and Tedes- 
chi (1987) provide an illustration of an employer who chooses a combined fixed-sample-size/ 
sequential search strategy. Employers do, in fact, often engage in search strategies that combine 
fixed-sample-size properties with sequential strategy. The added complexity of such a model of 
employer search, however, is not required to illustrate the interplay between belated information 
and employer search and to identify how factors such as the extent of on-the-job training influence 
employer search.
2. For simplicity, we assume the length of a period is sufficiently short such that the probabil 
ity that two or more applicants contact the employer in the same period is approximately zero. We 
also choose not to complicate the model by having the employer choose the extent of (costly) 
advertising that would affect the speed at which applicants visit the employer. As noted by van 
Ours and Ridder (1992), such advertising can be the source of a pool of applicants.
3. We could also assume that higher-ability workers have lower costs of training. In other 
words, we could assume that 32c/3T8cc < 0, such that the reduction in output during the first 
period that results from an increase in training is less for higher-ability workers. The results to 
follow would not be affected by adding this feature to the model.
4. These economies of scale may arise in part due to the existence of personnel departments 
that increase the flow of applicants per vacant position, van Ours and Ridder (1992) do find that 
". . . establishments with a personnel department. . . have more applicants" (p. 149).
5. Recall that the extent of intensive search excludes the indirect costs of a vacancy remaining 
unfilled. As this intensive search measure is computed by dividing the total time spent searching 
by the number interviewed, we add one to the number interviewed as reported by the employer in 
order that all employers, including those who reported interviewing zero individuals prior to hir 
ing, are included in the analysis. Except for the 1980 EOPP data, the number reporting no inter 
views was under 10 percent. For the 1980 EOPP data set, approximately 30 percent of employers 
reported no one was interviewed. This large number may be due in part to the absence of a preced 
ing framing question concerning the number of applicants for the position.
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6. Given that we add one to the reported measures of the number interviewed to compute the 
intensive search measure, we add one to the number interviewed in computing the extensive 
search measure, such that the product of these intensive and extensive measures equals total 
search. Estimation of a survival model for extensive search also requires that the lower bound for 
the number interviewed must be above zero.
7. This training measure is clearly truncated as the training refers only to the first month of 
employment. The substantially greater estimates of training over the first three months of employ 
ment reported below for the 1982 EOPP and the 1992 SB A illustrate this point.
8. The fourth measure of training was in response to the question concerning the total hours 
spent by the worker "in training activities in which he or she is watching other people do the job 
rather than doing it himself (EOPP data set) or "observing co-workers in order to learn skills 
required for the position" (SBA data set). One might omit this variable from our total training 
measures on the presumption that it introduces some double-counting given our other three train 
ing measures. The deletion of this fourth training variable, however, does not alter any of the find 
ings reported below.
9. Thus, our measure of extensive search has features similar to duration data.
10. The significance of the reported results are robust to alternative estimation procedures. For 
instance, estimation of the model using Davidon, Fletcher, and Powell (DFP) algorithm provides 
identical coefficients and similar estimates of the standard errors. We also used robust confidence 
standard errors of Huber (1967) and White (1980) in the exponential models and our findings 
largely unchanged.
11. van Ours and Ridder (1992) have a similar empirical finding that employers see more 
applicants prior to hire at positions requiring higher educational levels.
12. In general, the vacancy duration hazard rate function ht is the probability that a vacancy is 
filled at any given instant /. Time (duration) independence means that dX, Idt = 0 for all t, and 
occurs if the distribution of vacancy duration is exponential.
13. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for a good discussion of the estimation of discrete 
hazard models.
14. We follow Kalbfleisch and Prentice©s (1980) suggestion and use the Kaplan-Meier esti 
mates of the empirical hazard functions for the starting values of the y©s and C = 0. When C = 0, 
the method of Kalbfleisch and Prentice yields Kaplan-Meier estimates for the hazard function. 
Cox also proposes a discrete hazard model; if we adopt his approach, the parameter estimates for 
the C©s and the estimates of the hazard function are very similar to the estimates produced by the 
method of Kalbfleisch and Prentice.
15. Holzer (1993a, 1994) and Holzer and Montgomery (1993) analyze the 1980 and 1982 
EOPP data on firm vacancy rates, but do not examine the data on the duration of vacancy for the 
last worker hired by these firms. Holzer©s (1994) finding concerning the factors that affect vacancy 
rates complements our findings concerning factors affecting employer extensive search and thus 
the duration of a vacancy.
16. By other things equal, we mean the following. Let P, denote the number of positions of 
type / and let £, denote the number employed in type i positions, such that the number of vacan 
cies is Pj - EJ and the vacancy rate for type / positions is given by v(- = (/*,- - £,)/£,. Assume a con 
stant exit rate q from the employed ranks that is the same across all types of positions. Then for 
type i positions, qEt denotes new vacancies created each period. In the steady state, the number of 
vacancies for positions of type i that are filled equals qEj, the likelihood that a vacancy is filled is 
qEj/(Pj - EJ), and the expected duration of a vacancy for a type i position is given by £>, = !%£,-/ 
(Pi - £,-)) = Vj/q. Thus, the steady-state vacancy rate for positions of type i equals the common rate 
at which employed positions are vacated times the expected duration of a vacancy for positions of 
type i.

CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
What have we learned about training from the EOPP, SBA, and 
Upjohn Institute data sets? First, all the data sets agree that nearly all 
newly hired workers undergo on-the-job training. Moreover, in the first 
three months of employment, both the EOPP and SBA data suggest 
that newly hired workers, their co-workers, and their supervisors spend 
the equivalent of nearly four 40-hour weeks in training. Several other 
surveys, however, demonstrate much lower incidence rates of training, 
even if the sample is restricted to newly hired workers. But, when 
newly hired employees and their employers are asked a similar set of 
questions about training, both groups agree that training is nearly uni 
versal. This correspondence suggests that researchers must carefully 
design surveys to capture fully the types and quantities of training that 
workers receive.
The data also indicate that college-educated workers and workers 
employed in large establishments receive more training than other 
workers. College-educated workers have shown a proficiency for accu 
mulating human capital during schooling, and this proficiency appar 
ently extends to the workplace. Presumably, large establishments find 
training less costly than smaller establishments. Large firms can spread 
any fixed costs associated with training over their larger number of new 
hires, and they are more able to have co-workers provide the training 
without experiencing significant productivity losses.
The EOPP, SBA, and Upjohn Institute data sets also show that train 
ing generates productivity growth. In the absence of explicit measures 
of productivity, we relied on a subjective measure in which the 
employer rates the new employee against a fully trained employee. The 
productivity index demonstrates that training results in substantial pro 
ductivity growth: a 10 percent increase in training raises productivity 2 
percent during the first three months of employment.
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On-the-job training also increases wage growth. Whether looking at 
wage growth in the first three months or first two years of employment, 
the data indicate significant increases in wages associated with train 
ing. These findings confirm the predicted effects of on-the-job training 
on wage and productivity growth. The magnitude of the wage growth 
effect, however, suggests that current theories of on-the-job training 
are not satisfactory. A 10 percent increase in training results in only 
about a 0.2 percent growth in wages, or about one-tenth the magnitude 
of the impact of training on productivity growth. Such a differential 
could, with some difficulty, be justified if all training were firm-spe 
cific, but the impact of previous experience on wages makes it difficult 
to accept this proposition.
Further problems arise when trying to confirm the prediction that 
on-the-job training decreases the starting wage because workers bear at 
least some of the costs of training. We do find some evidence that train 
ing lowers the starting wage; a 10 percent increase in training in the 
first three months of employment lowers the starting wage between - 
0.5 and -0.2 percent. Workers appear to bear little of the training costs 
while firms bear most of the costs. Moreover, whether we infer the 
fraction of the training that is general training indirectly from the 
observed effect of previous experience on wages or directly from 
responses to survey questions, most of this training appears to be gen 
eral training. The notion of firms bearing the costs of general training is 
inconsistent with any equilibrium model of labor markets of which we 
are aware.
If firms do bear a large portion of training costs, hiring the wrong 
worker for a job requiring a significant amount of training is a very 
costly mistake. Firms should be willing, therefore, to expend resources 
to avoid these mistakes by improving their recruiting when hiring for 
such positions. As we demonstrated in chapter 7, firms recruit more 
intensively (they spend more time with each applicant) and more 
extensively (they see more applicants per position) when recruiting for 
positions with more training. To the extent that this increased effort 
results in higher-quality workers, the firm matches higher-quality 
workers to positions that require more training. As higher-quality 
workers command higher wages, this finding helps explain why posi 
tions with substantial training do not have significantly lower starting 
wages.
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Perhaps our most important findings come through the use of the 
Upjohn Institute survey that matched responses of employer and 
employees to a set of identical questions. We found significant differ 
ences in employer and employee reports across human capital mea 
sures, including both schooling and training measures. Training 
measures had correlation coefficients between employer and employee 
reports of only 0.2 to 0.4 for the individual measures and only about 
0.5 for the aggregate measure. For education, the correlations are 
somewhat higher, especially at the higher levels of educational attain 
ment, but there are substantial differences in employer and employee 
reports. Future research, therefore, must be concerned with the quality 
of the data used in attempting to measure the impact of human capital 
on wages.
For many years now, the wages of the least-educated Americans 
have declined while the wages of the most-educated Americans have 
increased. For instance, Katz and Murphy (1992) report that the earn 
ings of high school dropouts between 1979 and 1987 declined 6.6 per 
cent, while the earnings of college graduates increased 7.7 percent in 
the same period. 1 At least in part, these changes have created renewed 
interest in "investing in people" and mobilized policy makers to act on 
the perceived lack of investment in human capital. (So pervasive is this 
view that James Heckman (1993) refers to it as the "new consensus.") 
What insights do our findings provide concerning the forthcoming 
debates over how to increase the human capital of lower-income work 
ers?
First, for policy makers who wish to argue that the market under- 
provides training opportunities for workers, our results offer some evi 
dence for this view. Firms appear to finance a large amount of general 
training. While there may be other distortions that counterbalance the 
incentive to under-provide training, it seems unlikely, in our view, that 
such counterbalances would ever result in firms providing too much 
training. Thus, government may have an additional role to play in the 
human capital market.
Government already provides massive subsidies to education, and 
we may have too much schooling relative to job training in our human 
capital production. If policy makers wish to pursue policies that 
increase job training, our results also provide some insights into which 
policies may be effective. Most important, our results indicate that pol-
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icy makers should not overlook the importance of informal training in 
the acquisition of job skills. By far the majority of employee training 
for all sizes of establishments, and especially for smaller establish 
ments, is informal. Because workers and firms agree to provide this 
training voluntarily, we believe they do so because they find it efficient. 
Informal training is a less costly way of imparting human capital than 
formal training programs for the acquisitions of many types of skills. 
Because human capital should be produced as efficiently as possible, 
we should not encourage more expensive methods of imparting human 
capital through policies that emphasize formal training. Policies should 
not ignore the role of informal training.
For instance, suppose that you were concerned about the dismal 
level of training among academic economists. You mandate that uni 
versities and colleges spend 5 percent of the wage bill of their econom 
ics departments for training of economists. We predict you would soon 
find that there would be large training conferences in Honolulu in the 
middle of winter. Among the expensive flights, the expensive hotels, 
luaus, and mai tais, some useful training will occur, but this "training" 
is clearly less efficient than the economists going into their offices on a 
Saturday and, informally, learning some additional economics. (If this 
scenario sounds fanciful, examine how medical doctors meet their con 
tinuing education requirements, or where other professions have their 
trade meetings.)
Inducing substitution from inexpensive to expensive methods of 
producing human capital, either through tax credits, price subsidies, or 
mandates, is nobody©s prescription for fixing our human capital sys 
tem. Yet, this is precisely what programs that seek to encourage formal 
training programs would accomplish. While some of the programs may 
induce additional accumulation of human capital, there seems to be lit 
tle doubt that much of the increase in formal training programs would 
simply be replacement for existing informal training. Thus, any policy 
initiative to encourage expenditures on training will probably succeed: 
it will increase expenditures on training. What should concern policy 
makers is whether or not the training programs succeed in raising the 
wages of the target groups and whether that increase represents an 
acceptable rate of return on investment.
One reason often given for the policy makers© preference for formal 
training programs is that informal training is difficult to measure.
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While it is undoubtedly easier for firms to document expenditures on 
formal training than provision of informal training, it is not at all clear 
that the returns to the worker are higher for formal training than for 
informal training. Further, there is no guarantee that workers would 
even perceive such investments in formal training. When we asked 
identical questions to employers and employees within a month of the 
beginning of employment about formal training programs, we received 
significantly different responses about the quantity and incidence of 
training.
In our view, private sector training provides little insight into the 
design of a government training program to stimulate investment in 
human capital. For the most part, training experiences that we exam 
ined are the result of the interaction of profit-maximizing firms and 
utility-maximizing workers who jointly agree to an investment in train 
ing. Policy makers are interested presumably in stimulating investment 
in human capital beyond what the market is providing. To us, this sug 
gests that policy makers would learn more about the efficacy of their 
plans by examining past training programs governments have initiated. 
A voluminous literature exists on government training programs, many 
implemented in partnership with the private sector. Available estimates 
indicate that the investment necessary to reverse the decline in wages 
of high school dropouts and those with only a high school degree will 
be immense. Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994) estimate that if 
training investments will provide a 10 percent rate of return, it would 
have required over $212 billion (in 1989 dollars) to return 1989 high 
school graduates to 1979 wage levels, and it would have required 
another $214 billion to return 1989 male high school dropouts to 1979 
wage levels. While there are some notable successes in these programs, 
most of this literature indicates that the cost estimates of Heckman, 
Roselius, and Smith are quite conservative.
What advice, if any, can we provide to policy makers who wish to 
encourage the provision of on-the-job training in the private sector? 
First, given scarce resources, it seems obvious to us that any program 
should be targeted. While it may be true that well-paid lawyers, soft 
ware engineers, accountants, and economists for that matter, may also 
suffer from the under-provision of on-the-job training as well as disad- 
vantaged youth, it seems perverse to expend public resources to correct 
this distortion. As a society, we may wish to use resources to aid disad-
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vantaged youth, single mothers, poor families, and perhaps dislocated 
workers, but we probably do not want subsidies to the highly paid.
Second, government should avoid specifying how firms choose to 
train these targeted workers. Firms know best how to provide training 
to their workforce; government should not attempt to micro manage 
the employment relationship. How then should we guarantee that the 
targeted population receives training? Our answer is simple. If 
employed, workers receive training; if not employed, these individuals 
will not accumulate human capital. Evidence from the Upjohn Institute 
data is unambiguous: While workers and firms may disagree on the 
type of training and the quantity of the component parts of training, 
both firms and workers agree that there is much training in the initial 
period of employment. Thus, if you want to raise the earnings of the 
economically disadvantaged, you should pursue policies that insure 
they are employed. Policies to encourage the labor supply of the disad 
vantaged such as the earned income tax credit or policies to 
increase the demand for disadvantage workers such as explicit wage 
subsidies or tax credits for hiring the disadvantaged would seem the 
most obvious, direct route of insuring their employment.
Finally, we note that for policy purposes the measurement of train 
ing is largely irrelevant. While it is true that the human capital accumu 
lated through on-the-job training is difficult to measure, it is also 
largely irrelevant if we are concerned with increasing the earnings of 
the poor. While not measured with complete accuracy, wages are easier 
to measure than on-the-job training.
NOTE
1. Katz and Murphy (1992, table 1, p. 40). Percentages are approximated from the log of aver 
age real weekly wage.
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